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INTRODUCTION

Volitionalism pervades American thinking about law, politics,
religion, and morality. Overwhelmingly, Americans believe that individuals should suffer consequences only for actions that they individually and freely choose to undertake and could choose not to
undertake. It is unfair to hold an individual responsible for her actions or the actions of others if she could not control those actions.
For many Americans, volitionalism has almost attained the status of
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an orthodoxy. This volitionalist point of view is not inevitable;
many people at many times have believed that events in the world
over which the individual has no control might justly affect her fate.
God may afflict Job or Fate condemn Oedipus despite their best
mortal efforts. To many, such nonvolitionalist attitudes seem
vaguely un-American, vestiges of a darker world view that oppressively refused to recognize the right of the individual to direct her
own destiny.
But, ideological orthodoxy of any kind also seems vaguely unAmerican and regressive; Americans pride themselves on their commitment to the right of each to her own opinion. This aversion to
conformist pressure has always been especially manifest in religion,
hence the much-proclaimed American commitment to religious pluralism. Hostility to orthodoxy is especially acute when the state attempts to impose the orthodoxy, hence the oft-stated American
commitment to state neutrality on fundamental matters of belief.
For many, then, state treatment of nonvolitionalist religions poses a
conflict of principles: on the one hand, nonvolitionalism seems
unacceptably cruel or backward, a fit object of suppression; on the
other hand, discrimination against nonvolitionalism seems to violate
our commitment to neutrality toward all religions.
This Article discusses the implications of the conflict between
volitionalist and nonvolitionalist beliefs for the protection that
should be extended to religious liberty, especially under the free exercise clause of the Constitution.' Under one view of the Constitution, individual liberty presupposes volitionalism. Any belief system
that maintains that individuals justly suffer for events outside their
control hardly exhibits an adequate regard for individual freedom.
Under this view, the Constitution thus protects individual rights, including the rights of religious practice, precisely and only because it
incorporates a volitionalist frame of reference. Individuals should
have a sphere of autonomy in certain areas because their most fundamental moral, religious, or political action is making up their own
free and self-determining minds. In short, the enshrinement of religious liberty is nothing more than a recognition of the importance
of volitionalist activity.
In exercising her right of religious liberty, however, the individual' might reach conclusions at odds with volitionalism. Some of
these conclusions might seem ridiculous: A believer might conclude
that the color of the government's filing cabinets or the temperature
on a given day affect her chances of entering Heaven. Others might
seem more plausible: The adherent might believe that God decides
1 The clause provides: "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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who enters Heaven without regard to individual actions. Under a
volitionalist theory of liberty, these beliefs are palpably false. At this
point, however, the second principle, the opposition to all state-imposed religious orthodoxies, becomes relevant. An interpretation
of the Constitution emphasizing a broad commitment to religious
liberty for, and governmental neutrality toward, all religions requires the government to protect the nonvolitionalists' rights as vigorously as it protects the rights of volitionalists.
Thus, because of the pervasive and largely unexamined belief
that volitionalism and liberty are intrinsically tied, one would anticipate courts and legislatures displaying a bias in favor of volitionalist
religions. But at the same time, a commitment to religious liberty
and religious neutrality should require those bodies to examine that
unexamined assumption, to extend evenhanded treatment to both
volitionalist and nonvolitionalist religious beliefs.
The thesis of this Article is twofold. First, we will offer the recent history of free exercise clause jurisprudence as evidence that
American legal commentators too often assume that religious liberty makes sense only within a volitionalist framework. Confronted
in recent years with nonvolitionalist claims, the Court first held that
nonvolitionalist beliefs enjoy second-class status under the free exercise clause; 2 then last Term, it radically restricted the protection
3
available to all religious practice, volitionalist or nonvolitionalist.
We will argue that this retreat is due, in part, to the Court's
profound discomfort with nonvolitionalist beliefs. Second, we will
argue that the association of volitionalism and religious liberty is
unwarranted. The tradition, theories, and policies underlying
American religious liberty support protection for nonvolitionalist
beliefs as fully as for volitionalist ones. Courts and legislators
should protect each alike.
Part I of this Article will advance the first claim: Volitionalism
has almost attained the status of an unexamined orthodoxy. Section
One will offer definitions of volitionalism and nonvolitionalism; provide illustrations of these concepts in law, philosophy, and religion;
explore the pervasiveness of volitionalism in modern America; and
place the two concepts in a general intellectual context.
Sections Two through Four will analyze recent Supreme Court
cases against the backdrop of this widespread belief in volitionalism.
During the past several Terms, the Court has faced a new challenge
from nonvolitionalist claims under the free exercise clause. It has
2 See Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); infra text accompanying notes 206-48.
3 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990); infra text accompanying notes 257-76.
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responded by constricting and finally eliminating the protection accorded to religious practice from generally applicable laws. The
Court accomplished this doctrinal revolution through a redefinition
of the type of government action that qualifies as a "burden" on
religious exercise.
"Burden" is a magic word in free exercise clause jurisprudence.
A government action that burdens religious practice is constitutionally invalid unless the action is the least restrictive means by which
the government may serve a compelling state interest. 4 If the government action does not "burden" religious practice, the free exercise clause does not apply.5 The parameters of the class of
constitutionally cognizable burdens, therefore, largely define the
reach of the free exercise clause. 6 Until recently, free exercise doctrine seemed to offer a fairly straightforward, if very broad, definition of burden. If a government action pressured a believer, even
by a neutral secular law, to forgo a religious practice, the government burdened religious practice. 7 The protection extended religious practice was very generous. Conceivably, almost any
government act could pressure some believer into forgoing some
practice and thereby be subject to challenge. It was only a matter of
time before the Court restricted the reach of the clause.
The Court did not attempt to restrict the clause, however, until
it ruled on its first nonvolitionalist claims; it then began a retreat
that has since become a rout. In the best publicized of these claims,
Indian believers sought to prevent federal government development
of Indian sacred sites located on federal land. The Indians had no
hand in the development: they did not own the land; they did not
drive the tractors. Despite their inability to prevent the development of the land, however, they still believed that it would have tremendous negative consequences for them. In response, the Court
effectively held that the Constitution did not recognize those negative consequences because the document itself adopted a volitionalist perspective. More specifically, the Court held that what it called
4 See, e.g., Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
5 See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. For a discussion of the "gatekeeper" function of
the concept of burden, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 933-36 (1989).
6 The definition of "burden" does not perform this function alone; other lines of
doctrine, such as the constitutional definition of religion, also contribute to defining the
reach of the clause. Still, since the Court has not directly assayed a constitutional definition of religion, the definition of "burden" has been to this point the most important
element in determining the reach of the clause. On the definition of religion, see infra
notes 499-529 and accompanying text.
7 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963); infra text accompanying
notes 108-21.
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"internal" governmental practices posed no constitutionally cognizable burden on a religious practice. 8 In so holding, the Court effectively defined internal practices as those that are internal only
from the point of view of a volitionalist. Implicitly, the Court decided that the commitment to volitionalism must take precedence
over the commitment to neutrality between religions.
Last Term, the Court seems to have held that the Constitution
does not protect any religious practice, volitionalist or nonvolitionalist, from generally applicable laws. 9 This decision involved a volitionalist claim: a member of the Native American Church
complained that anti-drug laws frustrated his sacramental consumption of peyote. The Court held that facially neutral laws never constitutionally burden the practice of religion, regardless of whether
the government practice is "internal" or "external." Thus, the
Court superficially eliminated the discriminatory aspect from its jurisprudence. Significantly, the Court was prepared to be generous
in its protection as long as the claimants under the old regime were
volitionalists. When the Court confronted the possibility that its
prior jurisprudence would require protecting nonvolitionalist
claims, however, it began to restrict the protection extended by the
clause. At both stages of this retreat-when it first restricted protection to volitionalist claimants and then when it reduced the protection available even to them-the Court relied centrally on a
"parade-of-horribles" argument brought to their attention by the
prospect of nonvolitionalist religions claiming protection under the
Constitution. 10

Perhaps more significantly, the Court has now made clear that
protection for religious practice from neutral laws is largely a matter
of legislative grace. Legislatures may, but need not, give hardship
exemptions to believers. In light of the volitionalist orthodoxy, it
seems likely that legislatures will be inclined to grant exemptions for
volitionalists but not for nonvolitionalists. Indeed, those legislatures may not even understand the nature of the damage done to
nonvolitionalist religions. Part II, therefore, argues that nonvolitionalist religions deserve as much protection as volitionalist ones,
under either the Constitution or a statutory scheme. In making this
argument we rely on the conventional materials of constitutional
analysis-the history, policies, and principles underlying the free exercise clause. Nevertheless, these policies and principles should
guide legislatures no less than the Court. If a legislature decides to
8 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448-49; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986).
9 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1599-1600 (1990).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 246, 283-84.
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extend special protection, a concern for neutrality and liberty
should require it to grant that protection to volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist beliefs alike. If a legislature fails to extend such
evenhanded treatment, however, the Court should step in to correct
such discrimination. Under the Court's-new regime, the Constitution may no longer require special protection for religious practice.
Nonetheless, if a legislature decides to offer protection to some, it
should offer it to all. Nonvolitionalism is not a poor cousin within
the constitutional family of American religions.
To support this claim, Sections Five and Six will refer to standard materials of constitutional interpretation. Section Five offers
an analysis of the history of the first amendment and the intent of its
framers. Although Madison and Jefferson offered a typically volitionalist defense of religious liberty, they, as well as their Calvinist
supporters, intended to extend protection to predestinarian
Calvinists, a distinctly nonvolitionalist group. Section Six argues
that the precedent and policies identified by the Court as underlying
the free exercise clause-government neutrality toward religion and
voluntarism-require extending protection to nonvolitionalist
claims.
Section Seven will consider the practical problems that a legislature might face under a requirement that it treat volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist claims alike. Such a requirement would limit the
legislature's options. It cannot extend special protection to some if
it is not willing to extend the protection to all. Moreover, as a general rule, protecting nonvolitionalist religions may require greater
disruption of governmental activity because any action-landing a
man on the moon, the color of the government's file cabinets, initiating a war in Central America-might have an impact on a nonvolitionalist believer's religious practice. But, extant doctrine does
recognize the government's interest in such extreme cases. The
government may treat various religions differently if it has a compelling interest in doing so. This doctrinal option requires the government to categorize a religious practice on the basis of the disruption
that would be visited upon its own activities, but not on the basis of
its underlying belief system. The latter means of categorization
would pose a theological orthodoxy under the free exercise clause;
the former would merely recognize the government's own legitimate interests as they conflict with the rights of the believer. Protecting some nonvolitionalist claims may create overwhelming
disruption to the government. Thus, the state may have a compelling interest to exclude them from protection while including other
volitionalist practices. On the other hand, protecting other nonvoli-
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tionalist claims may pose a relatively minor inconvenience, no more
than protecting many volitionalist practices.
Given the enormous variety of religions and the subtle ways
that casual assumptions about them color the thinking of policymakers, achieving even a rough neutrality is a daunting task for government. This task is one that many decisionmakers may not even
want to undertake. The phenomenon here described, bias in legal
circles against nonvolitionalist religions, is part of a much larger
problem. Americans tend, despite their own best impulses, to believe that a limited religious pluralism is adequate if it includes the
bulk of the population. The inclination to exclude nonvolitionalist
religions from the protection accorded others is thus continuous
with the inclination, for example, to require Catholic children to listen to Protestant teachers read the King James Bible in public
schools-and to see no real issue of religious liberty involved in
those events. But the volitionalist bias may be even more endemic
than other prejudices against religious minorities, because it is simultaneously more unobtrusive and more fundamental. That individuals should control their own destinies seems to many utterly
self-evident-the very warp of American legal and popular culture.
But that assumption is not and never has been self-evident to all of
humanity. To shear off all nonvolitionalist thinking from the fabric
of American life would be drastically to restrict the thoughts that
Americans can think. To illuminate this danger, we begin by placing
the distinction between volitionalism and nonvolitionalism in intellectual context.
PART I:
THE ADOPTION OF A VOLITIONALIST THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENT
SECTION ONE.
VOLITIONALISM EXAMINED

Volitionalism is a word that calls to mind a focus on will, and
therefore on choice. But choice can take many forms and carry various types of significance. If volitionalism is to have any explanatory
power, it must be defined more precisely and placed in the intellectual context out of which it grows and to which it contributes. This
section will describe in detail the nature of volitionalist and nonvolitionalist beliefs and the difference between them. It will also
examine the legal and philosophical foundations of the volitionalist/nonvolitionalist distinction.

VOLITIONALISM
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A.

The Distinction

The distinction between volitionalist and nonvolitionalist beliefs lies in the role of individual free choice in the causal sequence
that leads to the religious, moral, or legal consequence. Volitionalists believe that religious consequences flow only from the freely
chosen behavior of human beings and that the religious consequences fall exclusively on the particular individual who chooses.
Nonvolitionalists acknowledge the possibility that some religious
consequences for individuals may be caused by activities or events
over which they had no free choice or control.
According to the common volitionalist view, morality and religion, like law, are defined by a set of rules or guidelines for behavior
and belief. 1 People are liable to suffer legal, moral, or religious
consequences only for their own free choices to fulfill or not to fulfill obligations that are laid down by some legal, moral, or religious
authority. In other words, the central moral or religious activity, the
activity that generates moral or religious consequences for the person, is his own free choice to behave or believe in ways specified by
12
moral or religious rules.
Note that the central volitional activity therefore has two elements: It must be a choice, and the choice must be in some important sense free. Although the two elements are analytically distinct,
the distinction may not be readily apparent because choice is a word
whose colloquial meaning has come to include an inherent notion of
freedom. An "unfree choice" may seem to modem eyes to be an
oxymoron. Many people may believe that only free acts are chosen
and only chosen acts are free.
This conjunction of choice and freedom is, however, an illustration of how volitionalism pervades our culture. In a volitionalist
view, unfree choices and nonchoices are functionally identical be11 There is great controversy over the definition of religion, and many religious
thinkers have believed that this simple moralistic picture of religion is inadequate. See
FRANCIS OAKLEY, THE WESTERN CHURCH IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 94-100 (1979) (discussing the "interior" piety of the medieval mystics); ELAINE PAGELS, THE GNOSTIC GosPELS 143-49 (1979) (discussing the Gnostic emphasis on knowledge rather than
morality). We do not assert that this is an accurate or adequate conception of religion,
for either theological or legal purposes. We merely point out that it is a very common
conception of religion and one with strong ties to the volitionalist focus on individual
choice which we are exploring. See infra text accompanying notes 305-11 (for discussion
of historical connection between volitionalism and this picture of religion).
12
In order to avoid caricaturing volitionalism, it is important to note that a volitionalist position does not require an unsophisticated acceptance of the appearance of
undetermined human choice. Volitionalists may believe that much of human activity is
determined by forces beyond the individual's control and that it is difficult for others to
judge when an individual is freely choosing and when he is determined. But the volitionalist must believe that free choice is possible at least some of the time if moral responsibility is to exist at all.
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cause neither can give rise to moral or religious consequences. The
volitionalist, therefore, elides unfree choices into nonchoices. However, there is nothing inevitable about this identification of the two
concepts. We will distinguish them in order to leave room for the
nonvolitionalist possibility that unfree choices can cause religious
consequences.
We offer the following definitions to allow us to talk intelligibly
about both volitionalist and nonvolitionalist concepts of choice. At
its most minimal, the term "choice" might imply only that the action
is the product of the actor's own will-free or not free, coerced or
not, with a broad or narrow range of options open to it. Unchosen
acts, which are the product of physical force imposed on the actor's
body, cannot give rise to volitionalist liability. Volitionalist liability
depends on a notion of causality. If the individual is not the cause
of the act, she cannot be liable for its religious or moral consequences. Choice is, therefore, essential to volitionalist liability.
The term "free," however, specifies a subset of choices that are
both uncoerced and undetermined. If a choice is free, the actor
could have chosen otherwise; she had a power to the contrary.' 3
Both coercion and determinism may undermine that power. 14 Liability for a volitionalist depends upon responsibility under a set of
rules. If the agent had no power to the contrary, then there is no
sense in which she could have been guided by the rules. Thus, for a
volitionalist, religious consequences can flow only from an individual's own free choices.
Nonvolitionalists, on the other hand, hold that a person may
suffer religious consequences because of some act or event over
which she had no free choice or control. The relevant act may
either be someone else's action, even the government's action, or the
act may have been committed by the individual but not freely chosen by her. If either choice or freedom is not a precondition for
religious liability, then the position is nonvolitionalist.
13
Not that she could have done otherwise, only that she could have chosen otherwise.
It may be that, had she attempted a different act, she would have found herself physically
incapable of carrying it out. Nonetheless, if she could have chosen to attempt it and did
not, then her choice was free.
14 Determinism may achieve this through the straightforward method of denying
that persons ever can choose otherwise than as they do. Coercion is more complicated.
Take the classic example of someone holding a gun to the head of the actor and demanding money. The actor can choose not to hand over the money: she can refuse and
be shot. She retains a technical power to choose, unlike in the case of complete causal
determinism. Coercion is, therefore, not a complete excuse in a volitionalist system because free choice still exists. Cf infra text accompanying notes 167-76 (discussing coercion as an excuse in the context of the free exercise clause). Nonetheless, extreme
coercion of this kind may reduce an actor's options to the point where the analogy to
determinism is quite strong. It is this analogy that makes coercion a threat to free choice
from the volitionalist perspective.
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To understand how a religious impact on an individual can be
caused by events over which she has no free choice, it is helpful to
see the nonvolitionalist view as positing an interrelated religious
universe. People, like other creatures and objects, are a part of an
integrated whole. A change in some other part of that universe may
cause religious effects on an individual through a kind of ripple effect, even if she had no choice or control over that change. Thus,
the individual's susceptibility to religious effects beyond her control
is central to the nonvolitionalist religious experience.' 5
The distinction between volitionalism and nonvolitionalism,
then, concerns most immediately the role of individual free choice
in generating moral or religious consequences. The differing views
of human agency presented by volitionalism and nonvolitionalism
have implications, however, for diverse issues far beyond this central one. The next section will explore some of the manifestations
and implications of volitionalism in law, philosophy, and religion.
B.

Volitionalism

If volitionalism were merely a theoretical construct, a model
designed to fit the facts of certain Supreme Court cases and nothing
more, then it might be valuable as description, but it would lack explanatory power. Explanation requires insight into the cultural assumptions to which courts respond. Volitionalism is very much a
part of those cultural assumptions. It is the basis of most of our
everyday moral judgments about ourselves and others, and it is also
deeply embedded in the legal, religious, and philosophical traditions on which modem American culture is constructed. The very
pervasiveness of volitionalist assumptions makes them easy to overlook and, perhaps, easy to impose unthinkingly on those who do not
share them.
1.

Volitionalism in the Law

Volitionalism is part of the foundation of the Anglo-American
concept of legal responsibility. In widely disparate areas of the legal
system, we find a strikingly similar reliance on individual free choice
as the basis for imposing legal liability. Other considerations, including issues of practical application and fairness across cases, have
influenced the particular formulations of legal rules regarding when
liability is appropriate. The exclusive focus on volitionalism in the
following analysis is, therefore, not intended to demonstrate that
volitionalism is the only, or even the single most important factor
guiding the ascription of legal liability. Volitionalism is, however,
15

See infra text accompanying notes 322-36.
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one significant, perhaps indispensable, assumption of our legal
system.
The most general legal implication of the volitionalist view is
the individuation of legal liability. Although it is possible for a legal
system to place responsibility for an individual's actions on the family, work group, or neighborhood of which he is a member, 16 the
Anglo-American legal system generally does not hold persons liable
for the acts of others. 17 Since choice is the foundation for liability,
and is understood as an individual volitional act, our legal system is
dominated by an individualized notion of liability. The deep unfairness that we perceive in punishing one person for the acts of another derives, at least in part, from this volitionalist reliance on
8
individual choice.'
It is possible to conceive of choice as an act taking place on
some level other than that of the individual human being. For instance, choice may be a social act, as when a group must reach a
decision together. Or, choice may also be the act of only one of the
personalities within a single human being, as in the common experience of a battle of "competing identities."' 1 If American cultures
fully recognized either of these alternatives, then an emphasis on
choice would not necessarily lead to the individualistic version of
responsibility which currently dominates the law. The inclusion of
an explicitly individualistic notion of choice within volitionalism best
20
explains present concepts of legal responsibility.
16 See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 104-05 (1861) (in ancient law, a family was responsible for actions of its members; an individual's moral status depended on the
group of which he was a member); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 553, 556 (1933) ("The older view held the family, tribe, or nation responsible for
the acts of any one individual...."); see also HENRY BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 297
(1963) (discussing "the strong Russian cultural tradition of collective responsibility for
individual misconduct"); SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU
CHINA 47 (1962) ("The edict of 1708 ... stressed the principle of group responsibility
for misdeeds of members, an idea with deep roots in China."). But cf. SALLY FALK
MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS 111-26 (1978) (arguing that although collective obligations
appear to correspond to collective responsibility from the outside, from the perspective
of an insider, members are held individually responsible).
17 See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 91, 103 (1985); Francis Bowes Sayre,
CriminalResponsibility for the Act of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930) (traditional
basis of criminal liability is intensely personal). For a general discussion of the contrary
claim that "we are all responsible for everything," see HERBERT MORRIS, GUILT AND INNOCENCE 111 (1976) (essay on "Shared Guilt").
18 Cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that one who does not
himself intentionally kill or attempt to kill cannot constitutionally be subject to the death
penalty).
19
See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE 62-63 (1982)
(describing intersubjective and intrasubjective conceptions of the self).
20 See Cohen, supra note 16, at 558-59 ("Back of this faith of legal individualism is
the modem metaphysical assumption that the atomic or individual mind is the supreme
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The exceptions to this general rule of individualized liability
serve only to highlight the volitionalist assumptions that underlie
this approach. First, we hold an actor liable for the acts of another
when the other is a legal agent acting within the scope of her
agency. 2 1 The principal has a general right to control the acts of the
22
agent when the agent is acting within the scope of her agency.
The principal's ability to choose whether or not to exercise this right
is an important part of the foundation for her liability. 23 Even if the
choice is actually nothing more than a legal fiction, the importance
of the choice in justifying the imposition of liability reveals the underlying volitionalist assumptions.
Second, we also hold persons legally liable for the acts of others
who are seen as extensions of the person rather than as individuals
in their own right. For example, parents are liable in many cases for
the behavior of their minor children. 24 Similarly, husbands were
once liable for the behavior of their wives because the law understood the wife to be an extension of the husband rather than a fully
separate person. 25 Parental legal liability reflects the legal reality of
parental control and the implication of parental culpability for a failure to choose to exercise properly that control. 26
reality and the theologic view that sin is an act of individual free-will, without which
there can be no responsibility.").
It is worth noting, however, that even a version of volitionalism that lacked this
individualism-one that recognized choice on other levels as wel-would still fail to
account for nonvolitionalist claims such as those in the sacred land cases. In a volitionalist scheme, group choice could lead to religious consequences only for the group that
chose (and perhaps its individual members, on an agency theory). But in a sacred land
case, it is the government, and not the Indian tribe, that makes the choice that causes the
religious harms. Thus, in a volitionalist scheme, neither the individual Indians nor the
tribe as a whole should suffer any religious consequences since they were not resppnsible for the choice that caused those consequences.
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958).
22 Id. § 14.
23 The implicit choice to control, or not to control, is one of the two explanations
offered in the commentary in the Restatement for the principal's liability for the unauthorized tortious actions of his agent: "[L]iability is normally based upon the fact that the
tort is brought about in the course of an undertaking for the benefit, and subject to the
right, of the principal to control his servant or other agent." Md. The other explanation-that the principal benefits from the agent's action-is not volitionalist. Volitionalism is not the only principle that influenced the structure of agency law, but it is one of
the important ones.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
25 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. XV, § III. In Blackstone's immortal words: "mhe husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and
cover, she performs every thing .... " Id. at *430 (emphasis in original).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316(a) & comments a & b (1965). The
right to control alone, without the ability to exercise meaningful choice about it, would
be insufficient. For example, if a parent has the legal right to control a child, but is
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Volitionalism also pervades the areas of contract and criminal
law. Indeed, legal doctrine in these areas illustrates an important
distinction between two forms of volitionalism. First, as in contract
theory, free choice may be the foundation for the relevant behavioral rules themselves. A contract represents a choice to bind oneself to a set of norms; without that choice the rules in the contract
generally lack any independent force. But even if one rejects this
first type of volitionalism, and asserts that some norms may be morally or legally binding regardless of whether they are chosen by
those to whom they apply, a milder form of volitionalism remains.
In this second form, the relevant rules may have their source in
something other than the individual's choice, but she is morally liable to punishment for violating them only if the particular violation
was a result of her own free choice. For example, a criminal law may
be binding regardless of the choice of the individual to recognize it,
but one who violates it through coercion, insanity, or fraud-i.e.,
without free choice-will not be legally culpable for that violation.
The courts' version of volitionalism in the free exercise cases we
27
shall discuss is of this second, milder variety.
Contract law might well serve as the paradigm for a thoroughly
volitionalist system of liability. 28 According to classical contract theory, it is only because of the free choice of the individual parties that
they are bound at all. Thus, the sine qua non of an enforceable contract is that such a choice must have been made. 2 9 Choice, in other
physically incapable of supervising the child, we would not hold him legally responsible
for the child's behavior during that time. See Seibert v. Morris, 252 Wis. 460, 463, 32
N.W.2d 239, 240 (1948).
It has been suggested that the traditional view of criminal accomplice liability is

based on a similar "forfeit[ure] of personal identity," a forfeiture that operates even in
the absence of any meaningful control over the behavior of the primary actor. See
Dressier, supra note 17, at 111. "[W]hen an accomplice chooses to become a part of the
criminal activity of another, she says in essence,'your acts are my acts,' and forfeits her
personal identity." Id Here, too, choice is essential: not the choice to control the actions of the other, but the choice to join oneself in some way to the criminal activity.
The legal emphasis on intent reflects the importance of this choice as the foundation for
responsibility. Cf id at 109.

27 In these cases, the courts do not demand that the religious beliefs themselves
must be acquired through an act of free choice, but only that the activities that cause the
religious effect must be ones freely chosen by the individuals who suffer those effects.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (ignoring entirely the genesis of Mrs.
Sherbert's beliefs and focusing instead on the coercion of her present choice to abstain
from work on her Sabbath); see also infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
28 It should, therefore, be unsurprising that the contract metaphor has provided
the foundation for much volitionalist political theory. See, e.g.,JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54-55 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952). Indeed, the connection between social contract theory and classical contract law is historical as well as conceptual. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 39-41
(1979).
29 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 16 (1981); Randy E. Barnett,A Consent
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words, is the foundation for the legitimacy of the specific norms that
will be contractually enforced.3 0
Many of the defenses to a contract claim reflect this volitionalist
assumption: a contract is void or voidable if the necessary free
choice was not exercised in the case at hand. Fraud and duress are
conditions that interfere with the ability of a person otherwise capable of choice to make a free choice in particular situations; infancy
and incapacity disable a person from choosing more generally; and
even mistake and impracticability provide a defense when circumstances, which could not have been or were not foreseen, vitiate the
3
possibility of a meaningftl choice. '
Criminal law provides an example of the milder form of volitionalism. Criminal obligations, like many religious ones, are imposed externally and their legitimacy is not dependent on the
individual's choice to accept them. 32 However, the legitimacy of imposing punishment for their violation is premised upon the belief
that those punished chose to commit criminal acts. Criminal liability rests on the assumption that individuals are autonomous, selfcontrolled persons whose actions are caused, at least in significant
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272 (1986); A.S. Burrows, Contract, Tort, and
Restitution-A Satisfactory Division or Not? 99 LAw Q. REv. 217, 258 (1983); Cohen, supra

note 16, at 557 ("The significance for the law of contract of this notion of individual
responsibility for voluntary acts is too obvious to need development."). There are those
who would challenge this traditional view and propose other bases for the legitimacy of
contracts. See, e.g., id. at 571-78 (criticizing the promise and will theories of contract); ia
at 591 (arguing that "the roots of the law of contract are many rather than one"). We do
not endorse the classical theory as the best model to guide the future of contract law,
but we do believe that it is an indispensable part of any sufficient explanation of its past.
See P. AnrYxAH, supra note 28, at 1-7 (arguing that benefit-based and reliance-based models are gaining ground and should be openly recognized, but pointing out that the
promise-based model is part of our legal and cultural heritage and depends on a belief
in individual responsibility and free choice).
30 Various contract theories disagree about the extent of volition required to generate contractual obligation. The volitional act of "choice" is, perhaps, stronger than
"consent," which may itself be stronger than an act that is merely not involuntary. See
Barnett, supra note 29, at 319 (contrasting his own "consent" theory with a "will" or
choice theory); see also ARisToTLE, NiCHOMACHEAN ETics bk. III, ch. ii (Richard P. McKeon ed. 1947) (contrasting choice, which is deliberative and purposive, with the merely
voluntary, which is within one's own power and not done through ignorance or coercion). Our use of the word "choice" is not intended to suggest a position on this issue.
We will use "choice," "will," and "volition" interchangeably because the degree of volitional activity (or of cognitive activity accompanying it) is not significant to our argument. Our point is that all of these theories are volitionalist in the sense that they all see
an exercise of free individual volition as the essential precondition of liability.
31 See P. ATIYAH, supra note 28, at 407; Barnett, supra note 29, at 318.
32 Arguably, the legitimacy of criminal laws also derives ultimately from choice, in
the form of the consent of the governed through their elected representatives. But even
if we reject this argument and adopt some other basis for criminal law (e.g., moral law),
the criminal law still exhibits the milder form ofvolitionalism: responsibility for a particular action, violating or fulfilling a law, is based on choice.
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part, by their own free choices.8 3 According to the volitionalist
view, punishment and blame are inappropriate where this assump34
tion is proven false.
Many commentators have understood the insanity defense, for
example, as positing that this assumption of the existence of free
choice is inaccurate in cases of mental illness; therefore, the normal
legal and moral liability for the act should not attach to the defendant.3 5 Insanity is a defense, and not merely a consideration in sentencing, because, from a volitionalist perspective, the inability to
choose destroys the very foundation of personal liability rather than
simply reducing the degree of blameworthiness.
Nor is volitionalism confined to the common and statutory law;
certain parts of the Constitution also reflect a volitionalist view of
liability.3 6 For example, under the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, laws must give adequate notice of
which acts are criminally punishable. Vagueness undermines this
notice and may therefore amount to a denial of due process.3 7
From a volitionalist view, notice is essential because culpability depends on the choice to violate one's obligations. Without adequate
notice of these obligations, this choice can never be exercised and
38
culpability cannot attach.
3
SeeJEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 165-66 (1947) ("[O]ur
criminal law rests precisely upon the same foundation as does our traditional ethics:
human beings are 'responsible' for their volitional conduct."); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 39-40, 181-83 (1968) ("there must be a 'voluntary' action if
legal punishment or moral censure is to be morally permissible"); MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 88-91 (1987) (discussing the use of determinist and
intentionalist dicourse in criminal law); Thomas E. Davitt, CriminalResponsibility and Punishment, in RESPONSIBILrrY 143 (Carl J. Friedrich ed. 1960) ("Prerequired for criminal
guilt is responsibility for one's actions. Such answerability derives from knowing, free
decision.").
34 There are deviations from the volitionalist view, for example, in strict liability
offenses. Nonetheless, volitionalism appears to be the starting point and the burden of
justification rests on those who would deviate from it. See Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952).
35 See, e.g., HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 306-10 (1979); DONALD
H.J. HERMANN, THE INSANrrY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL & LEGAL PERSPECTIvEs 74-75 (1983); PETER W. Low, JOHN CALVINJEFFRIES & RCHARDJ. BONNIE, CRIMI-

692-93 (1982); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
132-34 (1968); Jerome Hall, Psychiatry and CriminalResponsibility, 65 YALE LJ. 761, 765
(1956); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 273, 273-75
(1968). But cf. MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
(1984) (focusing on the loss of the ability to engage in practical reasoning as the justification for the insanity defense).
36
See infra text accompanying notes 179-88.
37
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
38
See LON FULLER, THE MoRALrry OF THE LAw 39 (1964) ("Certainly there can be
no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal
rule that ... is kept secret from him, or... was unintelligible .... "); John C. Jeffries,
NAL LAw
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There is, in short, widespread legal acceptance of a volitionalist
notion of liability. In fact, the concept may be late in coming to the
interpretation of the free exercise clause only because it is so deeply
embedded in our legal culture that it has remained almost unchallenged until recently. This cultural hegemony extends, however, far
beyond law. Volitionalism's roots run deep in the religious and
philosophical traditions that have shaped our legal culture.
2.

Volitionalism in Religion and Philosophy

Judaeo-Christian religion contains a powerful strand of volitionalism. Although the three major religions we will discuss also
include some important nonvolitionalist elements, volitionalism has
come to dominate American religious understanding.
In the Jewish tradition, the volitionalist view is evident in the
intricate system of rules and exceptions that constitutes religious
law and its centrality to the religion. 9 Jewish theology strongly asserts both that the human will is free, that is, undetermined, 40 and
that reward and punishment depend upon an individual's efforts to
understand and fulfill his responsibilities under God's law. 4 ' The
strong ethical focus of twentieth century American Judaism builds
on a volitionalist tradition in which individual choice and liability
under the law are central.
There are also important nonvolitionalist elements ofJudaism.
Many of these, for example, the communal and seasonal aspects of
religious practice, are based as much on folk culture as on self-conscious theology. However, others may actually serve theological
functions through a nonvolitionalist means. For example, the conLegality, Vagueness, and the Constructionof Penal Statutes, 71 VAND. L. REv. 189, 211 (1985);
Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L. REv. 77, 78 & n.8
(1948).
As should be plain from the discussion of nonvolitionalism later in this section, see
infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text, notice may be completely irrelevant from a
nonvolitionalist perspective. For example, it would be religiously insignificant to the
Navajo whether they were previously notified of the flooding of Rainbow Bridge Canyon. Such notice would have practical significance for their ability to prevent the flooding, but it would have no religious significance. They would suffer exactly the same
religious consequences from the flooding whether or not they had prior notice. Similarly, it would be irrelevant whether or not they knew beforehand that the location was a
sacred site that should not be flooded. Even if they were unaware of the significance of
the site, the religious consequences of flooding the canyon and drowning the gods
would be the same.
39 See MORRIS JOSEPH, JUDAISM AS CREED AND LIFE 179-81 (1903); see generallyJACOB
Louis KADUSHIN, JEWISH CODE OF JURISPRUDENCE (1915); THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH
LAw (Menachem Elon ed. 1975).
40 See L. JACOBS, PRINCIPLES OF THE JEWISH FArrH 323; M. JOSEPH, supra note 39, at
100-02; A MAIMONIDES READER 77-78 (Isadore Twersky ed. 1972).
41 LEo BAECK, GOD AND MAN INJUDAIsM 46-47; L. JACOBS, supra note 40, at 355; M.
JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 121-22; A. MAIMONIDES READER, supra note 40, at 81-83.
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cept of the Jews as a chosen people appears to be largely nonvolitionalist. 4 2 Certainly, individual Jews born now, thousands of years
after the original covenant, receive this special status not because of
any choices of their own, but because God willed it to be so. 43 Even
Abraham, the original party to the covenant, seems to have been
chosen by God rather than choosing God. 44 The modern controversy over how to interpret the story of the covenant-chosen for
what? chosen over whom?-is an eloquent testimony to the difficulty of incorporating a nonvolitionalist element into a largely voli45
tionalist religious view.
In the Catholic tradition, strong volitionalist inclinations are apparent in the theological emphasis on free will 46 and individual salvation. 47 Although God's grace is necessary to salvation, grace 48 is
also assured to all on condition of obedience. 4 9 Man's role is thus to
obey, to rigorously fulfill his obligations concerning his own behavior and belief.5 0 The religious destiny of each individual rests on his
own free choices: if he fills his life with good works,5 1 avoids the
pitfalls of sin,5 2 and holds to his faith, he will enter Heaven.
Once again, Catholicism also includes a variety of cultural and
theological nonvolitionalist elements. One of the most interesting
is the role of the institutional Church in individual salvation.5 3 The
Catholic Church has held itself as the unique way and path to salvation. The Pope, in direct succession from Saint Peter, holds the keys
to Heaven.5 4 As a result, those virtuous persons who lived in a place
See SACVAN BERCOVrrCH, THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD 31-32 (1978).
See M. JOSEPH, supra note 39, at 113-15 (acknowledging that although there is
some volitional aspect on the part of the chosen, the initial choice is God's).
44 Id. at 113.
45 Compare id at 115-19 (chosen to serve, suffer, and spread the truth) with Moses
Maimonides, Epistel to Yemen, in A MAIMONIDES READER, supra note 40, at 439-40 (chosen
to receive the Law and to be protected from destruction by the Lord).
46
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA question 6 (1952); WILLIAM N.
CLARKE, AN OUTLINE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 198 (1898); KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS
OF CHRISTIAN FArrH 39, 44 (1978).
47 See T. AQUINAS, supra note 46, question 87; W. CLARX, supra note 46, at 331;
RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 144 (1981).
48 See T. AQUINAS, supra note 46, question 109.
49 See it question 23; R. McBRIEN, supra note 47, at 309.
50 See K. RAHNER, supra note 46, at 407.
42

43

51
52

See T. AQUINAS, supra note 46, question 5; R. McBRIEN, supra note 47, at 968.
See T. AQuINAs, supra note 46, questions 19-21; W. CLARKE,supra note 46, at 247-

53.
53 See Donald Hendricks, What is a Catholic? in RELIGIONS OF AMERICA 40-41 (L.
Rosten ed. 1975).
54 See Pope Innocent III, Letter to the Emperor Alexius of Constantinople(1201), in THE
CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300, 133 (Brian Tierney ed. 1964) ("[A]nyone who
fails to acknowledge Peter and his successors as pastors and teachers is outside [the
Lord's] flock."). This may no longer be the position of the Catholic Church. See R.
MCBRIEN, supra note 47, at 724.
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and time in which they had no access to the teachings and practices
of the Church would be incapable of entering Heaven. 55 This doctrine is nonvolitionalist in that such persons suffer religious consequences because of an accident of birth over which they had no free
choice or control. The predominant volitionalist focus of the Catholic tradition is demonstrated by the fact that generations of believers found this doctrine problematic, and expended great energy to
make it more consistent with volitionalism by providing an intermediate status and alternative path to Heaven for such persons.
The rise of free-will Protestantism in America marked the pinnade of Protestant volitionalism. The essence of free-will Protestantism, which swept the country through revivals during the early
nineteenth century, was the importance of choice to the Christian
life: the choice to accept Jesus Christ and be saved and the choice
thereafter to live in accordance with the moral law set out in the
Bible.5 6 Human beings were fully responsible for their own religious fates.
This volitionalist focus characterized the new strains of Methodism, Baptism, and Unitarianism and distinguished them from
older sects such as the Congregationalists and Presbyterians. These
older groups maintained, at least formally, that God provided both
grace and the ability to fulfill the divine law without regard to the
choices of individuals. 5 7 Today, however, even the members of
technically nonvolitionalist sects often hold basically volitionalist
views. Indeed, in actual practice, modern American Protestantism
may be the most thoroughly volitionalist of the major American
58
religions.
Thus, the major religious traditions that have shaped American
culture share a predominantly volitionalist focus. All three have
struggled, to one extent or another, to adapt their occasional
nonvolitionalist doctrines to this basically volitionalist view. And all
have fit reasonably well into the volitionalist secular culture of twentieth century America.
Similarly, the Western philosophical tradition reflects the concerns of a volitionalist world view. Ethical philosophy has long been
preoccupied with the relationship between individual free choice
and the imposition of moral praise and blame, punishment and re-

55
56

See, e.g., DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO canto 4, 11.30-63.
See infra notes 422-26 and accompanying text.

57 See infra notes 384-94 and accompanying text.
58 We discuss the nonvolitionalist elements of Protestantism extant at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution in great detail in Section Five. See infra notes 322-70 and
accompanying text.

788

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:769

ward. 5 9 Although the debate continues to rage, the perceived inconsistency between determinism and the imposition of moral
consequences clearly arises from the volitionalist assumption that
liability for consequences can rest only on free choice, and free
choice can exist only in the absence of complete causal determinism.
Volitionalism is a prescriptive claim about the basis for liability
to religious consequences. It, nonetheless, holds implications for
the descriptive psychological or metaphysical issue of determinism
and free will. Human beings must possess free will, in the sense of a
power to the contrary, or no one could ever be liable under a volitionalist theory. 6 0 To the extent that determinism denies the existence of free will it is inconsistent with volitionalism.
The volitionalist position in moral philosophy existed at least as
early as Plato's middle period. 61 Many philosophers still argue that
some type of contra-causal free choice is a necessary foundation for
the appropriate imposition of moral consequences, 6 2 or at least a
necessary part of the layman's understanding of the foundation of
59 See generally DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (Sidney
Hook ed. 1958); FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (Herbert Morris ed. 1961).
60 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
61 See MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILrY OF GOODNESS 1-21, 87-164
(1988). Nussbaum distinguishes between a self-sufficient life immune to luck and a life
subject to both the risks and the beauties of tuche. Her categories are not identical to
our distinction between volitionalist and nonvolitionalist beliefs, but they are very
closely related. Her view extends far beyond legal, religious, or secular morality, while
ours is concerned only with the cause of moral consequences. Nonetheless, as she recognizes in her frequent references to Kantianism, a volitionalist view of morality is one
of the primary mechanisms through which people have attempted to achieve immunity
from both natural and social contingencies. To the extent that Plato sought such immunity, and sought it in the workings of the individual human soul and its capacity for selfcontrol, he can be described as at least a proto-volitionalist.
Aristotle is also sometimes identified with a volitionalist position, but he is probably
more accurately described as a nonvolitionalist in our terms. See WILLIAM CHASE
GREENE, MOIRA: FATE, GOOD, AND EVIL IN GREEK THOUGHT 327-28 (1944). Aristotle's
evaluation of the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of particular actions in the
Nichomachean Ethics relies on the apparently volitionalist premise that only voluntary actions give rise to praise or blame. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at bk. V., ch. 2 viii.1-3.
Aristotle's explicitly will-based position may be less volitionalist than it appears because
the voluntary act need not be free, in the sense of undetermined, in order to satisfy
Aristotle's criteria. See M. NUssBAuM, supra note 61, at 273-76 (arguing that "voluntary"
actions for Aristotle were not free from all contingency or vulnerability to external
forces). Thus, non-free choices, in our terms, could give rise to moral consequences for
Aristotle.
62 See, e.g., C.A. Campbell, Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?,LX MIND 441, 445-58
(1951) (arguing that attempts to define the conditions of moral responsibility in a way
consistent with causal determinism are ineffective because, interalia, they misunderstand
"the important truth that it is only as expressions of will or choice that acts are of moral
import," id at 455, and that one must have been free to choose otherwise); Morton
White, Oughts and Cans, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 215-16 (Alan Ryan ed. 1979) (the relationship between undetermined choice and moral praise and blame is one of moral, but
not logical or conceptual, necessity).
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moral responsibility.6 3 There are, of course, those who reject the
volitionalist premises entirely. 64 More often, however, the philosophical debate centers on salvaging at least parts of the volitionalist
basis of moral liability by finding room for free will or free choice of
some kind (or from some perspective) in a scientifically determinist
world.6 5 In other words, the terms of the debate in modem philosophy are still largely set by its volitionalist antecedents.
Volitionalism, then, pervades our legal, religious, and intellectual culture. In fact, the volitionalist perspective is so common, so
unquestioned, that it may be difficult even to imagine an alternative.
The next subsection will, therefore, define and describe nonvolitionalism.
C. Nonvolitionalism
The nonvolitionalist view of religion and reality may, at first,
seem very alien to most Americans. In this view, the individual's
religious fate is significantly dependent upon forces beyond his control. A predominantly nonvolitionalist religion may have no ethical
code at all, consisting instead of a metaphysical explanation of why
or how religious results come to pass, without any prescriptive
force. 66 These religions also may include no propositional knowl63 See IsAIAH BERUN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xii (1969) (praise, blame, choice, and
responsibility, as presently understood, are inconsistent with determinism); FRANCIs H.
BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 6-7 (1927) (in the vulgar view, "the deed must issue from my
will" in order for me to be held responsible). See generally W. DAVID Ross, FOUNDATIONS
OF ETHIcs 222-51 (1939) (discussing what freedom and responsibility mean in a world in
which all human behavior is causally determined and the extent to which such meanings
are consistent with everyday usage and intuitions).
64 See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 62-69 (1949); B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND
FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971); GABRIEL DE TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 83-89 (Howell
trans. 1912).
65 See, e.g., DANIEL DENNETT, BRAINSTORMS 233-55 (1978) (responsibility is possible
from the intentional stance, which can never be abandoned, and is consistent with the
simultaneous truth of mechanistic explanation);JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHics 203-26 (1977);

Carl Ginet, Might We Have No Choie?, in FREEDOM AND DETERMINIsM 87 (Keith Lehrer
ed. 1966); Stuart Hampshire, Freedom and Explanation, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM, supra

note 62, at 61-75; Keith Lehrer, An Empirical Disproofof Determinism?, in FREEDOM AND
DETERMINISM, supra, at 175; Wilfred Sellars, Thought and Action, in FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM, supra, at 105.

66 Volitionalist religions, since they focus on individual choice as the basis for moral
responsibility, tend to be quite "homo-centric." That is, the human being who chooses
is the central focus of religious concern. Nonvolitionalist religions, on the other hand,
recognize various spiritual forces outside the individual that control his religious destiny
regardless of his own choices. Such religions might, therefore, be called "sacro-centric": their primary concern is with all spiritually effective forces and is not limited to
human action or choice. See, e.g., WILLIAM BouwsmA, JOHN CALIN: A SIXTEENTH CEN-

TURY PORTRAIT 167, 172-74 (1988) (discussing Calvin's belief that God controls everything, including all human action); MIRCEA ELLADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE
NATURE OF RELIGION 116-28 (1959).
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edge at all, ethical or metaphysical, but only a personal experience
of God. 67 Even if it does place certain ethical demands on the individual, however, a nonvolitionalist religion will sometimes hold him
liable for violating those demands whether or not the violation resulted from his own free choices. A person may strive to keep his
own behavior and beliefs within the prescribed path and yet still suffer religious harm (e.g., damnation or the loss of spiritual power) for
a violation over which he had no choice or control. 68
The essence of the nonvolitionalist view is that something other
than the individual's free choices can determine his religious fate.6 9
The central moral or religious fact-the fact that generates moral or
religious consequences for the person-is not his individual free
choice. Instead, it is his existence within a religious universe over
which he has, at most, only limited choice or control.
Some examples of nonvolitionalist beliefs may clarify the concept. There are at least two different ways in which such an extant
religious order might create consequences for an individual, independent of his own free choices. First, a spiritual power, such as
God, may have ordained certain religious consequences for the individual. No human action, chosen or otherwise, undertaken by the
individual or other persons or groups, can affect that result. This is
commonly called predestination.7 0 A second version of nonvolitionalism holds that the actions of persons do create moral or religious
consequences, whether or not those actions were the product of free
choice. Those consequences may be limited to the actor or they
may affect other persons, but neither case requires free choice for
liability to moral consequences. The difference between these two
versions is that the first completely denies the efficacy of human action in generating certain religious consequences, while the second
does not. Both are nonvolitionalist, however, because both hold
67
See HARVEY Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY 56-57 (1984) (describing the
"modern theological notion that 'there are no revealed ideas,' and that faith is a personal encounter with God which carries with it no necessary cognitive content").
68 Cf M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 61, at 89 ("Tuche [luck] does not imply randomness
or absence of causal connections. Its basic meaning is 'what just happens'; it is the element of human existence that humans do not control.").
69
Cf id. at 32-41. Nussbaum argues that the recognition of inconsistent moral
claims leads to the conclusion that choice is not all: you can make the "right" choice,
the best choice under the circumstances, and still be guilty because you still have done
something evil. To deny that it is evil, as a volitionalist perspective would require, is to
falsify the emotional reality of such situations. See also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979) (our moral judgments depend, in part, on events controlled by luck);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL Lucx 20-30, 74 (1981) (same).
70
This common term may not be technically accurate in

light of the theology of the
groups involved. We discuss the technical meaning in a later section, see infra notes 32236 and accompanying text; the usage here is colloquial rather than theological.
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that something other than the free choices of a particular individual
can create religious consequences for that individual.
Predestinarian Calvinism exemplifies the first kind of nonvolitionalism. In strict predestinarian Calvinism, the individual's religious fate-his ultimate salvation-is not dependent on any human
choice or action; it is ordained by God. God decides, at some unknown time (or out of time) and in some incomprehensible manner,
who will be saved, and gives those persons His grace. In such a
predestinarian world, human beings cannot avoid action and the experience of choosing, but the character of their choices and actions
does not determine the moral or religious consequences for them.
A virtuous demeanor may often accompany a saved soul, but virtue
71
does not necessarily lead to grace.
The second type of nonvolitionalism holds that human actions
can create moral and religious consequences for the actor or for
others, regardless of whether the actions result from a free choice.
To explain why these actions have such effects, this type of nonvolitionalism often posits that the physical world and the moral or reli7 2 In such a sacralized cosmos, 7 3
gious realm are not separate.
natural features and events (like mountains and rain) have moral
and religious significance. Such sacred objects or events do not simply represent the divine; rather, they are simultaneously a part of a
spiritual reality and a secular reality. 74 In other words, the moral or
religious order of the universe exists through and in the natural, and
perhaps social, features of the world. 75 Disruption of the natural or
social order, for example, by taking land out of its natural state or
challenging the social authority of traditional religious leaders, may
disrupt the moral order. 76 Such disruption leads to moral consequences.
The individual's role in such a sacralized cosmos is simply to
exist as a part of this harmonious and well-balanced moral/material
order. If an individual takes action that disturbs that order, regardless of whether that action flows from his own choice or from forces
beyond his control, his punishment may be necessary to restore the
natural equilibrium. His actions, not his choices, are the foundation
See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA 160 (Gilbert Highet trans. 2d ed. 1945)
(describing Anaximander's belief in a moral standard guiding natural phenomena); cf id.
at 276-78 (describing the role of balance and proportion in Sophoclean tragedy).
73 See M. ELIADE, supra note 66, at 11-13.
Seeid. at 116-18.
74
71
72

75

See, e.g., HILL SMrrH, THE RELIGIONS OF MEN 199-200 (1958) (discussing the Tao

as the way of the universe, simultaneously immanent and transcendent); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAw AND JUSTICE 17-20 (1987) (discussing pre-Socratic Greek notion of
natural law as both a material and a normative order).
76
See M. ELIADE, supra note 66, at 47-50.

792

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:769

for his moral liability. Moreover, once the moral/material order is
disturbed, persons other than the actor may also be unable to fulfill
their proper functions. This inability may lead to moral or religious
consequences for such persons even if they did not cause the initial
77
disruption of the order.
The Greek notion of a "telos" is an example of this nonvolitionalist integration of moral and material reality. A telos is a goal or
end point that implies both moral and material completion. For the
Greeks, natural categories-such as "hawks" or "human beings"were defined, in part, in terms of the virtues that would make one of
their members a perfected thing of its kind. Each member of such a
category had a particular telos-a moral goal-simply by virtue of
being a thing of that kind. 78 This concept represents an integration
of material and moral reality because moral goals are largely deter79
mined by material definitions.
Greek literature and drama, building on this vision of an interrelated moral and material universe, provide direct evidence of the
second kind of volitionalism. The role of fate, "moira," in Greek
drama illustrates the imposition of moral liability based on action
even when the inexorable progress of destiny renders individual
choice meaningless.8 0 Oedipus, for example, was in no way culpable for his crimes from a volitionalist point of view: he had no
means of knowing that the actions which appeared to fulfill all of his
responsibilities actually violated his deepest duties. 8 ' Yet he is held
liable and suffers moral retribution. 2 Similarly, both Antigone and
Creon may be seen as moved, and doomed, by a fate beyond their
control, but they are, nonetheless, completely morally liable for
their own actions.8 3 The Greeks ascribed moral blame or praise
See id.at 33-34; L. WEINREB, supra note 75, at 18.
78 Cf L. WEINREB, supra note 75, at 33 (the essence of an object is teleological; it is
"the function for which the object is fit by its nature.").
79 See ALiSDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 57-61, 148 (2d ed. 1984); cf L. WEINREB,
supra note 75, at 3 (discussing natural law, both in the Greek understanding and in modem jurisprudential terms, as a denial of the separation of "ought" and "is"). This position is referred to in modem philosophy as the "naturalistic fallacy": inferring an
"ought" from an "is." See GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1903). It is a logical
fallacy only if one rejects the possibility of the nonvolitionalist premise asserting that
moral and material reality are united.
80 See ARTHUR ADKINS, MERIT AND RESPONSIBILI 22-23 (1960); L. WEINREB, supra
note 75, at 17. See generally W. GREEN, supra note 61 (discussing the role of fate in Greek
thought).
81 See A. ADKINS, supra note 80, at 98; L. WEINREB, supra note 75, at 42.
82 See SopHocLEs, OEDIPUS REX 11.1310-1420 (David Grene trans. 1954).
83 See L. WEINREB, supra note 75, at 23. This description is only one interpretation
77

and there are divergent viewpoints regarding how much scope is left for individual free

choice in the Greek world view. Some, like Professor Weinreb, have argued that fate, or
natural law, is both all-inclusive and inexorable. See id. at 25 ("The basic conception...
was that the entire universe is governed by lawlike principles, which account fully for
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based on the results of action, rather than on the intentions or efforts of the actor. 84 This emphasis on results follows naturally from
the belief that moral and material reality are interrelated in a way
that allows material changes, such as Oedipus's murder of his father, to cause far reaching moral effects, like the plagues affecting
Thebes, regardless of the actor's choice or will.
In Oedipus Rex we find an example of how such disruptive actions can also lead to dire moral consequences for persons other than
the actor. All of Thebes suffers because Oedipus transgressed.8 5
The Greek notion of "pollution," which depends upon the interrelation of moral and material reality, explains why persons other than
Oedipus suffer moral consequences.
Pollution is the existence of a material condition that disrupts
the natural order.8 6 As its name implies, however, "pollution," like
"telos," has a moral as well as a physical character. For Sophocles
and his audience, the natural and moral orders were not distinct.
Thus, disruption of the physical or social world could cause moral
repercussions. These repercussions function like ripples in a pond,
affecting those who had no part in causing the disruption because
they too are integrally a part of the natural, moral order. Thus,
Oedipus's unpunished presence in Thebes, as well as his incestuous
relationship with his mother, is a continuing pollution which brings
a series of catastrophes on the whole city-state.8 7 These moral consequences occur despite the fact that none of the other inhabitants
of Thebes chose or acted to create or allow this pollution, or even
what occurs in nature and human experience alike."). Others have suggested that while
a particular act may be determined by fate or by the gods, the actor's attitude toward it,
his recognition of its wrongness and his own moral responsibility for it despite his lack
of choice, may be within his control. See M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 61, at 35-44. Still
other interpreters have suggested that fate is almost always partial rather than complete,
leaving much room for human freedom of action. See A. ADINS, supra note 80, at 21
("Homeric beliefs do not warrant any theory of determinism: Homeric man knows
nothing of a 'dock-work' universe .... ). However, interpreters generally agree that
Greek thought recognized that individuals were, at least sometimes, moved to act by
forces beyond their own choice or control and that they were, nonetheless, morally responsible for such actions.
84

See W.

GREENE,

supra note 61, at 11.

Sopoct.Es, supra note 82, 11.25-30.
86
See A. ADKINS, supra note 80, at 89; W. GREENE, supra note 61, at 98. Adkins calls
this notion of pollution non-moral because it may lead to suffering for those who are not
causally responsible for the pollution. See A. ADINS, supra note 80, at 91. He thus
reveals a cultural bias similar to the courts': any nonvolitionalist notion, like pollution,
is by definition non-moral because volitionalism is the only possible moral system. He
fails to recognize that the concept of pollution may be moral, may involve a moral or
spiritual causality rather than a merely material one, even though it is not a volitionalist
concept.
85

87

See A. ADINS, supra note 80, at 95;

SOPHOCLES,

supra note 82, 11.25-30.
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knew that it existed. 88
Similarly, the claims made in the sacred land cases fall into this
second category of nonvolitionalism. The desecration of the Native
Americans' sacred sites was not preordained by some spiritual
power; the government's actions caused the disruption of the natural order. The resulting moral consequences follow from human action rather than being the product of some exclusively nonhuman
force. This claim, therefore, is not predestinarian in nature.
It is, nonetheless, nonvolitionalist because the Indians will suffer the consequences of this disruption despite the fact that they did
not in any way choose to create the disturbance. If the natural qualities of the Siskiyou Mountains are destroyed then vision quests will
become ineffective and the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa will be unable
to acquire religious power, or "medicine." 89 This catastrophe does
not depend upon the Indians' personal responsibility for the desecration in a volitionalist sense. They suffer this religious consequence not as punishment for their own choices, but simply because
they are part of an interrelated universe and they feel the repercussions when the supporting moral order is attacked.
Many Native American religions are quite explicit in their view
of the spiritual and material worlds as interrelated.
The old way-what the Lakota call wouncage, "our way of doing"is very consistent throughout the Indian nations, despite the great
variety of cultures. The Indian cannot love the Creator and desecrate the earth, for Indian existence is not separable from Indian
religion, which is not separable from the natural world. 90
Instead of a world in which spiritual consequences flow only from
"spiritual" acts such as choice, will, or belief, "the Indian religious
perspective centers around the supernatural world, populated not
only by gods and spirits but also by human beings, animals, plants
and inanimate objects, for the supernatural breaks through into the
88 We have now offered the Greeks as examples of volitionalism, see supra notes 6165 and accompanying text, as well as this second form of nonvolitionalism. Some of this
variability is due, of course, to changes in emphasis in Greek thought over time and
among persons. For example, Aristotle's superficially volitionalist views are from a later
period than the dramatic literature exhibiting nonvolitionalist attitudes. See generally A.
ADKINS, supra note 80 (discussing the development from Homer to Aristotle of a more
volitionalist view of responsibility). However, some of the variation is due to the fact
that the Greek vision, to the extent that it existed as a single entity at any particular time,
was a complex mixture containing elements of many different positions. See A.
MACINTYRE, supra note 79, at 134-35.
89 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 462
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 PETER MATrrESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 9-10 (1984); see Alfonso Ortiz, The Tewa
World View, in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
179 (Denis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock eds. 1975) [hereinafter TEACHINGS FROM THE
AMERICAN EARTH].
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everyday world." 9 1 It is this interpenetration of the religious and
secular realms that allows one person's physical actions to have a
religious consequence for another: a change in the physical world is
a change in the religious order and that order affects all people.
Thus, many aspects of American Indian religions, particularly
those aspects dealing with sacred sites, are strongly nonvolitionalist
in character. This distinguishes them from the primarily volitionalist religions that dominate the American religious scene, and from
the largely volitionalist secular legal and philosophical traditions.
Compared to volitionalist beliefs, nonvolitionalist beliefs may lead
to a markedly different theological focus and to dissimilar religious
practices. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Article,
however, government action may restrict nonvolitionalist religious
practices in very different and less obvious ways than it restricts volitionalist practices.
Indeed, governnient action may impact in strikingly different
ways on volitionalist and nonvolitionalist religious beliefs and practices. Further, from the volitionalist perspective, the impact on the
nonvolitionalist belief will not appear to be an interference with the
free exercise of religion at all. Consider the following examples.
In the first example, the believer asserts that he will suffer a
religious harm if he chooses to work on his Sabbath. The individual
choice that leads to the religious consequence is, in turn, constrained by some government action: the believer is pressured into
working on his Sabbath by the government's decision to deny him
unemployment benefits if he refuses such work. The government
action restricts the believer's activity through a mundane, secular
means. No special, religious effect need be ascribed to the government in order to explain why the unemployment law constrains his
choices; the restriction is explained by the plaintiff's rather obvious,
nonreligious desire for the money. We will call this type of government impact on the individual "non-ascriptive," 9 2 because the government's action does not itself give rise directly to a religious
effect. In this first type of impact, the government constrains the
91
AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 14 (Monica Setterwall trais. 1979); see also A. Irving Hallowell, Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View,
in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH,supra note 90, at 141, 145-49 (describing how
the Ojibwa consider supernatural beings and some inanimate objects to be "persons.").
92 We intend "non-ascriptive" to have a particular, stipulated meaning: a "nonascriptive" limit on individual conduct is one that is not caused by a direct religious
effect ascribed to the activities of the government itself. "Non-ascriptive" regulations of
individual activity may thus include laws prohibiting named conduct or laws conditioning benefits on the abandonment of named conduct. They may also include laws that
coerce conduct in any other way, except as a result of religious effects ascribed directly

to government action. For example, the govenment might "non-ascriptively" burden

religion by erecting a wall around a shrine on public property.
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plaintiff's individual choice and that individual choice is what will
lead to religious consequences for the plaintiff. Thus, non-ascriptive impact is compatible with volitionalism.
In the second example, the believers argue that they will suffer
a religious consequence-the loss of spiritual powers to be gained
through a vision quest 9 3-because of the government's action in
building a road through a sacred location. Unlike in the previous
example, the believers here cannot avoid the religious consequence
by choosing to forgo a government benefit. Instead, they are faced
with a situation in which the government has decided for secular
reasons to use its own property in a way which would lead directly to
religious consequences for them. The believers would suffer religious consequences due to government action, not because of any
action or inaction they chose. Thus, the government action causes
an ascriptive effect on the believers: in order to explain the effect on
them, some direct religious efficacy must be ascribed to the government's actions. This is a nonvolitionalist type of impact.
Viewed through the lens of volitionalism, the government activity in this second claim does not place any burden on religious freedom since it does not interfere with any individual free choice to
follow religious rules. From the nonvolitionalist perspective, the
government activity does limit individual religious practice, because
the vision quest will be futile if the site is desecrated. In order to
perceive the limit on practice, one must acknowledge that the government itself-not just free choices by individuals-can directly
give rise to religious consequences which affect individuals. 94 A
volitionalist cannot acknowledge such a possibility. As a result, the
volitionalist focus on free choice as the foundation for the appropriate imposition of moral or religious consequences leads to a refusal
to recognize this nonvolitionalist type of interference as a burden on
religion at all.9 5
Many religions contain both volitionalist and nonvolitionalist
elements in varying degrees, and therefore could be subject to both
types of impacts. 9 6 This combination of elements is possible be93
94
95

See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.

Cf M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 61, at 329 (arguing that there is a "well-established
tradition in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern, according to which moral
goodness, that which is an appropriate object of ethical praise and blame, cannot be
affected by external circumstances"). Nussbaum associates this tradition with both Plato
and Kant, and notes that the latter's influence on modern philosophy cannot be overemphasized. Id Focusing moral attention on the internal act of undetermined choice is
one way to insulate moral judgments from the effects of external circumstances.
96
See supra notes 39-58, and accompanying text. Therefore, we talk about volitionalist and nonvolitionalist beliefs, impacts, and claims and not, generally, about volitionalist and nonvolitionalist religions.
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cause religions sometimes recognize different types of religious con-

sequences subject to different schemes of causality. 97 Despite these
areas of overlap, however, religions with prominent nonvolitionalist
beliefs will, of course, experience the greatest amount of nonvolitionalist interference. Only in the last few Terms have believers in
such nonvolitionalist religions reached the Supreme Court with
claims that clearly raised the issue of this nonvolitionalist type of
interference. 98
The sudden appearance of nonvolitionalist claims forced the
background volitionalism, so prevalent in American culture, to the
foreground. In a collection of cases involving Native American
claimants, the Court dealt with the challenges posed by these
nonvolitionist claims. The Court did not acknowledge the role of
volitionalism in its decisions; perhaps the Court did not even recognize it. Nonetheless, it was, in large part, the nonvolitionalist character of these claims that led the Court to undertake a series of
retreats in free exercise doctrine.
In the 1989-90 Term, this retrenchment culminated in the
Court abandoning twenty-five years of free exercise clause jurisprudence. The Court has recently held that facially neutral, generally
applicable criminal laws do not "burden" religious practice even if
they prohibit that practice outright. This holding severely restricts
the constitutional protection available to both volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist religious beliefs. The remainder of Part I will examine the recent cases in detail to demonstrate that concerns about
nonvolitionalist claims lie at the heart of the Court's dramatic reduction in free exercise protection. Part II will argue that such a reduction is unnecessary, unjustified, and an important violation of the
promise of religious freedom.

97 For instance, the Navajo who contested the flooding of Rainbow Bridge Canyon
complained about both volitionalist and nonvolitionalist impacts. The nonvolitionalist
impact was the religious effect that would flow from the drowning of the gods that lived
in that location, regardless of who was responsible for the flooding. The volitionalist
impact consisted of the different religious effects that would flow from the Indians' own
failure to fulfill certain religious duties because the flooding denied them access. See
supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. Thus, in the Navajo religion, some religious
effects on a particular individual are caused by his own free choices while others are
caused by a more general disruption of the natural order of which he is a part.
98 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), may be an example of an earlier claim
concerning a nonvolitionalist impact. In that case, the Court held that the free exercise
clause required the state to grant an exemption to its compulsory education laws to the
children of Old Order Amish. However, Yoder also involved a straightforward volitionalist interference with choice, so the Court did not explicitly consider the novel claim. See
infra notes 430-62 and accompanying text.
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SECTION Two.
THE COURT'S DEFINITION OF A "BURDEN" ON FREE
EXERCISE: SHERBERT AND

BOWEN

Given the pervasiveness of volitionalist bias in the general culture, it would be surprising if the Supreme Court did not exhibit
such a bias as well, especially in its free exercise jurisprudence. The
Court may have entertained such notions sub silentio for many decades, but over the last several Terms, its volitionalism has become
more explicit. In 1986, Bowen v. Roy 99 provided the first clear evidence of this bias.
The modem era of free exercise clause jurisprudence began
with Sherbert v. Verner.100 In that case, the Court articulated a broad
rule that any pressure by the government on a believer to forgo a
religious practice constituted a burden on his free exercise of religion. This principle remained the law for over two decades.10 1
Then, in Bowen, the Court announced a new rule: Not all pressures
to forgo religious practices are constitutionally cognizable burdens
on religion. In particular, governmental "internal procedures" are
never burdens. To determine whether a particular practice is internal or external, the Court asserted that it would use, not the believer's framework, but a framework that, according to the Court,
the Constitution itself presupposes.' 0 2 We will argue that this
framework is recognizably volitionalist. The Court, in other words,
held that the free exercise clause itself contains a volitionalist
bias. 103
A.

Background: The Court's Definition of a "Burden": 19631986

The Supreme Court has recognized two basic kinds of burdens
that a government action may impose on religious rights: burdens
on belief and burdens on practice. 10 4 According to the Court, the
Constitution absolutely forbids burdens on belief, 10 5 but the gov99
100
101

476 U.S. 693 (1986).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd.,

450 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1981).
102 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699.
103 We do not suggest that the Court held nonvolitionalist claims to be entirely without constitutional protection, see infra note 153, but rather that the full range of protection extends only to volitionalist claims. In this sense, the Court seems to believe that
volitionalism is a favored religious belief under the free exercise clause.
104
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
105 See id. The Court has defined a "burden" on belief quite narrowly as comprising

only laws targeted at particular beliefs and laws that restrict the expression of beliefs.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963):
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
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ernment may impose a burden on religious practice if it can demonstrate a compelling state interest in doing so. The Court has divided
governmental pressures to forgo religious practice into two categories. Some laws facially discriminate against a particular religion, a
group of religions, or religion in general; 0 6 others are facially neutral toward particular religions and toward all religion, but on application frustrate religious practice. 0 7 The Court has consistently
held that the former category burdens religious practice; from at
least 1963 to 1986, the Court believed that the latter category also
posed burdens.
In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, 0 8s the Supreme Court held that a
general secular regulation that was neutral towards religion on its
face could nonetheless be unconstitutional if on application it burdened a particular believer's religious conduct. As a result, the
Court required the state to accord the burdened believer an exemption from the regulation unless it could demonstrate a compelling
state interest in denying one. 10 9
In the ensuing years, the Court recognized two primary types of
burdens on religious conduct caused by facially neutral, secular regulations. First, a law may directly coerce a believer to violate the
dictates of her religion by facially requiring conduct that a religion
prohibits or by facially prohibiting conduct that a religion requires.1 0 For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"' Amish parents chalgovernmental regulation of religious beliefs as such. Government may
neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the
dissemination of particular religious views.
Id.(citations omitted).
106 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982).
107 For example, a law against the use of controlled substances does not facially
burden anyone's religious practice, but in operation, the law effectively forbids the celebration of the central sacrament of the Native American Church, which involves the use
of peyote. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1622 (1990).
108 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
109 Ideat 403. Sherbert may not have been the first case to establish this rule. The
Court believes that the rule dates back at least as far as Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1980). Some commentators have disagreed with the Court's view of the age of the Sherbert rule, believing
that it actually originated with Sherbert. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1313 & n.333; Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond Alternativesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309,
311 n.7. The issue is irrelevant for our purposes, because the Sherbert rule has been the
law at least since Sherbert was decided, now over 25 years ago.
110 As we will suggest below, this meaning of "coercion"-requiring or forbidding
conduct by law, presumably under threat of state-imposed sanctions-is the one that the
Supreme Court has apparently adopted. It is not, however, the only possible meaning
of the term. See infra text accompanying notes 244-45.
III 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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lenged state laws requiring all children to attend school to the age
of sixteen. The attendance law compelled the parents to violate a
tenet of their religion, which required them to keep their children at
home, free from non-Amish influences, after the age of thirteen.
The Court recognized a burden on the parents' free exercise
rights" 12 and denied the existence of a sufficient state interest to justify the burden. Accordingly, it granted the Amish an exemption
13
from the attendance laws.
The second type of burden occurs when a law compels a believer to choose between receiving government benefits and observing the dictates of her religion.' 1 4 This type of burden differs from
the first in that the law does not on its face require or forbid conduct, but simply makes religious observance more expensive or
more difficult.
Thus, in Sherbert, the State of South Carolina
granted unemployment compensation to all unemployed persons
except those who failed "without good cause.., to accept available
suitable work." The State denied Sherbert compensation because
she refused to accept ajob that would require her to work on Saturday, the day of her Sabbath. The State maintained that her religious
objections to work on that day did not constitute "good cause" for
refusing employment." 5
The Court acknowledged that the law may have only indirectly
burdened Sherbert's religious rights, because it did not on its face
require her to violate any of the precepts of her religion. 1 6 None112

See id at 218.

The Court in Yoder may also have recognized a kind of burden different from
either of the two described in text. See infra notes 428-539 and accompanying text.
Whether or not the Yoder Court acknowledged this third type of burden, the opinion
clearly recognized facial prohibitions or compulsions as a burden on free exercise: "The
impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion
is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them,
under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental
tenets of their religious beliefs." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
114
These two burdens to some extent operate in the same way and therefore are
really the same kind of burden. It is true that unlike "indirect coercion," "direct coercion" facially forbids a practice rather than simply putting the believer to a choice. Presumably the penalty is designed to prevent the practice and to express public
disapproval. But in practice, even "direct coercion" prevents the practice, if at all, only
by putting the believer to a choice between the proscribed conduct and a penalty of
some kind. From the believer's perspective, then, both varieties of burdens are
weighted choices; the only difference is the heaviness of the weight.
115 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-402 (1963). The Court also noted that
South Carolina required employers to be closed on Sunday, with the result that the State
never subjected Sunday observers to the choice forced upon Mrs. Sherbert. The Court
clearly stated, however, that this discriminatory effect was in no way necessary to its
holding; even nondiscriminatory burdens imposed by neutral secular regulations can be
unconstitutional. Id at 406.
116 Two years before Sherbert, in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Court
held that a Sunday dosing law did not burden the religious practice of orthodoxJewish
113
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theless, the Court held that the denial of benefits did, indirectly but
unmistakably, burden her religious rights by forcing her
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
17
imposed against Appellant for her Saturday worship.'
After Sherbert, the Court consistently affirmed that both direct
coercion by facial prohibition and indirect coercion by a denial of
benefits were cognizable burdens on religious liberty. 118 Prior to
1986, however, the Court never indicated that these two types of
burdens were the only ones the Constitution recognized. During
this time period, the Court had no occasion explicitly to decide
whether other kinds of pressures on believers to cease a religious
practice might also qualify as burdens on free exercise, because it
entertained cases involving only the two types of "standard" burdens. 1 19 But until 1986, the answer seemed implicit in the Court's
rationale for its holding in Sherbert. The state could not put a believer to a choice between benefits and religious observance because
it would thereby pressure the believer to take the benefits and forgo
the practice. 120 In other words, as the Court has repeatedly reafmerchants. The merchants were forced by law to close on Sunday and by religion to
dose on Saturday, thus losing two full business days. The Court acknowledged that the
law would force the merchants to make "some financial sacrifice in order to observe
their religious beliefs" but still held that the law did not create a cognizable burden
because the law "imposes an indirect burden ... i.e., [it] does not make unlawful the
religious practice itself," but merely "regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive."
IL at 605-06. The decision in Braunfeld thus seems in direct contradiction to the language of Sherbert; in the latter case the Court recognized a burden even though, by the
Court's own admission, the burden was only an "indirect result" of the unemployment
law and "no criminal sanctions directly compel[led] appellant to work a six-day week."
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. Sherbert did not, however, overrule Braunfeld. Rather, perhaps
disingenuously, the Court reinterpreted the holding of that case. According to the 1963
Court, the 1961 Court had recognized a burden but had found it outweighed by "a
strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers." IdL at 408.
We may thus assume that the Sherbert Court would have recognized a burden on the facts
of Braunfeld.
117 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
118 See, e.g. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 708,
716-17 (1981); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
119 See Lee, 455 U.S. at 256-58 (facial compulsion); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (denial of benefits);Johnson, 415 U.S. at 383-85 (denial of benefits); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 462
(facial compulsion). The only possible occasion that the Court might have had to rule
on a different kind of burden was in Yoder. See infra notes 430-49 and accompanying
text.
120 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
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firmed, Sherbert rests on the broad principle that even facially neutral
regulations that in application pressure believers to give up religious conduct are for that reason unconstitutional as applied.12 1 Facial prohibitions or compulsions and denials of benefits are two
examples of such pressures, but they do not exhaust the class-or so
it seemed.
B.

The Holding of Bowen v. Roy

Then, in Bowen v. Roy, 1 22 an almost unanimous Court 23 repudiated this broad principle and announced instead that only certain,
obscurely defined kinds of pressures would qualify as free exercise
burdens. Stephen Roy is an Abenaki Indian who believes that the
use, by himself or by government, of a social security number assigned to his daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, will rob her of spiritual power.' 2 4 He therefore brought a free exercise challenge to
federal laws requiring the use of social security numbers in state ad12 5
ministration of federal welfare programs.
Roy objected to two features of these laws. First, he challenged
the federal requirement that each applicant for welfare benefits
must submit a social security number to the state agency in order to
receive the benefits. This claim alleged a straightforward Sherbertstyle burden: the requirement forced Roy to choose between violating the dictates of his religion, by submitting the number, and receiving federal benefits. However, the Court divided on which
constitutional standard it should apply to this claim. Three memSee, e.g., Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141:
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandatedby a religious belief thereby putting substantialpressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists.
(quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18) (emphasis added by Hobbie Court).
122
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
123 Justice White was the sole dissenter. I&. at 733.
124
Roy believes that because the social security number applies uniquely to Little
Bird of the Snow, its use by someone else could deprive her of her ability to control her
own personality and to ward off spiritual evil. Joint Appendix at 85, 109, 467-68, Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (No. 84-780) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. More particularly, Roy believes that the number is part of the "great evil" Katahdin, which he identifies with the use of computers and nudear weapons, because the social security number
is the "most widely shared number in the computers." Id. at 86-87. Use of such numbers robs the spirit of individuals, a process Roy compared to the psychological process
of "dehumanization." Id at 87. Similar beliefs are not uncommon. Many groups insist
that the "real" names of individuals be kept secret, because, as unique identifiers, they
could be used for evil purposes to control the person named. See, e.g., CLAUDE LxviSTRAuss, A WORLD ON THE WANE 270-71 (1961).
125 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695-99.
121
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bers of the Court proposed a new standard: 26 Neutral regulations
that incidentally burden religious practice need be only a reasonable
means of promoting a legitimate public interest.' 2 7 Last Term, this
standard gained a majority on the Court, but in Bowen four members
of the Court indicated their continuing support for the Sherbert standard.1 28 The two remaining Justices, Blackmun and Stevens, declined to reach this claim, finding it nonjusticiable. 29 As a result of
this odd configuration, the Court remanded the case without a clear
holding on Roy's request for an exemption from the requirement
that he submit a social security number to receive benefits.
The Court's treatment of Roy's other claim did command a majority, but is perhaps even more confusing.' 3 0 Federal law requires
that not only welfare recipients but also state agencies use social
security numbers in administering certain federally funded programs.' 3 ' Roy believed that the state's use of the number, no less
than his own, would rob his daughter of spiritual power.' 3 2 Therefore, he sought an injunction forbidding the state to use her social
security number. The Court did not question the sincerity or relig126 The three members of the Court who supported this standard-Chief Justice
Burger, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist-attempted to argue that Sherbert and
its progeny require application of the compelling state interest standard only in cases
where the statute at issue provides for individualized consideration. If the state denies
the exemption after such consideration, the denial is evidence of discriminatory intent,
which calls forth the highest standard of review. Id. at 707-08. Sherbert applied its standard of review not because of evidence of discriminatory intent, but because of the law's
burden on religious practice. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text. A majority
of the Court has since so construed Sherbert. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987); see also Note, The "Core'"-"Periphery"Dichotomyin First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause Doctrine: Goldman v. Weinberger, Bowen v. Roy, and
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 827, 849-50 (1987) (authored by Marc
J. Bloostein) (arguing that Chief Justice Burger failed to distinguish Sherbert and Thomas
from Roy).
127
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707-08 (pointing to a growing willingness on the part of the
Court to use rational-basis analysis on "peripheral" free exercise cases: those cases
which arise either outside the political community or involve nondiscriminatory restrictions on government benefits).
128 Justice O'Connor expressed this view in an opinion which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined. Id at 726-31. Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he asserted that Sherbert required allowance of both of Roy's claims. Id at 733. As White
dissented in Sherbert, he perhaps intended his Bowen opinion as irony. He may have intended his assertion that Sherbert requires granting both of Roy's claims to suggest that
Sherbert was incorrect from the beginning because it required the Court to go to ridiculous lengths to accommodate religion.
129 Id at 713 (Blackmun,J., finding the record incomplete); id at 718-23 (Stevens,J.,
finding the case either moot or not ripe). Justice Blackmun did indicate in dicta his
continued support for the Sherbert ruling and his belief that it would require an exemption for Roy if the case were justiciable. Id at 715-16.
130
From this point forward, our references to Roy's claim or Roy's challenge are to
this second claim.
131
See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1988).
132
See Joint Appendix, supra note 124, at 467-79.
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iousness of Roy's beliefs. 13 3 The Court considered only whether the
government's use of the number represented a constitutionally cognizable burden on free exercise rights. Eight Justices concluded
that it did not. The Court explained that the free exercise clause
distinguishes between individual religious activity, such as celebrating the Sabbath, and internal governmental conduct, such as the use
of certain filing cabinets. The clause protects the former but in no
way affects the latter. In the Court's words,
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens....
...

The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection

from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to3 dictate
the conduct of the Govern4
ment's internal procedures.'
Since government use of a social security number is an internal matter, Roy's second claim alleged no burden on his religious rights.
The Court did acknowledge that, from Roy's perspective, "internal government procedures" may have some definite external effects. Indeed, the Court conceded that state use of the number may
have as grave an impact on Little Bird of the Snow as Roy's use of it.
The Court maintained nonetheless that burdens are to be assessed
not from the standpoint of the believer, but from the standpoint of
the Constitution itself:
Roy's religious views may not accept this distinction between individual and governmental conduct ....
It is clear, however, that
the Free Exercise Clause, and the Constitution generally, recognize such a distinction; for the adjudication of a constitutional
claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must
35
supply the frame of reference.'

Although the Court distinguished "internal" and "external" government conduct from the perspective of a posited constitutional
"frame of reference," it neither explained the exact content of this
"frame of reference" nor how the Justices derived it from the
document.
The Court offered only three observations, none of them very
useful, on the subject. First, it insisted that the free exercise clause
"simply cannot be [otherwise] understood."' 3 6 Second, the Court
argued that the clause is "written in terms of what the Government
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
133
134
135
136

See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 696.

IM. at 699-700.
Id. at 701 n.6.
IM at 699.
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extract from the Government." 13 7 By this standard, claims would
involve internal conduct whenever they seek to extract something
from the government. This explanation is at best incomplete because it fails to distinguish Roy's claim from Sherbert's. Sherbert,
no less than Roy, sought to extract something from the government;
she sought to "extract" unemployment benefits, even though she
was not willing to work on Saturday. Therefore, in the Bowen
Court's view, the fact that a claimant seeks something from the government cannot alone be enough to render the claim un138
cognizable.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Court indicated that
the meaning and constitutional roots of the distinction between internal and external conduct were just too intuitively apparent to require much explanation. In this vein, the Court offered a parade-ofhorribles argument, the first in a series that the Court would utilize
in later cases. According to the Court, recognizing Roy's claim
would lead to the accommodation of hypothetical religious beliefs
that are unacceptably bizarre: "Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the' Government's use of a Social Security
number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objec' 13 9
tion to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets.
Unfortunately, the Court felt no need to analyze this intuitive
distinction between internal and external conduct, which is neither
clear nor unproblematic. As we will argue in the next subsection,
upon close analysis, the distinction seems to rest on the idea that the
Constitution itself adopts a volitionalist orthodoxy.

Id. at 700.
Ironically, the Bowen Court draws its language on this point from Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Sherbert, which in context makes precisely this point. Douglas
asserts that the believer may not extract money from the government, "the better to
exercise" her "religious scruples." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412. In this sense, the first
amendment does not give the believer the right to extract benefits from the government
for the purpose of subsidizing her religious practice. But if a believer is "otherwise
qualified for unemployment benefits, payments will be made to her not as a Seventh-day
Adventist, but as an unemployed worker." Id. Under these circumstances, the believer
certainly can "extract" something from the government.
139 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700. The other opinions in Bowen offered no further enlightenment on this distinction between internal and external conduct. The Justices who
concurred in this part of the holding perfunctorily indicated their agreement with the
Court's reasoning while adding nothing of importance to the analysis. See id. at 713
(opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 719-20 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 724 (opinion of
O'Connor, J.). Nor did Justice White, who dissented on this point and would have
granted the request exemption, explain why he found the distinction unsound. Dissenting from the Court's treatment of both claims, his entire opinion reads: "Being of the
view that Thomas v. Review [Board], 450 U.S. 707 (1981) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963), control this case, I cannot join the Court's opinion and judgment." Id. at
733 (White, J., dissenting).
137
138
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Making Sense of Bowen's Holding

Since the Court never explains the difference between internal
and external government conduct, we must attempt to understand it
by inference. To conduct this analysis, we will try to discern why the
Court saw a difference between the government actions in Sherbert
and in Bowen. Sherbert, by the Court's own admission, involved external limits on individual conduct; the internal government conduct in Bowen must therefore differ from the government actions in
Sherbert in some constitutionally significant way.' 40 In the first subsubsection below, we will consider and reject the possibility that the
difference between the two cases might lie in the practical effects on
the believer and the government. In the second sub-subsection, we
will suggest that the Court relies on a different, and real, distinction
between the two cases: Sherbert's claim was volitional and Bowen's
claim was not.
1. PracticalEffects: An Inadequate Reconciliation
A broad interpretation of Sherbert would have required the
Court to recognize the state's use of the social security number as a
burden on Roy's religious practice. Although Sherbert involved only
a particular kind of burden, a choice between benefits and a religious practice, the holding seemed much broader: whenever state
action places substantial pressure on a believer to forgo religious
practices, that pressure is a burden on free exercise rights. In
Bowen, the federal law requiring states to use social security numbers
posed such a burden because it pressured Roy and his daughter into
forgoing the religious activities and experiences associated with Lit4
tle Bird of the Snow's ripening spiritual development.' '
140
After last Term, Sherbert's actual holding may be of limited viability. See supra
notes 122-29 and accompanying text. That fact, however, does not affect the utility of
using Sherbert to understand Bowen, since the Bowen Court believed that Sherbert involved
external limits and Roy's claim did not.
141
In particular, Mr. Roy testified that use of the social security number would prohibit him from preparing his daughter for greater spiritual power, see Joint Appendix,
supra note 124, at 467-68, and that without this preparation, Little Bird of the Snow
would not be able to protect herself against evil, id. at 85, to heal or to see into the
future, id. at 73-74.
Even if Sherbert is rightly read to proscribe only one kind of burden, requiring the
believer to choose between benefits and religious practices, the federal law required Roy
to make precisely such a choice. He could apply for benefits and suffer the spiritual
consequences of the state's use of the number, or he could withdraw Little Bird of the
Snow from the AFDC program and thus provide the state government no reason to use
her number. Justice Blackmun recognized that Roy faced this choice, Bowen, 476 U.S. at
713, but cursorily rejected the contention that it burdened Roy's rights: "[F]or the reasons stated in Part II of the Court's opinion .... it stretches the Free Exercise Clause too
far." Id. The other Justices did not even recognize the existence of this choice. We
argue below that the Justices were correct to omit reference to this choice, because the

1991]

VOLITIONALISM

807

The Court, however, maintained that there is an important difference between the two cases. South Carolina's unemployment
compensation law was an "external" regulation of individual behavior, but the government's use of a social security number was somehow "internal" government activity without cognizable effects on
individual conduct. This distinction seems to refer to two sorts of
practical effects: the effect of the government action on the claimant
and the effect of the claim on the government's own activities. First,
the Court may mean that as a practical matter, the government action in Bowen does not limit individual activity, while in Sherbert the
government did impose such a limit. Second, the Court may mean
that Sherbert's claim did not request the government to modify its
internal procedures, but Roy's did.
Neither of these characterizations is accurate. The federal law
in Bowen placed quite substantial limits on the activity of the Roy
family. As a result of the state's use of the number, Little Bird of the
Snow will lose the ability to ward off evil, to see into the future, or to
heal.' 42 Just as the state unemployment law effectively forced Sherbert to forgo her Sabbath, the law in Bowen forced Little Bird of the
Snow also to forgo many of her religious practices.' 43 Similarly,
Sherbert demanded as much modification of internal government
conduct as Roy. Like Roy's, Sherbert's demand would significantly
effect the state government's administration of one of its programs.
The recognition of her exemption claim required the state to take
existence of the choice was not central to Roy's claim, from Roy's own "frame of reference." But the Court, having rejected that frame of reference, could not legitimately
ignore the existence of the choice.
142 See supra notes 124, 141. Similarly, the state's use of the number seems to have
limited Roy's own religious practice, in that he cannot prepare his daughter for a rich
spiritual life. See supra note 124.
143 At one point in the opinion, the Court seems to deny that the state's use of the
number will in any way limit religious conduct:
Roy objects to the statutory requirement ... not because it places any
restriction on what he may believe or what he may do, but because he
believes the use of the number may harm his daughter's spirit....
...The Federal Government's use of a Social Security number for
Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy's 'freedom to believe, express, and exercise' his religion.
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699, 700-01 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1996, which sets forth a general
policy of protecting American Indian religions). If this statement means that the state's
use of the number will not effectively limit Roy's or his daughter's religious practice, the
claim is plainly false, as the text shows. The Court seems to have meant something
different: having made the quoted statement, the Court conceded in a footnote that in
Roy's "frame of reference" this distinction between individual and government conduct
may not make sense. However, the Court measures burdens not from the believer's
frame of reference but from the constitutional frame of reference. Id. at 701 n.6. In
other words, even if the state's use of the number does in practical ways limit Roy's
religious practice, that limit is not constitutionally cognizable.
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whatever internal steps were necessary to ensure that Sabbatarians
need not demonstrate readiness to work on Saturday. The government would have to flag and document Sabbatarians' files and establish investigative procedures. Little Bird of the Snow's request
might require more elaborate changes in internal procedure, 14 4 but
that is merely a difference in the degree of "internal" change, not in
14 5
the kind of effect on the government's activities.
Thus, the difference between the two cases, between "internal"
and "external" government conduct, cannot lie in any difference in
the practical effects on the government or on the believer. Rather,
the Court must mean that even if Roy suffered some practical effect,
that effect is for some reason not constitutionally relevant. Further,
even if the government suffered some internal effect in Sherbert, that
effect is similarly irrelevant. The key to the internal/external distinction must lie not in practical effects but in the constitutional
"frame of reference" that deems some practical effects irrelevant.
Again, however, the Court never explicitly defines this frame of reference. In the next sub-subsection, we will attempt to infer its content based on hints supplied by the Court.
2.

Bowen's Volitionalist Meaning
a. Individualism.

The real difference between the government activity in the two
cases, as the Court sees it, can be glimpsed in the Court's assertion
that "internal" governmental conduct had external effects on individual activity only in Roy's own religious frame of reference. In
other words, Little Bird of the Snow suffered limits on her religious
practice only because she ascribed a direct, inherent religious effect-her loss of spiritual power-to governmental activity. The
government's own use of a social security number could place a
limit on individual activity. But only from the perspective of one
who believes that government conduct has such inherent, immedi144
It actually is not clear that Roy's claim would cause more internal changes than
Sherbert's. Although the changes in bookkeeping required to accommodate Little Bird
of the Snow might have been extensive, there are presumably many more Sabbatarians
than Abenaki Indians who believe that social security numbers will rob them of spiritual
power. In addition, Sherbert's claim required the government to pay out benefits to a
recipient to whom the government believed benefits were not due. By contrast, the
government conceded that Roy was due benefits; he wanted only to use certain procedures in administering payment. Of the two, Sherbert's claim was likely the more costly
to the government.
145
In a related vein, the Bowen Court at one point suggested that the two cases differ
because Sherbert asked only to be left alone, whereas Mr. Roy wanted to "extract"
something from the government. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699-700. As we argued above, this
distinction is untenable because both Roy and Sherbert wanted to extract something
from the government. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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ate religious significance could the government's own use of a social
security number place such a limit on individual activity. From the
believer's point of view, the government action was "external" because it caused this ascribed religious effect. From everyone else's,
however, it was merely internal. We might diagram this causal relationship as follows: Government Regulation (use of social security
number)-> Religious Effect (Loss of Spiritual Power)-> Limits
on Individual Activity.

The Court's language supports the interpretation that direct,
inherent religious effects ascribed to the government's conduct do
not create cognizable burdens on religion in a number of ways.
First, the Court insisted that the government's use of the social security number is an external action only in Roy's religious frame of
reference. 146 One who did not share this view could not perceive
that the government caused any limit on individual conduct. Thus,
finding external significance in the government's action depends on
some causal effect of the government action that no one but a believer can discern. Similarly, the Court asserted that free exercise
claimants "may not demand that the Governmentjoin in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify
their daughter." 147 "Join in" seems to be the critical but ambiguous
phrase in this sentence. "Join in" cannot mean "support"; Roy requested the government to support his religion no more than did
Sherbert. Nor can "join in" mean "endorse" or "adopt." Roy in no
way required the government to believe in the truth of his religious
beliefs.
The sense in which Roy requested the government to "join in"
his practices must be that he ascribed a direct religious effect to the
government action. The government therefore became a direct participant in the spiritual realm. Indeed, the Court opened its discussion of Roy's claim by flatly stating: "Never to our knowledge has
the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itsef to behave in ways that the individual believes will further
his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family."' 148 In
other words, the Court would not recognize any belief that government's actions have direct religious effects for the believer. The
government, by itself, simply cannot create religious significance.
The external effects that Bowen asserted and the Court denied
may be called "ascriptive effects" because the believer ascribes inherent religious significance to government actions. In Sherbert, by
contrast, the government action had "non-ascriptive" effects-limits
146
147
148

See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 701 n.6.
Id at 700 (emphasis added).
Id at 699 (emphasis in original).
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on individual behavior that did not arise as a result of direct religious effects ascribed by the believer to government action.' 4 9
Sherbert concluded that the government's conditioning of welfare
benefits would limit her religious practice for the rather obvious,
nonreligious reason that she needed or wanted the money. This
"external" limit on individual behavior could be widely and generally perceived; it was not part of an idiosyncratic ascription of significance by the believer. We may diagram this causal sequence thus:
Government Regulation-> Limits on Individual Activity.
This internal/external distinction is therefore based on the
premise that the Constitution recognizes only a certain category of
religious effects. Roy and Sherbert complained about religious
harms with very different origins. Roy complained of a religious
harm directly and intrinsically caused by the government action
(loss of spiritual power), and that harm was the cause, not the result,
of limits on individual action. Those limits on individual action in
turn may have caused secondary harms because of Little Bird of the
Snow's inability to engage in important behaviors. But the principal
religious harm is the direct result of government activity, not individual activity. The recognition of all secondary harms depends on
the recognition of this primary harm. The complete Bowen claim
might thus be diagrammed: Government Regulation-> Primary
Religious Effect-> Limits on Individual Activity-> Secondary
Religious Effects.
In Sherbert, by contrast, the plaintiff complained of a religious
harm directly and intrinsically caused by the individual's behavior
(failure to observe the Sabbath) and only mediately by the government activity. The religious harm was the result, not the cause, of
limits on individual activity. The government regulation did cause
religious harms, but only indirectly, through pressure on an individual to behave in a given way. The Sherbert claim might thus be
diagrammed: Government Regulation-> Limits on Individual Activity-> Religious Effects. The threatened religious harms in such
a claim are all directly the results of the individual's failure to perform or not to perform a certain act, not of government action.15 0
These diagrams highlight the central feature of the Court's distinction between internal governmental conduct and external regulation of individual behavior. In Sherbert, the cognizable religious
harm to the individual was the direct result of the individual's beSee supra note 92.
150 In Sherbert the religious effects were not inevitable, and the limits on individual
activity not absolute, because Sherbert could have refused the benefits, as she did. In
this sense, the complete claim might be diagrammed: Government Regulation ->
Limits on Individual Activity -> Religious Effects OR Loss of Benefits.
149
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havior; in Bowen, the noncognizable religious harm was the direct
result of governmental behavior. In other words, the Constitution

recognizes only those religious harms that directly result from a particular individual's activity; the Constitution denies that other events
in the universe can have cognizable religious consequences for that
individual.' 5 '

As a corollary of this position, the Court will recognize only
those limits on individual behavior that result "non-ascriptively"

from government regulation. 152 Bowen did involve limits on individual activity, and indeed those limits, in turn, produced harmful religious effects. But these limits on individual conduct result from
intrinsic religious effects that Roy ascribed to government action.
Since these intrinsic religious effects are not constitutionally cogni-

zable, neither are the limits on individual behavior that flow from
them.

Thus, the Bowen Court recognized only a certain category of
religious claims-claims that might, in a loose sense, be called individualistic. Only claims that take the following form are constitutionally cognizable: my religion demands that I act or not act in a
given way; I must be free so to act or not act, because if I deviate

from these demands I will suffer negative religious consequences;
but I will not suffer negative religious consequences for any other
reason, such as the intrinsic religious significance of government activity. 153 This form of claim is based on a particular view of religious
activity that individual action alone valorizes the religious world of
the individual, or at least that part of the religious world that is con151 The conclusion that only individual activity can have religious effects follows necessarily from the conclusion that government regulation cannot. All free exercise practice claims must assert that government regulation limits a believer's conduct. But
according to the Court, since a government regulation cannot itself generate direct religious effects, it cannot create limits on individuals by means of a religious effect. In the
causal diagram, no religious effect can intervene between the terms "Government Regulation" and "Limits on Individual Activity." Thus, the basis for any free exercise claim
must be that the government is "non-ascriptively" limiting individual behavior: Government Regulation -> Limits on Individual Activity. Since religious effect cannot precede a limit on individual activity, it can only follow individual activity in the causal
sequence. As a result, in the universe of possible free exercise claims, only individual
activity, and not government regulation, can have religious effects.
152 The two kinds of burdens that the Court recognized-prohibitions and weighted
choices-make sense in at least some individualist frameworks. See infra text accompanying notes 167-76.
153
The Bowen Court may not have intended to exclude nonindividualist claims from
all protection. Bowen concerned only burdens on practice resulting from facially neutral
laws. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986). Thus, the Court might have
recognized nonvolitionalist belief claims or claims that a law facially or intentionally discriminated against a nonvolitionalist religion. Under Bowen, then, volitionalist claims are
not the exclusive inhabitants of the free exercise clause's shelter, but they are clearly the
favored inhabitants.
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stitutionally cognizable. I am responsible, I am to suffer, only for
my own actions. Accordingly, we will call this model of religious
15 4
behavior an individualist model.
b.

Volitionalism.

Volitionalism is a subcategory of individualism. While individualism's general premise is that the individual may legitimately suffer
only as a result of her own behavior, volitionalism maintains m6re
specifically that she may suffer only from her own behavior for a
particular reason: she has the capacity to exercise free and self-determining choice, yet has failed to exercise this capacity so as to live
up to her obligations. The critical religious activity is not just individual behavior, but individual behavior that is the result of free individual choices' 5 5 informed by conscience, the central religious
faculty.' 56 Stephen Roy's claim was nonvolitionalist: Little Bird of
the Snow would suffer loss of spiritual power not because of any
failure on her part to exercise her will, but simply because some
other person possessed a unique numerical identifier that would
give him power over her.
The Bowen Court's distinction between "internal" and "exter154 The Court's adherence to this model may help to explain the majority's studied
neglect of the choice that Roy actually faced. Roy could have prevented the government
from using the number by not applying for benefits at all. On the face of things, the
statutory scheme thus presented a classic Sherbert-style burden. Roy was forced to
choose between forgoing government benefits and bringing religious harm upon himself. Except forJustice Blackmun, however, the Court entirely ignored the existence of
this choice. TheJustices' individualist bias offers one reason. Although Roy could have
chosen to avert the harm, his claim was still nonindividualist. Roy ascribed religious
significance to the state's use of the number not because he had a choice in the matter,
but simply because the government's action had inherent religious meaning. That Roy
had some choice in the matter is wholly coincidental; his application for benefits is an
occasion for harm but not the reason for it. His claim is essentially nonindividualist
because he suffers harm as a result, not of his own, but of the government's actions. The
Court may thus have found itself in a dilemma. On the one hand, Roy's case presented
the Court with a Sherbert-style choice long recognized as a burden; on the other hand,
the Justices' individualist "frame of reference" would reject the burden as nonindividualist in nature. The Court could have openly avowed that Sherbert ought to be confined
to individualist claims, but such an avowal, perhaps, would have made the Court's substantive bias too apparent. So the Court selected the easiest solution to its dilemma by
simply ignoring the existence of the choice Roy faced.
155
Not all individualist models are volitionalist. A belief system may maintain that
individuals suffer religious consequences only for their own actions, but not because
those actions are the result of undetermined choices. The religion may even deny that
the believer has any choice in the matter. Although such religions are logically possible,
they are extremely uncommon in western democracies today because of the pervasive
influence of liberal ideas enshrining individual responsibility and tying it to undetermined choice. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
156 This definition of conscience is based on what we suspect is the most common
use of that word. A person suffers from a guilty conscience when she has failed in her
moral obligations and knows that she could have done better.
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nal" government practices rested not merely on a general individu1 57
alist paradigm but more specifically on a volitionalist paradigm.
The Court implicitly revealed its adherence to a volitionalist view of
the religious self in four significant ways. First, the Bowen Court assumed that its view of the proper reach of religious freedom is selfevident and commonplace, and that any other view savors of the
bizarre; ascribing religious significance to the government's use of a
social security number is as odd and outrageous as ascribing religious significance to the color of the government's file cabinets.
The volitional model of the self is the most commonplace and selfevident model in American society.' 5 8 In this culture, to say that
one is an individualist is virtually to say that one is a volitionalist.
Although nonvolitional individualist religious practices are theoretically possible, they are extremely rare in modern America.1 5 9 To
the vast majority of modern Americans, individualism and volitionalism go hand in hand: individuals are responsible only for their
own actions because one can exercise free choice only over one's
actions.
Second, the Court's language in the exemption cases exhibits
the apparent assumption that paradigm free exercise claims are
claims of conscience, in which the individual must exercise her free
will to fulfill a religious obligation. Thus, the Court recognized
Sherbert's claim of "conscientious objection to Saturday work...
prompted by religious principles"; 160 Thomas's claim that he
"could not work on weapons without violating the principles of his
religion"; 16 1 and the claim of the Old Order Amish that in light of
"a religiously based obligation" to care for their elderly, they could
neither accept social security benefits nor pay social security
taxes. 16 2 This language suggests that paradigmatic religious activity
is volitional: individuals have the choice to obey or disobey the demands of conscience, and their religious fate is determined by mak16 3
ing the right choice.
157 Actually, little turns on whether the Court's bias is generally individualist or
more narrowly volitionalist because either bias is inconsistent with the underpinnings of
the free exercise clause and meaningful religious liberty. Neither courts nor legislatures
should be free to subject either nonindividualist or nonvolitionalist religions to discriminatory treatment.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 17-65.
159 See supra note 155.
160 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
161
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
162 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
163 Some commentators have criticized the Court's unduly restrictive focus on
claims of conscience. See Note, Religious Exemptions Under the FreeExercise Clause: A Model
of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE LJ.350, 357 (1980). Others have defended a focus on
protecting the religious person-cdearly recognizable as a volitionalist-from being
forced to violate his conscience. SeeJ. Morris Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause,
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Third, the Bowen Court revealed its volitionalist bias by recognizing only those kinds of burdens on religious practice that fit most
comfortably in a volitionalist belief scheme. The Court recognized
only two particular kinds of burdens: laws that facially compel a believer to act contrary to her religion, and laws that require the believer to choose between religious practice, government rights,
benefits, or privileges. More recently, in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery
ProtectiveAssociation, the Court definitively construed Bowen as holding that only these two types of pressures qualify as burdens under
the free exercise clause. 1 64 The former Lyng describes as "direct coercion"; 16 5 and the latter as "indirect coercion." 166 "Direct coercion," as defined by the Court, makes sense in either a volitionalist
or nonvolitionalist individualist framework. "Indirect coercion,"
however, is best understood in a volitionalist context because such a
burden involves pressure on the believer to make the wrong choice.
"Direct coercion" comports with any individualist system of belief. A law that "directly coerces" conduct is one that facially prohibits religious conduct or one that facially requires religiously
prohibited conduct.1 6 7 Direct coercion burdens volitionalist religious practice because it prevents the believer from fulfilling religious obligations. In some pure volitionalist systems, "direct
coercion" may not appear to be a burden at all because the religion
requires only a will to effect the given end. Therefore, "impossibility" because of a coercive law is considered an excuse. In these circumstances, some commentators have suggested that no burden
exists. 168 However, the situation is rarely this simple, because even
in a case of direct coercion, the believer still has it within his power
83 Hav. L. REV. 327, 337-38 (1969) ("[T]he cost to a principled individual of failing to
do his moral duty is generally severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of
moral self-respect."). Professor Choper would restrict the constitutional definition of
religion to those faiths that threaten "extratemporal consequences" for violations of
behavioral rules because "the commands of religious belief.., have a unique significance for the believer, thus making it particularly cruel for the government to require
the believer to choose between violating those commands and suffering meaningful temporal disabilities." Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 579, 597-99.
164
See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 448
(1988).
165
Lyng describes "direct coercion" burdens as "outright prohibitions," laws that
facially proscribe conduct inconsistent with religious belief. Id at 450.
166 Lyng describes "indirect coercion" as governmental actions that "penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges
enjoyed by other citizens." Id. at 449. Such indirect coercion is not regarded as an
outright prohibition but simply a penalty. Id at 450. The believer must choose between
forgoing the practice and incurring the penalty.
167
See supra note 165.
168
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 163, at 347-48.
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to effect the end: she can go to jail or pay the fine.1 6 9 From the
believer's perspective, therefore, direct coercion poses the same
kind of dilemma as indirect coercion: the law puts the believer to a
70
weighted choice, forcing on her a crisis of conscience.'
A volitionalist would thus recognize "direct coercion" as a burden on religious practice. A nonvolitionalist individualist, however,
would also recognize such a burden. Nonvolitionalist individualist
religions maintain that only individual actions, but not acts of will,
can create religious significance. Laws that facially forbid or require
conduct pose a threat to these religions, not because they tempt the
believer's will, but because the laws directly regulate individual conduct, with resultant religious effects. 17 1 Not all "direct coercion"
laws actually prevent conduct. The believer may simply be compelled to choose between incurring a penalty and forgoing the religious practice. The goal of these laws is, however, to affect conduct,
not simply to require the believer to make a choice. If the threat of
72
penalty does not prevent the conduct, the law has failed.'
Thus, Bowen's recognition of burdens that "directly coerce" the
believer comports with any individualist religious framework. By
contrast, the Court's description of "indirect coercion" fits best with
a volitionalist model of religious behavior. These burdens are not
designed to prevent certain religious conduct but merely to make
the believer choose between government benefits and religious
practice. Therefore, if the believer chooses religious practice over
benefits, the law has in no sense failed to achieve its goal, because
the goal was not to forbid the practice but merely to require a
169
In Yoder, for example, the State threatened imposition of a five-dollar fine, not
actual physical coercion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972).
170
However, we do not suggest that absent a choice, if the government were to
render a practice impossible by physically preventing it rather than by punishing it, volitionalists would recognize no burden. A government could completely eradicate the
practice of any and all volitionalist behaviors by the cumulative effect of a series of such
preventions. The individual would find no immediate consequence for herself in any of
the separate burdens, because she retains the defense of impossibility. In the aggregate,
however, the government measures would eliminate her religion as a phenomenon.
This explanation may help account for the tendency of courts to recognize a burden
when states force Jehovah's Witnesses to take blood transfusions, even though the religion may consider impossibility to be a genuine excuse.
171
To illustrate: a religion might ascribe beneficial religious effects to its adherents'
use of certain drugs. A volitionalist religion would require the believer to exercise her
free will to use such drugs. If the state were to criminalize use of such drugs, the volitionalist would be faced with a weighted choice between using drugs and going to jail.
The harm occurs in tempting the believer to stray from her obligations. A nonvolitionalist individualist religion, on the other hand, would find religious significance in
whether the believer actually used the drugs, not in the strength of his will in adherence
to his religious conscience.
172 Even if the goal of these laws were not prevention, they might still burden
nonvolitionalist religions simply by making the practice of the religion costlier.
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choice. The Court's concern in these cases is not that the state attempted to forbid religious practice, but that it compelled the believer to make a "cruel choice," 173 tempting him from his religious
dedication. 174 As a result, Sherbert condemns government action
that "forces [a believer] to choose between" benefits and religious
practice; 175 Thomas condemns these choices because they place
"substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs." 176 In its condemnation of such choices, the
Court's concern seems to be for the conscientious believer struggling to live up to the obligations placed on him by his religion; the
evil in such burdens is that they tempt the believer away from the
right path by weighting the choice against the straight and narrow.
In essence, then, the Bowen Court indicated its volitionalist bias
by recognizing burdens that only make sense in light of a volitionalist theory of the religious agent. Since the Court believes that the
Constitution adopts a unitary "frame of reference" for measuring
burdens, we may infer that, in the Court's view, the Constitution is
volitionalist.
Finally, the Court offered evidence of its volitionalism in its suggestion that the free exercise clause shares the same "frame of reference" as the "Constitution generally."' 17 7 This constitutional
"frame of reference" distinguishes between government actions
173 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 368
U.S. 869 (1961).
174
"Indirect coercion" not only imposes a cruel choice on the believer, such penalties to the exercise of religion also make the practice of the religion more costly. For
example, the Court in Sherbert analogized this choice to "a fine imposed against [her] for
...Saturday worship." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). Unlike the "cruel
choice" burden, this "extra cost" burden makes sense in a nonvolitionalist individualist
religion, because the focus is not on the will required to hew to the correct path, but on
the additional cost extracted for religious practice. Formally, then, recognition of such
burdens is consistent with nonvolitionalist individualism.
A closer consideration of the Court's treatment of "indirect" burdens, however,
suggests its volitionalism. First, as elaborated earlier, see supra text accompanying notes
167-70, the Court's actual language indicates concern about the cruelty of forcing a
believer to choose between conscience and benefits; the model of the stereotypical believer is a volitionalist struggling to make the right choices. Second, in the Court's conception, "indirect coercion" differs from "outright prohibitions" in that it requires
believers to choose rather than forbidding or commanding behavior. The Court thus
presupposes that putting the believer to a choice is analytically distinguishable from an
outright command, because the believer has some freedom in making choices and is not
simply driven by an external stimulus. "Indirect coercion" thus presupposes some degree of free will.
175 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
176 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
177
"[T]he Free Exercise Clause, and the Constitution generally, recognize such a
distinction [between individual and governmental conduct]; for the adjudication of a
constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must supply
the frame of reference." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 n.6 (1986).
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which cause a cognizable external impact on individual conduct and
those that are merely internal. As previously discussed, the Bowen
Court drew this distinction by adopting a theory of individual activity from which to measure internality and externality. 178 The Court
apparently believed that the Constitution "generally" enshrines a
particular view of moral, religious, or political activity.
The view that the Court had in mind was almost certainly volitionalist. Although it is not the only possible reading, perhaps the
most common view is that the Constitution rests on a volitionalist
view of moral and political activity. Paradigmatic individuals are
moral agents because they are independent and significantly selfdetermining-uncontrolled by material, sociological, psychological,
biological, or theological determinism. This view is plain in the general philosophical underpinnings frequently attributed to the Constitution: in social contractarian theory, the free choice by
individuals to enter into civil government is the basis for political
17 9
legitimacy.
Similarly, the most common view of many constitutional liberties is that they rest on a volitionalist view of moral activity. The
Constitution protects certain spheres of autonomy so as to allow individuals to exercise their ability to choose how to live their lives
based on their own views about the good life.' 8 0 Such autonomy
would be meaningless if individuals were at the mercy of forces be178 See id at 700. A volitionalist, for example, would ascribe no direct religious effect
to the color of the government's file cabinets-and therefore, no external limit on his
own behavior resulting from their color-but a nonvolitionalist might.
179 In fact, the historical relationship between volitionalism and social contractarianism is somewhat more complicated than is usually recognized. See infra notes 316-18 and
accompanying text. In contemporary legal circles, however, it seems safe to say that
social contractarianism is believed to derive the legitimacy of the state from the individual's free choice to enter the contract.
180 The notion that the Bill of Rights protects the ability of the individual to choose
is, of course, so common that it borders on the trite. The more problematic element of
this claim is that the Constitution protects choice because individuals can exercise free
will and it is important that the state allow them the space to do so. The Court rarely
makes this element of the claim explicit. Nonetheless, we think that when the Court
speaks of protecting choices, it usually means undetermined choices. We base this conclusion on several factors. First, volitionalism as a moral and political theory is pervasive
in our society, and so the most likely reason to protect choices is to allow room for the
exercise of free will. Second, the Court has, at times, made its volitionalist interpretation of the Constitution more or less explicit in connection with specific clauses of the
Bill of Rights. Third, the Court has regularly denied constitutional rights to those apparently incapable of exercising an autonomous will. See John H. Garvey, Freedom and
Choice in ConstitutionalLaw, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1756, 1757-62 (1981). Other commentators have noted that the Court generally presumes that normally individuals are capable
of making self-determined choices. See Martha Minow, Foreword-Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REv. 10, 55 & n.217 (1987); Martha Minow, When DiferenceHas Its Home: Group
Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 142-44 & nn.95-96.
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yond their control. When an individual speaks, acts, or believes a
given way, generally those acts are morally attributable to her will,
not to an external web of causation. 8 1 As Professor Richards has
noted, "[t]he vision, ultimately, is one of persons who, because of
the effective exercise of their autonomy, are able to identify their
lives as their own, having thus realized the inestimable moral and
human good of having chosen one's life as a free and rational
being."182
Thus, the Constitution guarantees the right to free expression
in the "marketplace of ideas" so that an individual may freely
choose from among a range of ideas and then promote her chosen
view by exposition.' 8 3 Alternatively, the speech guarantee exists because "speech is one important way in which we define ourselves as
autonomous actors, worthy of human dignity .... In speaking, we
create our identity and proclaim it to others."' 8 4 Similarly, commentators defend substantive rights under the due process clause as
protections for self-determined, individual choice in intimate association.1 8 5 Finally, voting rights arguably emerge from a view of the
political self as volitional: the franchise is central to a democratic
government because it allows individuals to participate in rational
8 6
self-determination.1
181
This view of the Constitution does not necessarily presume, of course, that the
individual is never subject to determinism. Rather, the Constitution presumes that individuals only sometimes exercise free will, and that this exercise of will is the only basis
for moral activity.
182
David AJ. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A MoralArgumentfor
the Decriminalizationof Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1225-26 (1979).
185
See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv.
964, 968-74 (1978). Indeed, the "marketplace of ideas" notion has recently received
extensive criticism precisely because many believe that individuals do not "freely"
choose their views based simply on a rational, independent, undetermined assessment
of the objective truth. Rather, experiences, interests, class location, the "market" itself,
and other elements substantially determine the views of individuals. See, e.g., id at 97678.
184 John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CoNN. L. Ruv.
779, 788 (1986); see also Baker, supra note 183, at 991-92.
185 Perhaps the clearest articulation of these assumptions occurred injustice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S.
1039 (1986):
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and
material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life. "[The concept of privacy embodies the
'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society
as a whole.'"
Id at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) ("Protecting these [intimate] relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.").
186 Thus, the Court has held that laws barring the insane and children from the
franchise are constitutional, whereas wealth requirements are not. See Harper v. Virginia
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Under this theory of the document, the Constitution guarantees
liberties to prevent the state from constricting the individual's exercise of free will. Any state action that imposes a restriction, a direct
limitation on individual choice, has constitutionally cognizable external effects on individual activity. 18 7 However, the Court defines
as internal government activity any state action that constricts individual activity only from a nonvolitionalist perspective. Thus, even
if an individual believed-for nonreligious reasons-that the color
of the government's filing cabinets prevented her from voting Republican or speaking her mind, the Court would presumably conclude that the effect of the government's action was not cognizable
in the constitutional "frame of reference." And, since the Bowen
Court asserted that the general framework for the Constitution is
also the framework for the free exercise clause, it must have believed that the free exercise clause incorporated a volitionalist view
of religious activity. 18 8 A free exercise claim, then, must look like a
free speech claim or a substantive due process claim.
In Part II, we will argue that even if the Constitution does incorporate a volitionalist paradigm of the moral and political self in
some of its provisions, it does not necessarily follow that the free
exercise clause also incorporates this frame of reference.' 8 9 Part of
religious freedom is the right to select one's own paradigm of the
religious self; a freedom without which all other religious liberties
may become meaningless. First, however, the next section examines
another set of nonvolitionalist claims-Native American sacred land
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."); Garvey,
supra note 180, at 1761 ("[Uiltimately the ballot functions as a means ofsef-govemment,
an activity difficult for those incapable of moral and rational choice.") (emphasis in
original).
187 In fact, the Court does not even consider "indirect coercion" to be a burden on
the substantive due process right of a woman to choose whether to abort a fetus; the
state may constitutionally decide to favor childbirth over abortion by granting funding
to the former but not the latter. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, reh'g denied, 448 U.S.
917 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). This approach seems attributable not to
any diminution of the Court's volitionalism-the Court, after all, recognizes that disproportionate funding may well discourage abortions, see id at 474-but rather to the
Court's own ambivalence about the abortion right in particular. The Court avers that a
weighted choice does not qualify as a burden on the abortion right because the state is
allowed to prefer childbirth over abortion. See id. at 474 n.8.
188 Professor Baker has recommended precisely such a linkage of the various clauses
of the first amendment. Arguing that the free speech clause should protect the volitionalist values of self-realization and autonomy, he maintains that the free exercise clause
should protect the same values by protecting conscientiously motivated conduct. See
Baker, supra note 183, at 1035-39.
189 Cf. Garvey, supra note 184, at 788-92 (arguing that the autonomy value protected
by the other individual rights should not be the value protected by the free exercise
clause).
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claims-and argues that the Court's treatment of these claims
reveals again its volitionalist bias.
SECTION THREE.
THE COURT'S DEFINITION OF A "BURDEN":

LYNG

Stephen Roy's claim was perhaps factually unusual, but by no
means unique, in being based on a nonvolitionalist paradigm of religious activity. Traditionally, the dominant view in this country has
been volitionalist, but a variety of nonmainstream religions, especially Native American religions, hold alternative views. In recent
years, American Indians' 9 0 have brought a series of nonvolitionalist
claims to prevent federal development of sacred sites. Anticipating
Bowen, the appellate courts tended either to ignore them or to reject
them outright.1 9 1 And ultimately, the Supreme Court held that
these nonvolitionalist claims fall outside of the protection of the first
92
amendment.'
A.

Introduction

As a result of the conquest of America, a number of Indian sacred sites are now located on federal property, principally national
parks and forests. For religious reasons, many American Indians
believe that these lands must be kept in their natural state, or else
their people will suffer serious religious consequences.19 3 Recently,
however, the federal government began to develop these sites in a
variety of ways-by building roads through the area,194 flooding the
190 We use the terms "Native Americans" and "Indians" interchangeably for the
reasons noted by Stephen Cornell: "Both terms are widely used by Indians, and it is by
no means clear which is the preferred usage. In general, 'Indian' is more common on
reservations and in urban Indian communities, while 'Native American' appears to be
preferred in universities, among many intellectuals, and in some Indian organizations."
STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLTICAL RESURGENCE vi (1988).

191 E.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983);
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981);
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Dedman v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28
(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988).
192 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
193 The Supreme Court conceded that development of sacred sites "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices" and that "the threat to the efficacy of at least some religious practices is extremely grave." Id. at 451. The federal
appellate courts made similar concessions. See cases cited supra note 191. Thus, the
negative religious effect of development was simply not an issue in these cases; rather,
the issue was whether the effect was of a kind cognizable under the religion clauses.
194 See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Petersen, 764 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1985), withdrawn & aff'd on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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sites,' 9 5 or, in one case, allowing the construction of a private ski
resort on them. 19 In response, individual Indians and Indian
groups have brought free exercise claims to prevent this
development.
97
The sites are sacred to Native Americans in at least two ways.'
First, Indians must have access to the sites to perform certain religious activities, such as gathering medicine or celebrating rituals, so
as to bring about a desired end, such as healing the sick. Federal
development may interfere with these activities in ways which do not
involve ascribing inherent religious significance to the government's
actions, e.g., by flooding the spot or prohibiting entrance. Indians
therefore brought claims to stop such development or to gain access
to the sites so as to conduct their religious activities. For convenience, we will call these access claims.
Access claims may be readily understood in volitionalist
terms.198 The central religious activity is individual behavior chosen
by the Indians for religious reasons. The Indians' failure to participate in the prescribed activities at these sites causes the harmful ef195 See, e.g., Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162; see also Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981) (site flooded as an indirect consequence of construction and operation ofadjoining dam).
196 See Wilson v. Block, 708 U.S. 735, 740 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983).
197 The Indians themselves may not distinguish between the two ways in which sites
are sacred, but the distinction is necessary for analysis because the courts draw it, implicitly or explicitly. Cf Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development:
A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 771, 778 n.48, 791
n.138 (1987) (authored by Mark S. Cohen) (noting the distinction between claims about
impaired access to the site and about the intrinsic sacredness of the site).
198 Some Indian religions contain very substantial volitionalist elements. Many focus on the importance of ritual propriety; humans must carefully adhere to religious
rules in order to ensure the continued harmony of the natural world. See, e.g., JERRY
KAMMER, THE SECOND LONG WALK 32-33, 58-59 (1980). The Hopi religion is perhaps
the best example ofvolitionalism. The Hopi Way, the core of their religion, is an elaborate set of rules, and "they believe they can, through regulating their behavior, emotions
and thoughts in a prescribed manner, exercise a measure of control over their environment." LAURA THOMPSON & ALICE JOSEPH, THE Hopi WAY 37 (1965).
On the other hand, some access claims may appear volitionalist but, from the Indians' perspective, are not, since the event that produces religious effects is the ceremony
itself, not the choice to engage in the ceremony. Moreover, some of these claims are not
even truly individualist because failure to perform a ceremony may negatively affect not
only the potential celebrant but also those in no sense responsible for the failure. Even
truly volitionalist claims, such as the Hopis', are closely linked to nonvolitionalist claims.
The Hopi kachina dances are a good example. For the kachina dances to be effective,
the Hopi must engage in weeks of spiritual discipline and self-control, but the sacred site
must also be undefiled by development. See J. KAMMER, supra, at 59. Moreover, the
failure of one of the celebrants can have dire consequences for all of the Hopis in a given
village. See L. THOMPSON & A. JOSEPH, supra, at 41. The point, however, is not that any
of these claims are truly volitionalist, but that the courts can and have assumed they were
volitionalist. As a result courts have extended more protection to these claims than
others.
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fect. The burden imposed by government development is readily
cognizable from a volitionalist perspective: the government effectively prevents the Indians from eugaging in religious behavior on
the sites by preventing access in ways that do not depend on ascribing inherent religious significance to the government's actions. In
light of Bowen, then, we would expect that a volitionalist Court
would be sympathetic to some range of access claims, and, in fact,
the cases bear out this prediction.
The sites are also sacred to the Indians in a more fundamental
and nonvolitionalist way: These sites effectively define an Indian
religion and an Indian people. In several important senses, the
sites, rather than the activities surrounding them, constitute the religion of Native Americans. 199 First, many Indian groups believe that
the natural world began in chaos and threatens to slip back into
chaos. The sacred site, in its natural state, gives religious meaning
and order to the world because the supernatural enters the natural
world there. Since the natural and the supernatural commingle at
the site, the site provides a fixed point of absolute value so that natural chaos can become order only by reference to this point, this
20 0
inbreaking of the supernatural.
Second and relatedly, a site in its natural state is necessary to
the cosmic harmony of the universe and the sacred balance of the
land. Since the "Gods live there" (either literally or by analogy to
non-Indian religious concepts) or because of the site's significance
in giving meaning to the world,20 1 the site is the axis which assures
continued harmony.
Third, sacred sites religiously define the Indians as a people by
providing the central connection between them and the supernatural. These sites bridge the natural and the supernatural, for the Indians began their existence as a people by erecting these bridges
and entering the world on them. In this sense, the site defines the
tribe as a people; without it, they will cease to exist as a religious or
cultural body.20 2 Finally, Native Americans believe that their ceremonies can have spiritual effect only if the sites are in their natural
199
The following is a composite description of the claims; not all of the claims exhibit all of the listed features.
200
See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1162 (6th Cir.), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); WILLIAM E. COFFER, SPIrrs OF THE SACRED MOUNTAINS 5152 (1978); M. ELIADE, supra note 66, at 29-54.
201
See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
945 (1981); Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160; A. HULTKRANTZ, supra note 91, at 60-64; JOHN
UPTON TERRELL, THE NAvAjos 3 (1970); L. THOMPSON & A.JOSEPH, supra note 198, at 42
(1944 ed.); Ortiz, supra note 90, at 187.
202
See, e.g., Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740 n.2; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162;JOHN BiERHORST,
THE MYTHOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICA 78, 82-83, 192-93 (1985); W. COFFER, supra note
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state. The success of the ceremonies depends not only on the activity of individuals but also on the condition of the world, a quality
20 3
beyond the control of the Indian practitioners.
Therefore, governmental modification of these sacred sites
causes great damage to Native American religions, even if the Indians are not complicit in the modification. According to the Indians,
alteration of the sites will turn order into chaos, disrupt the sacred
balance of the land, destroy the existence of the Indians as a people,
and deprive Indian practitioners of all spiritual efficacy. Consequently, the Indians have brought claims to enjoin any federal alteration of the land. For convenience, we will call these disruption
claims. Disruption claims are nonvolitionalist because the central
element is not individual religious obligation 20 4 but preservation of
the land, which is of the utmost importance regardless of who performed the alteration. The Indians thus ascribe desecratory effect
to the government's activity-building a road, flooding the site, or
allowing the presence of tourists.
Despite the grave religious effect, one would predict that volitionalistically biased courts would prove unreceptive to disruption
claims because they are nonvolitionalist in nature. In fact, with one
exception, courts have rejected the Indians' disruption claims. In
1985, the Ninth Circuit created a split in the circuits by becoming
the only court to grant such a claim. That decision was also the first
sacred land opinion to be overturned by the Supreme Court. 20 5
200, at 51-52; P. MATrHIESSEN, supra note 90, at 119-21; Ortiz, supra note 90, at 181-83,
187.
203
See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 592 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985),
withdrawn & aff'd on rehearing,795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Badoni v. Higginson, 455
F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Utah 1977), aft'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
204 In some cases, such disruption claims might be associated with a related volitionalist claim that the Indians are under a duty to keep the land in its natural state. See
Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
205
See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1985), withdrawn & aff'd on rehearing, 795 F. 2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub norn.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). We consider
here only the Indians' free exercise challenges to the development of sacred sites. The
Indians also brought claims under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988), a congressional policy statement that recognizes the
unconventional nature of Indian religions and recommends a more sensitive approach,
especially regarding sacred sites. The courts, however, have concluded that AIRFA is
only a policy statement and has "'no teeth.'" The Act mandates administrative "'consideration'" of Indian interests but creates no substantive rights. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (quoting 124 CONG. REC.
21,444-45 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)); see Note, The FirstAmendment and the American Indian Religious FreedomAct: An Approach to ProtectingNative American Religion, 71 IowA
L. REv. 869, 891 (1986) (authored by Diane Brazen Gould); Note, The American Indian
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Before Lyng: The Early Sacred Land Cases

Well before the Supreme Court had occasion to reveal its volitionalist bias in Bowen, the appellate courts were already rejecting
nonvolitionalist sacred land claims based on a volitionalist reading
of the Constitution. The Court's decisions in Lyng and Bowen, therefore, did not so much lead the way as they did ratify the volitionalist
bias. A quick review of the major cases suggests the virtual ubiquity
of the volitionalist viewpoint among the circuit courts before Lyng.
20 6
In the first major case, Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Cherokees sought to prevent the flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley. They believed the flooding would sever the Cherokee
connection with the Great Spirit, rooted in the historical origin of
the Cherokees in that valley. 20 7 The court stated that the free exercise clause protects only religious practices that are "central[ ]" to a
religion, 20 8 a restriction that the Supreme Court has since definitively rejected. 20 9 The court's reason for adopting this novel restriction may perhaps be gleaned from its explanation of why the valley
is not "central" to the Cherokees: "The overwhelming concern of
the affiants appears to be related to the historical beginnings of the
Cherokees and their cultural development. It is damage to tribal
and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observances, which appears to be at stake." 2 10 In other words, the
court will recognize as central only religious harms arising from limits on an individual's "particular religious observances." Nonvolitionalist harms caused by the government's severing the "historical"
connection between a people and a geographical feature are automatically peripheral.
Next, in Badoni v. Higginson,2 1 1 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
Navajos claim that the presence of tourists at Rainbow Bridge National Monument desecrated a sacred site. For relief, the Indians
Religious Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indians' Prayers?, 29 S.D.L. REV. 131, 137-39, 143
(1983) (authored by Rex P. Craven).
206
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
207 Id at 1162.
208 Id. at 1164.
209
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58. To be fair to the Sequoyah Court, some academic commentators urged a kind of "centrality" test as a way of limiting the potential reach of
Sherbert, and courts may perhaps be forgiven for listening to academics. See LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUioNAL LAw § 14-12, at 1246-48 (2d ed. 1988); Joseph M.
Dodge, II, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv. 679
(1969); Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection,

1971 Sup. CT. REv. 31, 87. However, the centrality test had no clear basis in case law
when Sequoyah was decided. The question still remains as to why the court decided to
apply the test to the Indians' claim and not to other, more volitionalist claims.
210
Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
211 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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requested an injunction ordering the National Park Service to regulate the behavior of the tourists. The court asserted that most free
exercise claims involve one of the two volitionalist burdens:
"[G]overnment dictates which compel citizens to violate tenets of
their religion [direct coercion] ... or government action which conditions a benefit or right on renunciation of a religious practice [indirect coercion]." 2 12 The court also suggested that it might
recognize a pure access claim alleging such a burden: "The government.., has not prohibited plaintiffs' religious exercises in the area
of Rainbow Bridge; plantiffs may enter the Monument on the same
basis as other people. ' 2 13 But the Navajos complained that religious harm arose, not from their own inability to gain access, which
might be volitionalist, but from the conduct of the tourists-which is
nonvolitionalist because the Indians suffered for another's actions.
The court denied the request for an injunction regulating the
behavior of tourists, stating that it would violate the establishment
clause since its "avowed purpose" was "aiding plaintiffs' conduct of
religious ceremonies. ' 2 14 The Supreme Court, however, had previously unequivocally rejected the Tenth Circuit's apparent premise.
The Court stated that accommodation of religious practice required
by the free exercise clause is not forbidden by the establishment
clause. 2 15 The Tenth Circuit chose to overlook this unambiguous
precedent, apparently because the Navajos claim does not follow the
"normal" volitionalist pattern.
Finally, in Wilson v. Block,2 16 Navajo and Hopi plaintiffs claimed
that the construction of a ski resort in the San Francisco mountains
would desecrate the sacred area, destroying the Indians' existence
as a people and rendering their ceremonies ineffective. The court
accurately characterized these nonvolitionalist claims in its summary
of the facts,2 17 but then in its rationale and holding, the court mischaracterized or ignored them. First, the court addressed what it
termed the Navajos "belief" claims-their unease and fear caused
by the threat of desecration of the site.2 18 In its consideration and
subsequent rejection of belief claims, the court addressed only the
Id at 178.
Id.
214 Id at 179.
215 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21, 234 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963); see also Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the
Suprene Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913-14 (1987) (a
"purpose of complying with the mandate of the free exercise clause" is legitimate under
the establishment clause).
216 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
217 Id at 740 & n.2.
218 Id at 740.
212
213
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Indians' fears, not the Indians' contention that desecration would
cause limits on their practice.
The court then considered practice claims. It interpreted these
claims as volitionalist because they were based on the need to gain
access to the site so as to gather medicines and perform ceremonies.
Relying on Sequoyah, the court held that the free exercise clause extends protection only to "indispensable" sites in the sense that the
"religious practice... could not be performed at any other site." 2 19
Since the Indians physically could perform ceremonies elsewhere,
the court rejected their claim. But again, the court failed even to
address the Indians' nonvolitionalist practice claims. These claims
maintain not that the Indians must be allowed to perform their ceremonies somewhere in the area, but that the government must not
develop the area at all. If the government did so it would be desecrating the mountains, thereby disrupting the Indians' whole way of
life and rendering all their site-connected ceremonies ineffective,
wherever performed. The court apparently ignored or did not understand this nonvolitionalist aspect of the challenge.
The courts thus rejected all of the early sacred land claims for
reasons connected to their nonvolitionalist nature. Even prior to
Bowen, volitionalism had become a part of free exercise clause jurisprudence. After Bowen, it was perhaps predictable that the Supreme
Court would ratify this tendency. The Ninth Circuit gave it the occasion to do so when it became the first court to approve a sacred
land claim.
C.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation
1.

The Lower Court

In Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation (NICPA) v. Peterson,220 the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court to find for the
Indians in a sacred land case. The basic claim was nonvolitionalist.
For generations, spiritual leaders of various Northwest tribes have
travelled into the High Country, a segment of the Siskiyou Mountains, to communicate with the Great Creator and receive power.
For these medicine quests to be spiritually effective, the area must
remain in its "unitary pristine nature. ' 22 1 In 1977, the National
Forest Service decided to build a logging road through the High
Country, and the Indians sought to enjoin its construction. 2 22 This
Id. at 744.
764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn and aff'd on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th
Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
221
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692.
222
The Indians also challenged the Forest Service's decision to allow timber har219
220
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claim was nonvolitionalist because the Indians ascribed direct religious significance to the government's own actions. The believer
mainly suffered harm not from his failure to honor his obligations,
but from the government's desecration of the site, making the
quester's spiritual development impossible. Indeed, the claim
closely echoed Roy's: government activity would "rob [the questor]
'2 23
of... spiritual power.
Application of the Bowen standard would thus have required denial of the Indians' claim. 224 Only in the Indians' "frame of reference" does the government limit religious practice; from the
constitutional "frame of reference," the road placed no cognizable
limit on individual conduct at all.225 The government's use of its
own land would seem to be a clearly "internal governmental procedure" since the only external effect would occur as a result of religious consequences ascribed by the believer directly to the
government's activity.
The Ninth Circuit held, however, that construction of the road
would burden the Indians' free exercise rights. The court rejected
the government's argument that the Constitution prohibits only
penalties for volitionalist religious practices. Instead, the court
adopted the broad interpretation of Sherbert's definition of "burden"
vesting in the High Country, but this claim became moot when Congress statutorily
prohibited harvesting in the area. Congress allowed logging, however, in a 1200-foot
wide corridor, following the path of the proposed road, and the Indians challenged logging in this area.
223
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986). The Indians' claims also involved some
seemingly volitionalist elements, but these all depended on the nonvolitionalist claim.
In particular, the Indians alleged that they were under an "obligation" to perform certain ceremonies at the site, and failure to do so would produce negative religious effects.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting); NICPA, 764 F.2d at 585-86. These
effects would thus be volitionalistically caused. However, the Indians would be unable
to engage in those ceremonies for nonvolitionalist reasons. The government had desecrated the site and therefore the ceremonies could not have their intended effect. The
causal sequence thus parallels that of Roy's claim: Government Regulation (building a
road, using a social security number)-> Religious Effects (desecration of a site, loss of
spiritual power)-> Limits on Individual Activity-> Further Religious Effects.
224
Cf.Dedman v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, 69 Haw. 255, 258-64, 740
P.2d 28, 31-34 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988). Appellants, Pele practitioners,
claimed that development of geothermal resources in a sacred Hawaiian Island would
"desecrate the body of Pele by digging into the ground and ...destroy the goddess by
robbing her of vital heat." Id at 261, 740 P.2d at 32. This deprivation would interfere
with the training of the young and other religious practices. Citing Bowen, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii perfunctorily refused to find a burden on practice or belief.
225
The Indians' nonvolitionalist claim should be carefully distinguished from a potential claim that they did not make. The Indians argued that their individual conduct
was limited as a result of government desecration of the site, not of government denial
of access to the site. For example, the Indians could have claimed that the road might
run over the site or the traffic might be such that they could not get to the site. This
latter claim would not involve ascribing inherent religious significance to the government's actions.

UUMiVPELL LAI VY Air VIP, WY
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sketched earlier: A burden is any "[g]overnmental action that
makes exercise of first amendment rights more difficult or impedes
religious observances." 2 26 Construction of the road would impede
the Indians' vision quest by degradation of " 'salient... environmental qualities' " necessary for those quests. 22 7 The Ninth Circuit
thus dissented from the view implicit in the other sacred land cases
by holding that all governmental interferences with religion may be
cognizable burdens.
The circuit panel handed down its original decision before the
Supreme Court decided Bowen, and on rehearing, 22 8 the panel unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish that case. 22 9 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari under the name Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association and reversed.
2.

The Majority

In Lyng, the Supreme Court came much closer than in Bowen to
226 NICPA, 764 F.2d at 586.
227 Id at 585 (quoting Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 586, 594-95 (N.D. Cal. 1983)). Actually, degradation of" 'salient... environmental qualities'" might describe either a volitionalist or a nonvolitionalist burden. If
the court meant that the road disrupted the natural environmental condition of the
mountain and so desecrated it, the burden was nonvolitionalist, because the government's action had a direct religious effect. The Supreme Court seems to have adopted
this interpretation. See infra notes 242, 243, 245 and accompanying text. If, however,
the court merely meant that the degradation of the environment prevented, in some
practical way, the Indians from engaging in their quests, then the burden was volitionalist because it involved a non-ascriptive restriction on individual conduct.
228 Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub norm. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
229
The circuit court distinguished the cases in two ways. First, "[t]he fact that the
proposed government operations would virtually destroy the plaintiff Indians' ability to
practice their religion differentiates this case from Bowen v. Roy." Id. at 693. The court
might have been correct that the harmful effect in NICPA was greater than in Bowen, but
the Bowen Court did not reject Roy's claim because the degree of harm was slight.
Rather, the Bowen Court rejected the claim because the government regulation was of
the wrong form-"internal" governmental action, rather than external limits on individual conduct.
The circuit court then attempted to characterize the conduct as external because the
public had access to the land: "[L]ogging and road-building on public lands, to which
the public has access, is not the kind of internal governmental practice that the Court
found beyond free exercise attack in Roy." Id. But the Bowen Court did not find the use
of the social security number internal because it took place behind locked doors, but
because the external effects occurred only in Roy's own religious "frame of reference."
Similarly, here, desecration of a site could occur only in a religious frame of reference
because it involved ascription of inherent religious significance to the government's actions. The court's distinction, moreover, would lead to absurd results. If federal land
use is external whenever the public has access to the land, then the government may free
itself of all constitutional restraints simply by completely preventing access. Such a distinction might allow a greater religious harm, denial of all access, but not a lesser one,
construction of a road.
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announcing in so many words that the first amendment protects
only those claims that find religious significance exclusively in the
believer's own choices. The Court asserted that the claims in Bowen
and Lyng were "remarkably similar." 23 0 In Bowen, the claimant
maintained that the state's use of a social security number would
"rob the spirit" of his daughter. In Lyng, "disruption of the natural
environment caused by the G-O road [would] diminish the sacredness of the area in question and create distractions" for the
seeker.2 3 ' The Court explained the similarities between the two
cases, quoting from Bowen:
"The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways
that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just
as the Government may not insist that [the Roys] engage in any
set form of religious observance, so [they] may not demand that
the Government join in their chosen religious practices 23by
re2
fraining from using a number to identify their daughter."
As we have argued, the Bowen Court intended this language to
limit protection to volitionalist claimants. Believers cannot ascribe
inherent religious significance to the government's actions and require it to "join in" their practices. Government action might have
external effects on the believer as a result of such ascription, but the
Court refuses to read this perspective into the Constitution.
In the same way, the Lyng Court asserted that internality is not
measured from the believer's perspective. The Court openly conceded that the challenged government action would "interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment
according to their own religious beliefs. ' 23 3 Indeed, the road might
"have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices."' 23 4 From the believer's point of view, "[r]obbing the spirit of
a child, and preventing her from attaining greater spiritual power, is
both a 'substantial external effect' and one that is remarkably similar
23 5
to the injury claimed by respondents in the case before us today."
But that effect is external only from the perspective of the believer,
not from that of the Constitution.
In both Bowen and Lyng, the Court implicitly maintained that the
constitutional frame of reference is volitionalist. According to the
Court, the Constitution recognizes two and only two kinds of bur230
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 456 (1988);
see id.
at 452.
231

232
233
234
235

Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 451.
Id at 456.
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dens, both of them prototypically volitionalist. First, the free exercise clause protects individuals from being directly "coerced by the
Government's action into violating their religious beliefs. ' 236 The
' 23 7
Court identified "indirect coercion" with "outright prohibition,
and specifically distinguished nonvolitionalist coercion: "Tlhe location of the line [between actions that create a cognizable burden
and those that do not] cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual de23 8
velopment."
Second, the Constitution forbids weighted choices, which the
Court called "indirect coercion or penalties": "denying any person
an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by
other citizens" because he insists on maintaining his religious practice. 23 9 Such government actions do not literally coerce the believer
because he could forgo his rights, benefits, and privileges and continue his practice. But they do "have [a] tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs" and so are like "a
2 40
fine imposed on... worship."
The Court's recognition of only these two burdens as religious
harms suggests a generally individualist and specifically volitionalist
bias. 241 This bias is plainly individualist: The Court emphatically
denied that government action have any direct religious significance, such as desecration of a site. Religious harms could occur
only because individuals misbehaved in various ways. Indeed, the
Court specifically suggested that an individualist pure access claim
might be cognizable: "[A] law prohibiting the Indian respondents
from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different set of
constitutional questions. ' 24 2 Thus, government action desecrating
236 Id. at 449. For an analysis of Bowen and Lyng as adopting a "coercion" model of
burden, see Lupu, supra note 5, at 944-46. Although consistent with our reading, the
coercion model does not explicitly address the individualistic and volitionalist aspects of
the cases. Lupu is, however, quite critical of the coercion model on other grounds, see id
at 961-63, and proposes an alternative approach that measures burden by asking
whether the government action would have been actionable under common-law principles if it had been committed by a private party. Id. at 966.
237
Id. at 450.
238
Id. at 451.
239
Id. at 449-50.
240
Id. at 450.
See supra text accompanying notes 155-78.
241
242
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. The full passage reads: "The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as
sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock
area would raise a different set of constitutional questions." Id. It would be a mistake
to interpret this passage as suggesting merely that a law that barred access only to Indians would be invalid because facially discriminatory. Rather, a law that barred access to
everyone would be discriminatory as applied to the Indians because they are differently
situated (they treat sites as sacred), just as the laws in Sherbert and Yoder were neutral on
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a site would present no cognizable effect, but government action
denying access to the site would, because the religious harm would
arise not from the inherent significance of the government action
but from the inability of Indians to perform ceremonies there. In
both, the effect is the same, but in the latter, the individualist form
brings the claim within the protection of the first amendment.
Even more dearly than Bowen, moreover, the Lyng Court meant
to limit protection not only to individualist claims but specifically to
volitionalist claims. As we have already argued, weighted choices
and facial prohibitions are the prototypical volitionalist burdens because they put pressure on a believer to make the wrong choice by
threatening ajail sentence or loss of benefits. The particular facts of
this case also suggest the Court's resolution to limit protection to
specifically volitionalist harms. The Court described the logging
road as interfering with the Indians' ceremonies in two ways, from
the Indians' point of view. First, the government action directly desecrated the site. This harm was "internal" to the government in any
individualist scheme, volitionalist or nonvolitionalist, because individual action did not cause the negative effect. But the second interference, the road's creation of distractions for the medicine-seeker,
was internal only in a volitionalist scheme. A nonvolitionalist individualist perspective could accommodate this claim, because individual conduct caused the negative religious effect: The failure of
the seeker to complete his quest on account of the distractions. But
a true volitionalist might find the distractions irrelevant: the pilgrim
would need only to concentrate harder on his goal and ignore the
irritating but ultimately irrelevant logging trucks. 243 Thus, by denytheir face but discriminatory when applied. See supra text accompanying notes 104-17.
Under this interpretation, the rule's flaw is not that it is facially discriminatory but that it
operates to "coerce" the Indians.
This second interpretation is more convincing for several reasons. First, Justice
O'Connor did not specify that the hypothetical law denies access to the Indians but to
no one else. Rather, she specified that the law denied the Indians access, so that coercive denial of access, not discrimination, was the critical feature. Second, this interpretation fits best with O'Connor's focus throughout the opinion, which is not on
discrimination, but on coercion. Third, the very next line in the paragraph is the following: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights
do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land." Lyng, 485
U.S. at 453. Again, the opinion focused not on discrimination between the Indians and
everyone else, but on the positive right of the Indians to gain access to the area without
"vetoing" governmental action desecrating the area.
243
Actually, even a volitionalist might recognize this claim if characterized correctly.
The Lyng Court never explained why this "distraction" was not like an indirect coercion
or a penalty, since "distractions," in either a volitionalist or nonvolitionalist view, would
"tend to coerce" a believer not to complete a ceremony. The noise of the trucks in
effect penalized the believer for choosing to go on the quest. Or, to put the matter
another way, from a volitionalist perspective, this is a weighted choice. The believer
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ing this second claim, the Court implicitly denied protection even to
individualist but nonvolitionalist claims.
Indeed, the Court's volitionalist outlook is so deep, pervasive,
and unexamined, that the Court at times seemed to forget that any
other view is possible. The Court purported to draw its limitation
on cognizable burdens from the word "prohibit" in the text of the
free exercise clause. Acknowledging that not only direct but indirect coercion would cognizably burden religious practice, the Court
nonetheless insisted:
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.2 44The crucial word in the constitutional text is
"prohibit.

But the unemployment law in Sherbert did not literally prohibit
the claimant from observing her Sabbath, because she could simply
have forgone her benefits. True, such self-denial would have made
it "more difficult" for her to practice her religion, but the Court
found that difficulty standing alone to be irrelevant. By contrast, the
government action in Lyng does effectively prohibit the practice of
vision quests, from the Indians' perspective, as the Court itself acmust choose between finishing the ceremony, even though it is less pleasant to do so, or
giving up and going home.
There are several possible explanations why the Court did not view this as a volitionalist weighted choice. First, as we suggest later, see infra text accompanying notes
253-55, the Court may have intended to recognize only some but not all volitionalist
claims. In particular, it may have intended to recognize only the dejure version of such
claims. The "distractions" claim described here is a de facto claim because the challenged regulation does not facially refer to the religious behavior in question-the vision quests-and either forbid it or attach a cost to it. Rather, the regulation simply calls
for the construction of a road, but the road traffic de facto disrupts the quester's concentration.
The more likely explanation, however, seems to be that the Court believed that the
distractions are themselves desecrations of the site. It is for that reason that believers
cannot complete their quests. The Court never considered the distraction claim separately from the desecration claim and at times seemed to combine the two. See Lyng, 485
U.S. at 448 ("Scarred hills and mountains, and disturbed rocks destroy the purity of the
sacred areas, and [Indian] consultants repeatedly stressed the need of a training doctor
to be undistracted by such disturbance.") (emphasis added). In the words of the district
court, construction of the road would disrupt the "salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country" necessary for "[c]ommunication with the 'great creator.'" Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 59495 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn & aff'd on rehearing,795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). From a volitionalist perspective, the distraction claim does not exist because the desecration does not exist.
244
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
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knowledged. If the road went through, the Indians simply could not
go on vision quests.
Thus, the unadorned word "prohibit" in no way suggests the
result in Lyng because, from the believer's perspective, the government action in Lyng involved more "prohibition" than did the government action in Sherbert. Only by adopting a specifically
volitionalist reading of the word could the Court equate "prohibit"
with the particular burdens that it did recognize: Making the believer choose between his religion and criminal sanctions or a loss of
benefits.2 4 5 From this perspective, there is not even a "tendency to
coerce" in Lyng because the volitionalist refuses to recognize that a
government action could have direct religious significance. Wherever this volitionalist reading of "prohibit" comes from, it is not the
bare language of the first amendment alone; the Court must import
its volitionalist assumptions about the nature of reality into the word
"prohibit." Yet, the Court's volitionalist outlook runs so deep that
it did not even recognize that the word "prohibit" might have profoundly different meanings in other frames of reference.
The Court offered one other reason for its restriction of free
exercise protection to volitionalist claims-a parade-of-horribles argument, the second in a series of such arguments that began with
Bowen and would culminate in Smith:
[G]overnment simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.... The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various
competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as
ours.

246

For practical reasons, then, the Constitution cannot subject to the
compelling state interest test all government actions that make some
religious practices somewhat more difficult; if it did the government
might be crippled.
This argument, however, establishes only that the Court must
place some limit on the reach of the free exercise clause, not that this
particular limit is the appropriate one. After all, volitionalist claims
245 A different, more obvious reading of the word "prohibit" is "forbid." Thus, only
those laws, like those in Yoder, that specifically outlaw conduct demanded by a religion or
require conduct forbidden by a religion would count as burdens. But the Court obviously did not intend to adopt this meaning because it also granted protection against
"indirect coercion"-laws that do not explicitly forbid certain conduct but that simply
extract a price for that conduct. Rather, the Court believed that "prohibit" means "coerce" (direct coercion) or "have a tendency to coerce" (indirect coercion). Nonetheless,
the Court refused to recognize the coercion or tendency to coerce created by the government actions to which the believer nonvolitionalistically ascribed direct religious
significance.
246 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452.
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also threaten the freedom of government action, but the Lyng Court
ignored that danger. Indeed, there are two responses to the Court's
concern that are more obvious and more neutral. First, the Court
could have overruled Sherbert altogether by holding that neutral laws
place no cognizable burdens on religious practice, volitionalist or
not. In effect, the Court pursued this course last Term, but significantly the Lyng Court declined to do so. Alternatively, the Court
could have held that neutral laws may pose cognizable burdens on
all varieties of claims but some claims must be disallowed because
they create too much disruption. Such a holding would focus not on
the content of the religion but on the real concern, the restriction
placed on the government's legitimate interest. The Court decided
not to adopt this course, either.
Instead, the Court adopted a discriminatory standard: it specifically affirmed Sherbert, but only for volitionalist claims. From the
time that Sherbert was argued, some commentators have insisted that
the Sherbert rule would make it impossible for the government to
function. Until Bowen and Lyng, however, those voices fell on deaf
judicial ears. As long as the Court had before it only volitionalist
claims, it was prepared to accept frustration of government policies
in order to get freedom for religious practice. Only when the Court
faced its first nonvolitionalist claim did concerns about government
freedom occupy center-stage, and then only for nonvolitionalist
claims. As we will discuss in Part II, some nonvolitionalist claims
may pose more disruption to the government than typical volitionalist ones, but not all. Roy's claim, for example, would inconvenience
the government less than Sherbert's. If the Court were concerned
solely with the state's ability to function, it could have adopted a
standard that disallowed any claim that disrupted the government
too much-but only and all such claims, whether or not they were
volitionalist.
The Court offered only one reason for the discriminatory path
it chose: Its volitionalist reading of the textual term "prohibit." In
the course of explaining that any rule other than Bowen's would cripple the government, the Court insisted: "The First Amendment
must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto
over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion."' 24 7 The free exercise clause, in other words, does allow some
believers to veto a public program, but only programs that "prohibit" religious practice in the Court's volitionalist sense. The
Court thus created two categories of believers: volitionalists, who
248
had the veto, and nonvolitionalists, who did not.
247
248

Id
The Lyng majority drew a spirited dissent advocating a broad reading of Sherbert
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Alternative Interpretations of Bowen and Lyng

We have now offered an elaborate interpretation, based on limited textual evidence, of the Court's decisions in Bowen and Lyng.
We recognize that reconstruction of the Court's likely meaning on
the basis of such fragmentary evidence is not "proof" of that meaning in any absolute sense. Thus, we acknowledge that many are
likely to disagree with us and offer alternative accounts of the two
cases. This subsection will address some of those accounts. We
would like to emphasize first, however, the limited nature of our argument: the Court's volitionalist bias is necessary but not necessarily adequate to account for the Court's recent jurisprudence. This
bias alone may not explain the Court's behavior but it is nonetheless
a salient feature of that behavior.
First, many may concede that the two cases create a theological
orthodoxy by stopping some claims at the threshold, but disagree
with us about the precise orthodoxy. In particular, some may believe that our demonstration of an individualist bias is convincing,
but maintain that our argument for a volitionalist bias is primarily
speculative. These readers might then argue that an individualist
orthodoxy is really not unduly restrictive. 24 9 As already indicated,
we believe that individualism is indeed a somewhat plausible alternative account of the cases, but it really makes no difference which
of these two interpretations is closer to the truth. As we will argue,
while religious liberty must indeed have limits, a content-based thethat would recognize a burden whenever "any form of governmental action... frustrates or inhibits religious practice." Id at 459 ( Brennan, J., dissenting). Like the Ninth
Circuit, the dissent tried to distinguish Bowen by maintaining that the use of the social
security number in that case was merely a matter of "how the Government conducts its
own affairs" and thus was purely internal. Id. at 470. The dissent, however, revealed its
own continuing volitionalist bias, because from Roy's perspective the government's
"own affairs" also "inhibit[ed] religious practice." Only by adopting some "frame of
reference" can the state action in Bowen but not in Lyng be dubbed the government's
"own affair" (even in Lyng, in the majority's words, the sacred site "is, after all, [the
federal government's] land" and therefore its own affair), but the dissent never outlined
such a frame. The dissent seemed caught and confused: it agreed to exile nonvolitionalist religions in Bowen but then found the claims in Lyng much more sympathetic, perhaps because of their antiquity, seriousness, and relative popularity. But the dissenters
could never see through their own volitionalist bias long enough to realize that the
Court would have to overrule Bowen to allow the sacred site claims.
249
After all, notice how broad our term individualism is: it embraces all those religions that believe that only the actions of an individual can give rise to religious consequences for that individual. In the first place, the term implies nothing about why
religious consequences should be so restricted-because it is fair, because God wills it,
or for any other reason. In the second place, the term implies nothing about the psychology, the causes, or the ultimate origin of human behavior. In particular, humans
may or may not possess free will; and if determined, they may be determined in any way
and to any degree.
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ological orthodoxy, however broad, is the least appropriate way to
create those limits.
Other readers might acknowledge that volitionalism or individualism do seem to play some part in the Court's decisions but fail to
offer by themselves a full or adequate account of the two cases.
Again, we gladly acknowledge the likely presence of other factors in
the cases, but maintain only that volitionalism is also one necessary
element in any fully textured explanation. Still other readers, however, might further maintain that these other factors offer an adequate account in themselves and that volitionalism has nothing to
do with the cases. We will now examine a few of these alternative
interpretations and suggest that they are incomplete without a recognition of the Court's volitionalism.
One likely alternative account of Bowen and Lyng might suggest
that the Court's real concern was proximate causation. As a practical matter, we must create some limit on how far causation can be
traced from a governmental action to a perceived harm. Otherwise,
governmental regulations would be responsible for all consequences in American society, and the public and private spheres
would collapse into each other. In the chains of causation diagrammed earlier, 25 0 the governmental regulation in Sherbert directly
caused the limit on individual conduct, whereas those in Bowen and
Lyng directly caused a religious effect, which then caused a limit on
conduct. This greater causal distance in Bowen and Lyng animated
the Court's refusal to recognize nonvolitionalist burdens.
Depending on its details, this interpretation suffers from at least
two flaws. First, it may rest on the notion that causation is an objective, natural chain of events that can be described with reference to
some pseudo-physical "law of causation." According to this view,
the harms in Bowen and Lyng are objectively farther from the government action than the harm in Sherbert. But such a view ignores the
point that any chain of causation can analytically be broken down
into any number of stages. Indeed, if invisible events such as desecration of a sacred mountain site or psychological trauma are to
count as separate causal stages, free exercise causal sequences are
even more malleable than most tort claims, which at least involve
25 1
observable physical events.
Thus, if it is to be intellectually coherent, "proximate cause"
See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
Thus, we might locate an additional stage in the Sherbert sequence: the government action caused Mrs. Sherbert anguish because it put her to a choice, and that
anguish in turn limited her individual conduct. Under this rendition of the causal sequence, Sherbert and Bowen both involved one causal step between regulation and the
limit on conduct.
250
251
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must refer not to some "objective" chain of causation, but to policy
concerns. We might want to limit liability for a variety of familiar
reasons, and those reasons determine what it means for an event to
be a "proximate" cause. Using this perspective, a reference to
"proximate cause" only begins the analysis. By itself, it does not
explain why the Constitution should draw the causal cutoff where
Bowen and Lyng do, rather than at some other point. And the reason
that the Court gives for drawing the line at this point is that the
Constitution adopts a metaphysical "frame of reference" in which
government actions cannot have inherent religious significance.
Thus, the proximate cause rendition of the two cases only supplements the volitionalism account. The Court might have conceived
of its holdings as placing a limit on causation-but the reason that it
chose its particular limit is volitionalism.252
A second account of the two cases might argue that they simply
limited cognizable burdens to dejure, rather than de facto, impositions on individual behavior. De jure burdens are those created by
laws that facially regulate the particular activity that gives rise to the
religious effect. The burden is de jure because it facially regulates
individual behavior, but it need not facially refer to the fact that the
behavior is religiously charged. 2 53 A de facto burden, by contrast, is
any regulation that pressures a believer to forgo a religious practice
but does not facially refer to the practice. Thus, bulldozing a shrine
in a cathedral would not facially forbid pilgrimages by volitionalists
2 54
but would de facto make them impossible.
252
One reason to cut the causal sequence off at Roy's claim-a reason that the
Court did not give-is that when regulations "non-ascriptively" burden conduct, the
Court can be certain that the regulations do impose some limits on individual activity
without relying on the believer's own statements, because the limits on conduct do not
arise from an idiosyncratic spiritual effect ascribed by the believer to the government's
action. Apparently the Justice Department interpreted Lyng in this way. It argued that
Bowen required an "objective" burden, one that does not depend on religious significance idiosyncratically ascribed to government action by the believer. Brief for Petitioners at 30, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Even in a Sherbert-style claim, however, the causal sequence is not in fact wholly
secular or "objective." A court must still assess the sincerity of the believer's claim that
the facial regulation of conduct will have a negative religious effect in order to determine whether there is a burden on free exercise. If the Supreme Court could ascertain
that Sherbert genuinely believed that Saturday is a holy day of rest, it could also ascertain whether Roy genuinely believed that a social security number will rob his daughter
of spiritual power. Cf Lupu, supra note 5, at 962 (recognizing the danger posed by
Bowen and Lyng to the Sherbert line of cases).
253
Thus, Yoder presented a de jure prohibition: 'on its face, the law specifically
stated that certain forms of behavior would not be allowed. Similarly, Sherbert involved a
de jure penalty: the law expressly put the believer to a choice between government
benefits and a particular named behavior. Neither law specifically referred to the fact
that the burdened behavior was religiously significant for some persons.
254
See L. TRIBE, supra note 209, § 14-13 (describing a closely analogous distinction).
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The Court has expressly recognized only de jure burdens and
avoided recognizing or rejecting de facto burdens. 255 The de jure
theory of Bowen and Lyng would explain the two cases as simply restricting protection to de jure claims. In neither of those cases did
the challenged statute facially refer to the religious behavior of the
individual claimant. In Bowen, the statute referred only to the government's internal use of the social security number, not to Little
Bird of the Snow's spiritual growth. In Lyng, the regulation referred
only to the construction of a road, not to the pilgrimages of the Indians. The Court's distinction between statutes that govern "internal government procedure" and those that burden "individual
conduct" might turn on whether the statute facially refers to government activity or individual activity. Under this alternative interpretation, the Court would recognize dejure and not de facto claims
whether or not they are volitionalist.
This interpretation of the cases, however, also suffers from two
flaws. First, the Court did not discuss dejure and de facto burdens;
rather, it referred to metaphysical "frame[s] of reference." 25 6 Second, regardless of the Court's language, the de jure theory cannot
completely explain the results of the two cases, because Bowen and
Lyng confined recognition not just to de jure claims but to de jure
volitionalist claims. For example, Roy's claim presented a type of de
jure burden. The statute facially regulated the activity that directly
gives rise to religious effects for the individual, the government's
own use of the social security number. Granted, the dejure burden
fell on the government's behavior, not on the individual's. But, for
a nonvolitionalist, the government's behavior may have as much
religious significance as his own. A nonvolitionalist could therefore
recognize a de jure claim whether the facial regulation falls on "internal governmental procedure" or "individual activity" because in
either case, the law facially regulates activity with inherent religious
significance.
255 The Court's failure to take a position on de facto claims may be due to the fact
that it has encountered so few of them. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), which
upheld Sunday dosing laws against a free exercise challenge, may be the only clear instance in which the Court was faced with a de facto volitionalist burden. In that case, the
closing laws created a severe economic hardship for Sabbatarian merchants, who were
forced to close on Sunday by law and on Saturday by their religion. The Court refused
to recognize this hardship as a constitutional burden, and one might argue that the
Court thereby implicitly rejected de facto burdens. Indeed, such an explanation would
serve to distinguish Braunfeld from Sherbert, which many have believed inconsistent with
the earlier case. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). But the Court did not explain its holding in Braunfeld in these terms, and
Sherbert may well have overruled Braunfeld. For these reasons, we believe that the Court
has not yet clearly spoken on the cognizability of de facto volitionalist burdens.
256
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 701 n.6.
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Proponents of this account of the cases might argue that the
only de jure claims worthy of constitutional protection are those
that facially regulate individual activity. A de jure claim by definition, is dejure regulation of individual behavior, not dejure regulation of all religiously charged behavior. But as with the causation
theory, this answer is incomplete because it does not specify why de
jure claims should be so confined. If the free exercise clause neutrally protects all believers, then the clause should recognize dejure
burdens on all religiously significant activity. Under the dejure account, the Court must believe that the clause does not neutrally protect all believers because it blocks only those laws that facially
regulate individual behavior. Thus, it protects only those religions
(volitionalist/individualist) that attribute religious significance to individual activity. This response, then, is simply a reassertion of the
view that the Constitution's "frame of reference" favors those
claims that ascribe inherent religious significance to individual activity and not to government activity.
E.

Conclusion

Taken together, then, Lyng and Bowen express a judgment by at
least a majority of the Court that a bias in favor of volitionalist beliefs is compatible with religious liberty. Indeed, under the Lyng
standard, the Constitution not only allows but requires discrimination in favor of such beliefs because the document itself adopts a
volitionalist perspective. The Court seemed to believe that the
whole constitutional scheme of individual autonomy rests on a particular view of the relationship between individual and government
activity-one in which the individual does not believe that government conduct has any inherent moral or religious meaning for him.
The Court insisted on using this frame of reference to determine
whether facially neutral laws, as applied, burden religious practice.
To paraphrase Henry Ford, the believer could have any religion he
wanted-as long as it was volitionalist. Lyng, however, lasted only a
few years before the Court restricted still further the protections extended to religious practice. The meaning and genesis of this further restriction derived in significant part from the Court's
volitionalist bias.
SECTION FOUR.
THE COURT'S DEFINITION OF A "BURDEN":

SMITH

Last Term, in a dramatic reversal of over twenty-five years of
precedent, the Court held in Employment Division, Department of
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Human Resources v. Smith 2 57 that the free exercise clause extends no
protection to any religious practice against generally applicable
laws. 25 8 It thereby superficially removed the discrimination against
nonvolitionalist claims imposed by Lyng by reducing the protection
extended to volitionalist claims to the same level as that extended to
nonvolitionalist ones. However, even in this apparent equalization,
the Court revealed its volitionalist bias. The core of its argument is
a parade-of-horribles argument that the Court took seriously only
after confronting nonvolitionalist claims. Further, the Court serenely contemplated the likelihood that as a result of its decision,
minority religions would suffer at the hands of the majority. Perhaps the most likely candidates for such treatment are those that
embrace nonvolitionalist beliefs, beliefs that are so unconventional
that even the Court has yet to understand them.
A.

The Holding

Alfred Smith and Galen Black are members of the Native American Church which holds as one of its sacraments the ingestion of
2 60
peyote. 25 9 Oregon law prohibits the ingestion of this drug.
When Smith and Black were discharged from their jobs at a private
drug rehabilitation center for using peyote, they applied to the state
department of human resources for unemployment compensation.
The State refused them compensation on the grounds that they had
been dismissed for work-related misconduct. 26 1 Smith and Black
challenged the denial and, after a tortuous procedural history, arrived in the Supreme Court, which denied their claim in a five-four
26 2
opinion.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia first observed that if the
State could prohibit the use of peyote, it could certainly deny unemployment compensation because of the use of peyote. 26 3 Therefore, the central issue in the case was the validity of the general
criminal law outlawing peyote. 2 64 In upholding the law, the Court
drastically restricted the applicability of the compelling state interest
257 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
258 As we discuss below, the holding may not be quite so broad: the Court might
continue to apply stricter scrutiny to noncriminal laws or to general laws that provide for
individualized consideration of particular cases. See infra notes 265, 268 and accompany-

ing text. To the extent that a loophole exists, Lyng and Bowen presumably still apply
within its ambit. Thus, the Court is still committed to a formally discriminatory position
against nonvolitionalist religious practices.
259 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
260
261
262

263
264

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1597.
1598.
1598-99.
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test, but the extent of the restriction is somewhat unclear. At the
beginning of his opinion, Scalia distinguished the law in Smith from
that in Sherbert by asserting that Sherbert's conduct was not "prohibited by law." 26 5 A state, in other words, may criminally forbid certain behavior and may then condition benefits on abstention from
that behavior, but it may not condition benefits on behavior that it
has not so prohibited. In Lyng's terminology, the state may engage
in direct but not indirect coercion. That conclusion, however,
seems so counter-intuitive that one is inclined to search for a differ2 66
ent reading of the case.
Such a reading is not hard to find. The majority repeatedly distinguished between general neutral laws and those that "ban . . .
acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display." 26 7 A
law that prohibits peyote use by members of the Native American
Church, in other words, would be very different from the Oregon
general ban on peyote ingestion.
Later, the Court distinguished Sherbert on the grounds that the
unemployment law in that case contained a mechanism for "individualized governmental assessment" 268 to determine whether an applicant had refused work for good cause. In cases "where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason. '2 69 Each decision whether to grant or deny compensation was thus a particularized determination, targeted on the
individual applicant, of whether a religious motivation constitutes
good cause. The Court hinted that it might limit Sherbert to such
cases, but concluded that it would in no event extend Sherbert to
"across-the-board criminal prohibition[s] on a particular form of
conduct. ' 270 Indeed, the Court apparently decided that such
facially neutral laws should receive no scrutiny at all: having deId
As Justice O'Connor noted, "a neutral criminal law prohibiting conduct that a
State may legitimately regulate is, if anything, more burdensome, than a neutral civil statute placing legitimate conditions on the award of a state benefit." Id at 1611
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Scalia himself observed: "'[I]f a state has prohibited
through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct .... it certainly
follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation
benefits to persons who engage in that conduct.'" Id. at 1598 (quotingEmployment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988)). In other words, if a
state directly coerces a behavior, it may then indirectly coerce as well. In Sherbert, by
contrast, the state indirectly coerced without first directly coercing. But Scalia never explains why a state must first directly coerce before it is allowed indirectly to coerce.
267 Id at 1599.
268 It at 1603.
269
_Id (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
270
Id.
265

266
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cided that Sherbert did not apply to them, the Court perfunctorily
upheld the law without further analysis.
Justice Scalia denied that Smith changed the law in any significant way, but it is plain that Smith is a real revolution in the field. As
27 1
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion points out at length,
Scalia's characterization of precedent is less than admirable in its
honesty. 27 2 Sherbert, in particular, was not limited to statutes that
contained provisions for individualized exemptions. Rather, as
Scalia himself agreed only three Terms before, that case applied
whenever the government forced a believer to "'choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work, on the other hand.' ",273
Scalia himself conceded that the Court had applied the compelling state interest standard to "analyze free exercise challenges" to
"across-the-board criminal prohibitions." 2 74 But, he insisted, "we
have never applied the test to invalidate" such a law, instead finding
a compelling state interest in every such case. 275 In fact, that characterization of precedent is also incorrect; the Court had struck
Id. at 1607-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Since O'Connor's opinion provides most of this analysis, we sketch here only the
most dramatic of these mischaracterizations. The majority relied on language in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), without noting that West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), had effectively overruled it. Smith,
110 S. Ct. at 1600. It cited Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), without recalling
that Sherbert had substantially recharacterized that case. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 4435; see
supra note 116. The majority described United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944), as upholding a neutral law against challenge without noting that in each case the
Court had first applied strict scrutiny. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. However, the Smith
opinion later did concede that Lee and Gillette had applied the heightened standard. Id.
at 1608. Apparently with no other option, Scalia dubbed Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), as "hybrid" cases involving free exercise rights in combination with other constitutional protections-parental
and speech rights. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602. Both cases, however, described the conduct as protected by the free exercise clause without finding it necessary to rely on any
other provision. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219-29; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-07. Finally, the
majority maintained that "in recent years" the Court had avoided any reliance on Sherbert except for the unemployment context. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (citing Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987),
Bowen, and Lyng). But in those earlier cases the Court had expressly limited Goldman to
the military context, see 475 U.S. at 507, O'Lone to the prison context, and Bowen and
Lyng to internal government conduct, plainly assuming that these cases were exceptions
to the general Sherbert rule, not the rule to which Sherbert was an exception. For a detailed critique of the Smith opinion on these and other grounds, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Excercise Revisionism and the Smith Opinion, 57 U. Cim. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
273
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
274
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
275
Id.
271

272
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down a number of such laws. More importantly, however, it is irrelevant to the question of whether Smith is an instance of the Court's
new activism. As O'Connor observed, "it is surely unusual to judge
the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by looking to the win-loss
record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us." 27 6 The
Court used to apply strict scrutiny to facially neutral laws; it no
longer does so. That change is a dramatic departure from precedent.
B.

The Continuing Volitionalist Bias

At first glance, this change seems to equalize the treatment of
volitionalist and nonvolitionalist religions. Before Bowen, the Court
professed to treat all religions the same by protecting them from
burdens caused by neutral laws. After Bowen but before Smith, the
Court would extend that protection to volitionalist but not to
nonvolitionalist religions; but after Smith, the Court would extend
such protection to no one. True, the net result is a loss of religious
liberty for everyone, but at least everyone is in the same sinking
boat.
Indeed, Scalia implicitly relied on a notion of equal treatment
to defend the holding in Smith. Quoting from Lyng, he insisted that
the government's ability to enforce its laws " 'cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.' "277 O'Connor responded by observing that Lyng applied only to internal government actions, which
pose no burdens because in Justice Douglas's words, the free exercise clause is "'written in terms of what the government cannot do
to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from
the government.' "278
Scalia countered by maintaining that the internal/external distinction makes no sense. In terms of practical effects, the government action in Sherbert was no different from the ones in Bowen and
Lyng:
[S]ince Justice Douglas voted with the majority in Sherbert, that
quote obviously envisioned that "what the government cannot do
to the individual" includes not just the prohibition of an individual's freedom of action through criminal laws but also the running
of its programs . . .in such fashion as to harm the individual's
279
religious interests.
Id. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I& at 1603 (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451).
Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 412 (1963)).
279
Id. at 1603 n.2.
276
277
278
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And Scalia could see no reason to draw the distinction:
[I]t is hard to see any reason in principle or practicality why the
government should have to tailor its health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not have to
tailor its management of public lands, Lyng... or its administra28 0
tion of welfare programs, Roy.
The Lyng or Bowen Courts could have offered such a reason: the
Constitution adopts a volitionalist frame of reference that does not
recognize inherent religious significance to the government's actions. Scalia now apparently regards such a privileging of one frame
of reference as unprincipled, so Lyng must rest on the broader idea
that the free exercise clause ignores all burdensome effects of general laws, not just "internal" ones. Roy might find it ironic that a
majority of the Court would reject his perspective in order to deny
him protection, but then adopt his perspective in order to deny protection to others. Even so, this shell game results in less discrimination as well as less protection. The Court seems hostile to all
religions claiming special protection, not just nonvolitionalist ones.
On closer inspection, however, Smith offers reason to believe
that the Court's volitionalist bias is necessary to explain even its apparent equalization of religious claimants. The majority's central argnment for ignoring the effects of neutral laws was that to do
otherwise would invite anarchy and government paralysis:
To make an individual's obligation to obey [a generally applicable] law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State's interest is "compelling"-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself,"
-- contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense....
...

anarchy.

Any society adopting such a system would be courting
28 1

Significantly, the Court viewed that risk as especially grave in a diverse nation:
[T]hat danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan
nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference,"... and precisely because we value and protect that
religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest
280
281

Idj
Id at 1603, 1605 (citations omitted).
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order. 28 2
The majority then reeled off a number of parade-of-horribles challenges that had been brought against facially neutral laws.
This argument may or may not justify overruling Sherbert, but it
is not a new argument for doing so. 285 Thus, the question of timing
becomes important: why did the parade-of-horribles argument suddenly become persuasive? The answer seems apparent on the face
of the Court's language: the danger of disorder becomes acute in a
diverse nation. The Court had nightmare visions of strange religions arriving in court to shackle the government with bizarre demands. The animus behind the decision, in other words, was a fear
of marginal religions; behind the apparent neutrality lurks a discriminatory mindset.
The Court, moreover, quite bluntly admitted that its new rule
will disproportionately hurt minority religions, but insisted that allowing them to suffer is -better than giving them protection at the
expense of order. In the Court's words, "[i]t may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
govemment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience
is a law unto itself."2 8 4 As long as the Court had conventional
claimants like Sherbert before it, the danger of government disruption seemed unimportant. As soon as some truly non-mainstream
plaintiffs arrived, government flexibility and order seemed critical.
And yet Sherbert herself was hardly a member of a mainstream
religion; she belonged to that litigious and outspoken group, the
Jehovah's Witnesses. Why did the Court find the Indian claimants
in Bowen and Lyng so threatening by contrast? Native Americans
might answer: precisely because they were Indians. And surely it is
no coincidence that the plaintiffs in all three cases were Native
Americans.2 85 The Court, moreover, denied not only Roy's
nonvolitionalist claim but later Smith's volitionalist challenge as
well. Thus, if one were looking for common threads, one might focus more on the race of the claimants than on their belief system.
Yet race alone will not account for the sequence of decisions. For
Id at 1605 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
See supra text accompanying notes 220-48.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
285 Nor is it a coincidence that the Court decided Lyng, Bowen, and Smith at the same
time that it substantially restricted Native American rights of self-determination. See,
e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct.
2994 (1989) (restricting tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian country); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (expanding state jurisdiction over
non-Indians on Indian country).
282
283
284
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one thing, Justice O'Connor would still maintain the distinction between external and internal action, as presumably would Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, at least as Bowen formulated it.286
They would all deny protection to some Indian religions but accord
protection to others. The religion-protective wing of the Court thus
retains its volitionalist bias.
But what about the other wing of the Court? Perhaps it is fairer
to say that they are fearful not of nonvolitionalist religions but of
Indian religions or of all religions that need protection from the legislature. Here, it is important to remember that the destruction of
Sherbert occurred in stages. Peyote cases had been in the courts for
years. Indeed, the right of Native American Church members to ingest the drug was one of the first applications of Sherbert.2 87 Yet the
Court never took action on any of these cases, 28 8 apparently believing that the analogy to Sherbert's claim was accurate.
Only when the Court adjudicated nonvolitionalist Indian claims
did the parade-of-horribles argument become convincing, and then
for a particular reason: A broad application of Sherbert might allow
believers to invade the government's ability to conduct its "own affairs," to manage its "own land." The Court realized the potential
reach of the case when it began to contemplate the possibility that
nonvolitionalists would unreasonably want to interpret government
action in their own peculiar frame of reference.
Having looked into that frightening future, the Court apparently found the Sherbert rule fraught with very different implications.
But Bowen and Lyng drew an inherently unstable line-at best, confusing, and at worst, discriminatory. Once the Court started down
the path of restricting protection, it just continued, reading Lyng to
extend to volitionalist claims as well. The Court has thus arrived at
a formally nondiscriminatory position but the etiology of that position is saturated with volitionalist bias.
Yet on further analysis, even the Court's final position is not, in
fact, so nondiscriminatory. The protection remaining to believers
after Smith still makes the most sense in a volitionalist framework.
First, the majority would still extend absolute protection to belief,
but the scope of the protection reveals the Court's continuing voi286

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined the result in Bowen and dis-

sented in Lyng without wishing to overrule Bowen.
287 The classic exposition is People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813,40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964). Courts also found for Native American Church members in Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984), and Whitehorn v. State,
561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
288
Indeed, in at least one case finding for Native Americans, the Court denied a writ
of certiorari. State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 946 (1974).
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tionalist bias. Since belief is an internal occurrence, government
may reach it only by regulating external events-and it may do so in
one of two ways. First, laws may govern belief by using conduct,
typically public statements, as evidence of belief, and then punishing
the believer on the basis of those statements. The second method is
best exemplified by the sacred land cases. Belief for the Indians depends on events in the physical world, such as the existence of a
sacred mountain. If the mountain ceases to exist in its pristine form,
so does the freedom to believe in the effect of the mountain. Thus,
the government may regulate belief by changing the factual predicates for belief.
These two methods correspond to two different types of belief.
The second rests on a nonvolitionalist type of belief: one's capacity
to believe is directly dependent on events outside one's control, like
the existence of a sacred mountain. 28 9 The first method of regulating belief derives from a volitionalist view: penalties for public profession force the believer to a crisis of conscience by making her
choose between going to jail or losing benefits, on the one hand,
and foreswearing or keeping silent about deeply held beliefs on the
other. But no events in the world other than penalties can affect her
faith. Belief is entirely a matter of will. The volitionalist must hold
fast to her faith and to stand witness to it. No material alteration of
the world should even be relevant to that task.
The Smith Court forbade only the volitionalist method of regulating belief-punishing belief through its public expressions. The
Court described the right as "the right to believe and profess
whatever doctrine one desires. ' '290 It listed a series of burdens, all
characterized by the pressure that they level directly at the believer
to change her views or at least its public manifestations: "The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, ... punish

the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false .... impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status ....

or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies

over religious authority or dogma." 291 None of these recognize the
nonvolitionalist possibility that the government may burden an individual's belief by altering the natural world, the behavior of other
persons, or its own behavior.
Second, the Court will still extend constitutional protection
against statutes that facially or intentionally discriminate against
religious practices. In both kinds of discrimination, the key to
heightened *scrutiny seems to be the government's intent, as op289
290
291

See supra text accompanying notes 72-91.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1595.
Id at 1599 (citations omitted).
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posed to the effect of the law. This view comports with the Court's
growing proclivity in other areas to see evil not in laws that in fact
restrict protected activities but only in laws that the government intends to restrict those activities. 2 92 This conviction may derive from
a volitionalism focused not on the believer but on the government.
The Constitution's "frame of reference" is such that the Court will
strike down only those laws for which the legislature's intention may
be blamed. That conclusion is by no means inevitable. In guaranteeing individual rights, the Constitution might seek to establish a
range of practical freedoms, not praise or censure the legislature
through upholding or striking down its acts. But the Court's volitionalist stance seems to be so acute that it insists on casting the
question into one of legislative moral accountability for its actions
and freeing it from accountability for all unintended consequences.
In the view of the Smith Court, however, the primary source of
protection for religious practices is plainly not the Constitution at
all, but the legislature. As noted previously, the Court rather complacently accepted the probability that minority religions will disproportionately suffer in this process of legislative "accommodation"; it knew and did not care. Probably all minority religions
will suffer to some extent from the new regime, volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist alike. Surely no legislature will enact a ban on the
consumption of wine such that Catholics will be unable to celebrate
the Mass, but many have banned the use of peyote. Nonetheless, as
the culture is so pervasively volitionalist, nonvolitionalists may suffer most systematically at the hands of legislatures. Like the Court
itself, few legislators will even understand the religion; of those that
do, many will feel only indignation at the idea that the believers
have any legitimate interest in the government's "own business."
In short, then, a volitionalist bias pervades even the Court's
new, formally nondiscriminatory position. For the time being, the
legislatures bear the responsibility of special protection for believers. There is little reason to expect that nonvolitionalists will fare
any better in that forum. But even though the legislature need not
extend special protection to religious practice, its range of options is
not constitutionally unlimited. The Court explained that legislatures may grant special treatment to believers and predicted that at
least some would:
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded
292 Indeed, Scalia explicitly makes this connection, maintaining that the Court must
find a discriminatory intent before it will exercise heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection clause or the first amendment's speech component. Id. at 1604 n.3. See generally Susan Williams, Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615
(1991) (describing the proclivity noted in the text).
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to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also
a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its
legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of
States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental
peyote use.... But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
2 93
say that it is constitutionally required.
The legislatures have thus gained a new freedom. They may or may
not grant special treatment to religious practice. But that freedom
is limited: whatever special treatment they do grant must be
"nondiscriminatory."
Smith, in other words, overturns Sherbert by allowing states to
decide how much protection should be extended to religion, but it
does not touch the rule associated with Larson v. Valente,2 94 that the
state may not discriminate among religions by protecting some
more than others, without a compelling state interest. The Court
has never clearly explained how it would engage in measuring the
comparative protection accorded different religions. 2 95 Since it is
likely that the legislatures will grant some exemptions under the
new regime, it becomes even more important that the Court remain
vigilant in insisting on impartiality. If an omnibus drug and alcohol
statute contained an exemption for sacramental wine but not sacramental peyote, for example, the Court would presumably find a
prima facie violation.
But by the same token, the legislature should not be able to
grant protection to volitionalists and deny it to nonvolitionalists. It
could not, for example, give Sherbert a special right not to work on
Saturday but deny Roy's demand that the government not use a social security number to refer to his daughter-without a compelling
state interest. Nor could it grant exemptions for Catholics from the
alcohol statute, from certain tax laws, 29 6 and from labor laws, 2 9 7 but
293

Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.

456 U.S. 228, rehg denied, 457 U.S. 228 (1982).
In Larson, for example, the Court struck down a state law exempting from the
requirements of the state's Charitable Solicitation Act only those religious organizations
that received more than half of their total contributions from their members. The exemption, according to the Court, favored "'well-established churches' that have
'achieved strong but not total financial support from their members.'" Id at 1685 n.23
(quoting Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981)). On the other hand, the
Court upheld, for example, tax exemptions for church real property, without noting that
the statute facially discriminated between two sets of religious organizations-those that
have property and those that do not. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
296 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), upheld a state scheme that allowed parents to deduct expenses associated with private schooling from their gross income in
computing their income tax.
294
295

850

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:769

deny the Indians' request that their sacred sites remain undisturbed.
It seems very likely, however, that the legislatures will do all of
these things-and that the Court, d la Bowen and Lyng, will casually
uphold such a discriminatory scheme. The Court, indeed, would in
all likelihood repeat its position that the Constitution's own "frame
of reference" supports a distinction between internal and external
government action. Even under the Court's new, less formally discriminatory position, then, the lingering bias of the Court and legislatures will likely result in nonvolitionalists receiving less religious
freedom than volitionalists. Part II of this Article will therefore address and refute the Court's central contention-that the Constitution and the concept of religious liberty rest on a volitionalist world
view.
PART II:
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST VOLITIONALISM AS A THRESHOLD
REQUIREMENT

To modern legal sensibilities formed in the prevailing culture,
volitionalism may seem the only defensible moral or religious system. The Constitution, moreover, may well endorse volitionalism in
many of its political provisions. Finally, as we will suggest, many of
the framers-Madison and Jefferson among them-believed in a
species of volitionalism both as a personal religious belief and as an
explanation for why the Constitution protects religious beliefs and
practices. As a result, modern judges may presume that the Constitution guarantees liberty to the practice of volitionalist religions
alone, and indeed that religious liberty itself depends on a volitionalist view. They may conclude, furthermore, that if the Constitution
itself discriminates against nonvolitionalists, surely legislatures may
do so by granting special treatment only to volitionalist religions.
This conclusion is mistaken: the frame of reference of the religion clauses-as distinct from the Constitution generally-does not
exclude nonvolitionalist views from protection. We base this contention on the three standard sources of constitutional law: the language of the clauses, the history of their adoption, and the policies
identified by the Court as underpinning them. In doing so, we do
not mean to attribute any particular significance to these three
sources. Rather, we intend to refute the Court's assertion in Bowen
297 Cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that the ban on religious discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not extend to the secular nonprofit
activities of religious organizations); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
(holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to lay employees of
church schools).

VOLITIONALISM

1991]

851

and Lyng that the "frame of reference" of the free exercise clauseas defined by the Court's own conventional sources-is exclusively
volitionalist.
The language of the free exercise clause-"Congress shall
make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" 29 8offers little guidance. It certainly contains no suggestion that only
certain kinds of religion are to receive its protection.2 9 9 Indeed, the
general reference to "religion" suggests that the clauses were meant
to protect the free exercise of all religions. As we have already argued, 0 0° the term "prohibit" could refer either to nonvolitionalist
prohibitions or volitionalist ones; the Court can restrict the term to
the latter only by importing volitionalist assumptions from outside
80
the text. '
The Court presumably derives its constitutional "frame of reference," not from the language of the free exercise clause, but from
the theoretical framework that it believes undergirds the Constitution. The following sections will consider the primary sources for
this framework: the history of the document's adoption and the polides that underlie it. First, we will argue that the framers of the first
amendment meant to include within its protection clearly nonvolitionalist religions-in particular predestinarian Calvinists, who
played as important a role in the adoption of the clause as did their
better-known volitionalist allies. Second, we will argue that the policies of the free exercise clause identified by the Supreme Courtneutrality and voluntarism-warrant extending protection to
nonvolitional claims. In at least one earlier case, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 8 0 2 the Court seemed to recognize this argument. In general,
then, legislatures and courts must extend nonvolitionalist religions
amend. 1.
The clause does extend protection only to the "free exercise" of religion. On
the face of it, this phrase may suggest that the clause protects only religious practice,
that is, only the conduct of individuals or groups of individuals. Even if this reading of
the language is correct-and the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected it by extending
protection to belief as well as practice-it does not follow that the free exercise clause
protects only volitionalist religions. Nonvolitionalist religions, like volitionalist religions, may involve discrete religious practice, and the government may interfere with
that practice in nonvolitionalist ways. Thus, the government's use of the social security
number may destroy Little Bird of the Snow's ability to heal; or its construction of a ski
resort in the mountains may effectively prevent the Hopis from summoning the
Kachinas.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 220-48.
301 The Court's only other linguistic argument is its claim that the free exercise
clause "is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in
terms of what the individual can extract from the government." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 700 (1986) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)). As we have already demonstrated, however, this argument cannot support
a volitionalist reading of the clause.
302 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
298
299
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the same level of protection enjoyed by others. Finally we will consider whether and when the special attributes of nonvolitionalist religions justify treating them differently because the state has a
compelling interest in doing so.
We will conclude that the Constitution's frame of reference allows neither courts nor legislatures to discriminate between volitionalist and nonvolitionalist religions. Whatever degree of protection the government extends to one, it must extend to the other.
On the other hand, protection for some nonvolitionalist practices
may prove excessively disruptive to the government. In these cases,
the government may decline to protect such practices and still protect others-not because they are volitionalist but because they less
severely disrupt the government's secular activities.
SECTION FIvE.
THE ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY

The Supreme Court and commentators have often maintained
that the views of those responsible for the adoption of the first
amendment-especially Thomas Jefferson and James Madison-are
significant to its interpretation.30 3 Thus, when the Court insisted
that the Constitution adopts a volitionalist "frame of reference," it
may have meant that Madison andJefferson intended that result. As
a personal system of belief, the two framers did, indeed, adopt a
volitionalist religious scheme: the essence of religion was the practice of virtue so as to earn a reward in Heaven. Moreover, they
based their defense of religious liberty on the assumption that religion is volitionalist: individuals reserve the right to religious freedom from the social contract so that they may be free to please God
(or Providence) and win a reward for their conduct. Because of the
dominance of Madison and Jefferson, the Court may have assumed
that volitionalism was the sole religious theory embraced by the
framers' generation.
In fact, however, the modem American tendency to equate religion with volitionalism is primarily a product of the nineteenth century. For the century and one-half preceding the drafting of the Bill
of Rights, the principal orthodox theology of the colonies was
nonvolitionalist predestinarian Calvinism. In this belief system,
human choices have no religious effect. God alone chooses individuals for salvation, uninfluenced by their attempts to save themselves. By the time of the ratification of the Constitution, this kind
303
See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-13, reh k denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98

U.S. 145, 162-64 (1878), overruled on other grounds, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981).
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of Calvinism had come under attack from volitionalist Arminian
theologians, yet it retained the loyalty of a substantial portion of the
American public.
In light of this history, the contention that the framers intended
to exclude nonvolitionalist views from constitutional protection is
insupportable. It is highly implausible that Jefferson and Madison
meant to exclude the Calvinist denominations-Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and many of the Baptist groups-from protection,
since some of those denominations were among the most mainstream and respectable in the nation, and others were Jefferson's
and Madison's most important allies in the battle for religious
freedom.
Even if the Constitution should be interpreted according to the
intent of those who brought about its adoption, the views of
Madison and Jefferson should not constitute the entire foundation
for interpreting the free exercise clause. Madison and Jefferson
were not alone responsible for its adoption 3 °4-Calvinist supporters
of the clause offered a nonvolitionalist defense of religious freedom,
best articulated in the writings of Isaac Backus. Among the
promoters of religious liberty, Calvinists may well have been most
responsible for its adoption into state and federal constitutions.
Nonvolitionalism therefore has a significant place in the first
amendment's origins alongside volitionalism.
A. The Volitionalism of Madison and Jefferson
The framers most often associated with the drafting of the religion clauses, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, were volitionalist in their approach to religion and religious liberty. Their personal
religious beliefs inclined to rationalist Deism-an emphatically volitionalist position. 30 5 Adherents of this view maintained that all es304 Indeed, as we will suggest, attributing only one metaphysical explanation to the
religion clauses-such as that of Madison and Jefferson-conflicts with establishment
clause values. See infra text accompanying notes 582-89.
305 Jefferson's Deism is universally recognized. See, e.g., HENRY MAY, THE ENIGHrENMENT IN AMERICA 293 (1976); SIDNEY MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT 41 (1963).
Madison rarely discussed his personal religious beliefs, so it is more difficult to discern
them with any certainty. He probably held essentially Deistic beliefs, although perhaps
not as extreme as those of his friendJefferson. See IRVING BRANr, JAMES MADISON: THE
VIRGINIA REVOLUrIONIST 118, 277 (1941); Ralph Ketcham,James Madison and Religion-A
New Hypothesis, 38J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. Soc'Y 65, 65, 71-72 (1960). Madison was, however, more pessimistic than the Deists regarding human nature and the cosmic orderperhaps as a result of his early training under the Presbyterian Divine John Witherspoon. See Ketcham, supra, at 86; James Smylie, Madison and Witherspoon, Theological Roots
of American Political Thought, 22 PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRONICLE 118, 128-29 (1961). On
the other hand, Madison and Witherspoon shared the belief that God delivered to man a
code of morals, to which humans are accountable through their capacity for virtuous
action. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON, A BIOGRAPHY 46-47 (1971); H. MAY, supra,
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sential religious truths are accessible to natural reason, unaided by
special revelation and unfettered by the superstition that they associated with institutional religion.3 0 6 The truths so revealed are simple and few:3 0 7 God exists and is to be worshipped; the worship of
God consists of the practice of virtue;30 8 and there exists a future
realm of reward and punishment. 3 09 Religion is, in other words,
fundamentally a divinely sanctioned set of moral rules binding on
man. The essential religious activity is the exercise of an undetermined will to follow those rules, so as to earn future reward.3 10 Not
surprisingly, many Deists believed that the chief function of religion
at 62-63. Moreover, Madison, unlike Witherspoon, probably shared the Enlightenment
belief in the perfectibility of humankind. He thus denied the doctrine of original sin, the
basis for the nonvolitionalism of predestinarian Calvinists. See Ketcham, supra, at 86.
Most importantly for present purposes, Madison probably believed in the capacity of
humans freely to choose the right. See infra note 314. Any limited extent to which
Madison inclined away from Deism and toward a nonvolitionalist belief, such as Calvinism, directly supports our general thesis that the free exercise clause extends to nonvolitionalist religions.
306 See S. MEAD, supra note 305, at 44-50; Edwin Gaustad, A DisestablishedSociety: Origins of the First Amendment, 11 J. CHURCH & ST. 409, 419-24 (1969). For evidence that
Jefferson and Madison shared this view, see infra notes 312-21 and accompanying text.
307 Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson provided the clearest and most concise
list of these features of Deist religion. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Mod.
Libr. C. ed. 1981) (1st ed. 1818); THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, 1776 [hereinafter
T. JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion], in 2 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 94 (1893) [hereinafter
WRITINGS I]; THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush, with a Syllabus (Apr. 21,
1803), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1125-26 (1984) [hereinafter WRITINGS II];
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Benjamin Waterhouse Uune 26, 1822) [hereinafter T. JEFFERSON, Letter to Benjamin Waterhouse], in 10 WRITINGS I (1899), supra, at 219.
308 Jefferson maintained that he was a "real Christian" for the simple reason that he
followed the ethical teachings ofJesus. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Charles Thomson Uan.
9, 1816) [hereinafter T. JEFFERSON, Letter to Charles Thomson], in WRITINGS II, supra note
307, at 1373 (emphasis in original). One ofJefferson's life-long projects was to separate
the actual sayings ofJesus from the comments of his chroniclers in the New Testament.
When he did so, he discovered thatJesus's sayings constituted the finest code of morals
known to man, whereas the commentators had added the metaphysical mysteries that
infected the various Christian sects. See, e.g., THOMASJEFFERSON, Letter to Dr.Joseph Priestley (Apr. 9, 1803), in WRITINGS II, supra note 307, at 1120, 1121; THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Letter to John Adams (Oct. 12, 1813), in WRITINGS II, supra note 307, at 1300, 1301-02.
309 See H. MAY, supra note 305, at 295.
310
Many Deists condemned the Biblical stories in which God visits hardships on
individuals for reasons unrelated to their own failings, such as the misery of Job, the
punishment of Adam, and the Crucifixion itself, which involved the sacrifice of one man
for the sins of others. See id. at 21-22.
Deism is thus volitionalist in the "milder sense": the essential religious activity is
choosing to follow the rules, but natural justice rather than choice defines the content of
these rules. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. Indeed, Jefferson and Madison
emphasized that the rules are so self-evident to reason or the moral sense that individuals cannot but recognize their morally obligatory quality. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes
on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS II, supra note 307, at 285; Ketcham, supra note 305, at
67-69, 71-72 (influence of Samuel Clarke's rationalist theology on Madison); infra text
accompanying notes 312-13, 319-20. See generally JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA 35-72 (1985) (discussing broad ap-
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was the maintenance of peace, morality, and good order.3 1 1
More importantly for present purposes, Jefferson and Madison
not only held this view of religion privately, but also based their defense of religious liberty on it. The chief elements of this defense
are the same for both Madison and Jefferson. First, even before he
enters the social contract, natural reason reveals to each individual
that he owes a duty to God and what that duty entails. This duty
rests on a volitionalist view of the self: each individual is under a
duty because he can freely choose to live up to the divine obligations perceived by reason. When the individual enters the social
contract, he cedes some powers to the government but reserves certain spheres of autonomy, including religion. Individuals choose to
retain autonomy in this area because they owe a duty to God, and
each individual is alone responsible before the court of Heaven for
the choices that he has made in this life. Therefore, because his
duty to God takes precedence over his duty to the state, the jurisdiction of the state cannot reach religious practice.
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance presents this argument in
standard Deistic fashion. The Memorial begins by insisting that relipeal of rationalism and moralism and the connection between the two in seventeenthcentury America).
For purposes of argument and brevity, we have conceded that Jefferson and
Madison were volitionalist. In fact, however, neitherJefferson nor Madison were unambiguously volitionalist even in this milder sense. Jefferson's views on the matter are
complex and somewhat unclear. Methodologically, he believed that some form of materialist determinism provided the best guide for scientifically understanding phenomena
in the world; this view would suggest that men do not possess any meaningful free
choice. See ADRIENNE KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 94-104 (1943); H.

supra note 305, at 118, 294. But he also refused to take a position on materialism
as a metaphysical question, to maintain systematically that individuals are in fact chained
by materialist determinism. Id. Moreover, his religious views were highly moralistic (indeed he tended to identify religion and morality), see supra note 308, and he excoriated
the Calvinists for their determinism, see infra note 377. Madison, too, found determinism a logically compelling position, but ultimately denied it on the grounds that even if
determinism is the only defensible position on logical grounds, it has no support in
human experience. Human beings experience undetermined choice as real, and therefore it exists. See R. KETcIAM, supra note 305, at 46-47; see also Edmond Cahn, Madison
and the Pursuit of Happiness, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 270-71, 275-76 (1952) (arguing that
Madison and Jefferson, borrowing from Locke, both believed that wills are partially materialistically determined by different desires but that humans can choose discriminatingly among desires).
Even if Madison and Jefferson were not volitionalists, they were plainly individualists: their conviction that God rewards and punishes necessarily involves the claim that
the religious fate of each individual depends on what that individual does or does not
do. For this reason, they would part company with the Indians on the idea that the
government's actions can have inherent religious significance for individuals.
311
See, e.g., S. MEAD, supra note 305, at 44, 59-60. Deists disagreed over the wisdom
of religious liberty precisely because they disagreed on whether religion was necessary
to the social order. Jefferson believed that the existing American religions adequately
promoted social order, so that persecution added to social disorder rather than reducing
it. See T.JEFFERSON, supra note 310, at 286-87.
MAY,
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gious belief can be influenced only by reason and not by coercion. 3 12 Furthermore, the Memorial implicitly maintains that the
religious truths identified by reason consist of a code of behavior, a
set of divine rules: Madison directly identifies "Religion" as "the
duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging
it," and that duty "of every man [is] to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him."3 13
The word "duty" implicitly suggests that the essential religious activity is volitionalist. Without the capacity for free will, at least in the
context of Madison's and Jefferson's presuppositions, we could not
be under a genuine duty to do something we have not the freedom
31 4
to choose to do.
Finally, and most significantly, Madison derives the principle of
religious liberty from this volitionalist view of religion: the state has
no jurisdiction over religion because the duty to God "is precedent,
both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society." 3 1 5 Implicitly, this argument draws on Madison's
broader social contractarian philosophy. 3 16 In this familiar scheme,
312

James Madison, To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia,

Memorial and Remonstrance, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 56 (1985) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS LIBERTY] ("'Religion ... can be directed only by reason and conviction' ") (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights, art XVI (1776)).
313 Id

314 This implication of the word "duty"-that we have the capacity through undetermined will to live up to our obligations-is not unavoidable. Predestinarian Calvinists,
for example, believed that we are under a duty to God that we cannot, by our own
efforts, satisfy. See infra note 393. For Deists such as Madison and Jefferson, however,
duty implied free will. Both Madison and Jefferson believed that we have the capacity
for undetermined choice and thereby implicitly denied the Calvinist view of duty. See
supra note 310 and text accompanying notes 313-14. Jefferson, in particular, waxed eloquent in his denunciations of Calvinism as cruel and tyrannical because it imposed a
duty while denying the free will to fulfill the duty. See infra note 377. Similarly, Madison
maintained that only the free choice of humans to fulfill their duty could please God:
"If the public homage of a people can ever be worthy of the favorable
regard of the Holy and Omniscient Being to whom it is addressed, it must
be that in which those who join it are guided only by their free choice, by
the impulse of their hearts and the dictates of their conscience."
Donald Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the FirstAmendment, 25 J.
CHURCH & ST. 427,441 (1983) (quoting IJAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 533 (1901)).
315 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 312, at 56.

316 The argument also implicitly refers to Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, with
which Jefferson and Madison were almost certainly familiar. See Robert Rutland, James
Madison's Dream: A Secular Republic, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 312, at 203 (arguing for Madison's familiarity with the Letter); T. JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, supra note
307, at 99-103 (reproducing portions of the Letter verbatim but without attribution).
Locke's defense of religious liberty is not unproblematically volitionalist. Locke believed that individuals would choose contractually to withhold religion from civil jurisdiction, because each individual owes a duty to God, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTExR
CONCERNING TOLERATION 18-19 (2d ed. 1977), but those choices are in large part determined. For Locke, passion determines judgment, and judgment determines the will;
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individuals suffer legitimate consequences only as a result of their
choices. Government can be based only on individual consent, or at

least assent, so the power of the government reaches only those activities confided to it in the social contract. Individuals choose to
enter the contract to effect their own ends, but they also choose to
exempt certain spheres of autonomy from the contract.3 1 7 Individu-

als choose to retain religious autonomy because each owes a duty to
God, a duty precedent "in time and in degree of obligation" to his
civil obligations to the state. Religious exercise is exempted from

the civil covenant because we are responsible for our own acts to
18

God.3
In various works, Jefferson mirrors these ideas. In his original,
unedited version of the Billfor EstablishingReligious Freedom, he main-

tained that religious truths were available to "reason alone." 31 9
And for Jefferson as for Madison, reason reveals that the essence of
religion is conduct calculated to win salvation. In early notes, echoindividuals cannot will other than they will. They can, however, suspend choice while
they rationally consider all the possible objects of desire. Because salvation is the greatest good, rational beings will always choose to uphold their duty to God. See, e.g., NORMAN FIERING, JONATHAN EDWARDS'S MORAL THOUGHT AND ITS BRITISH CONTEXT 288-89,

296-97 (1981); Raymond Polin, John Locke's Conception of Freedom, in JOHN LocKE:
PROBLEMS AND PERspEcarlvs 2-5 (J. Volton ed. 1969). Thus, choices provide the only
legitimate basis for political or religious consequences, but the choices are self-determined only in a limited sense. But see Cahn, supra note 310, at 271 (emphasizing the
capacity for self-determination inherent in Locke's thought). Again, however, Locke is,
at a minimum, individualist: only the actions of each individual, even if those actions are
nonvolitional, can have legitimate consequences for that individual. See Polin, supra, at
11. As a result, he too would disagree with the Indian belief in the inherent religious
significance of government action.
317 As many have noted, the social contract is not based on actual choices of real
individuals but on the choices that "reasonable persons" would make at the mythic origin of the polity. What these hypothetical individuals give up (rights in the state of
nature), why they give it up ("reasonable persons" would always prefer civil society),
and what they gain (a state bound by the social contract) are all artificial constructs
based on some substantive view of natural justice, as in the case of Locke, or human
nature, as in the case of Rawls. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF

JUSTICE 105-06 (1982); Polin, supra note 316, at 10, 13. In this sense, the terms of the
contract are set not by human choice, but by God or natural law or some other source of
standards of justice. Importantly, however, the contractarians rhetorically defend the
legitimacy of the state not on the grounds that God or natural law directly ordained the
state in a certain way, but that individuals-however highly abstracted-chose to form
the state, for their own ends, in accordance with these standards ofjustice. Thus, for the
contractarians, choice legitimates the state.
318
Rationalist Deism is the religious correlate of social contractarianism, in that
both derived from a single metaphysic: individuals suffer legitimate consequencesmoral, political or religious-only as a result of their choices. One apparent difference
does exist between the two ideas. Deism is volitional in the "milder sense": individuals
are held accountable for their chosen failure to abide by the rules, but they do not
choose the rules. Social contractarianism is volitional in the "stronger sense": individuals actually choose the fundamental rules, at least rhetorically, in making the contract.
319

THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for EstablishingReligious Freedom, in WRITINGS II, supra

note 307, at 346.
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ing Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration almost verbatim, Jefferson defined a church as a "voluntary society of men" into which an
individual enters for the "hope of salvation" because he believespresumably by the use of his natural reason-that the church's
mode of worship is "acceptable to [God] and effectual to the salvation of [his] soul[]."3 20 Again, the view of religion is volitionalist:
human beings are rewarded for choosing to live up to the duty of
worship and punished for not doing so. And again, the defense of
religious liberty is based on this view of religion: the right to regulate worship is exempted from the social contract because the people "have not given [the magistrate] the care of souls because they
could not; they could not, because no man has the right to abandon
32
the care of his salvation to another."1 '
On first observation, then, the Court's view that the Constitution incorporates a volitionalist "frame of reference" seems to have
an impressive pedigree. The reason that Jefferson and Madison
proffered for religious liberty is that we have a religious duty to follow God first and the state second. Remove this duty-remove the
volitionalist responsibility to render the Creator homage-and one
has removed the reason offered by Jefferson and Madison for religious liberty. Nonvolitionalist religions thus have no place within
the Constitution's scheme of liberty. Despite its initial plausibility,
however, this argument is ultimately insupportable. To demonstrate why, we turn to a description of nonvolitionalist religions in
colonial America.
B.

Calvinism in Colonial America

Although volitionalism has been an important strain in Western
320
321

T. JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, supra note 307, at 101.
Id. The preamble to Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom-in which

Jefferson laid out his reasons for the Bill-is concerned with freedom of opinion and the
closely related freedom to maintain one's opinion by argument. As a result, the preamble to the Bill does not directly defend the liberty of general religious practice. The
preamble's defense of the freedom of public argument, however, itself suggests a volitionalist view of religion and a volitionalist defense of religious liberty. The Bill maintains that freedom to promote a religious view in public is a natural right, for the
typically Jeffersonian reason that free discourse is the best way to promote truth. See T.
JEFFERSON, supra note 319, at 347. But forJefferson, public profession of one's religious

views is also a religious duty: Jefferson condemns as "criminal" those who succumb to
the "temptation" of receiving worldly honors in exchange for denying their true beliefs.
The Bill also maintains that those "who lay the bait in their way"--i.e., those governors
who condition worldly emoluments and honors on foreswearing beliefs-are "not innocent." Id. Again, then, the defense of liberty of argument is derived from religion's
volitionalist nature: the state should not subject the believer to a weighted choice between a governmental benefit and his duty to maintain his beliefs in public, because his
religious fate depends on the free choice to fulfill his religious duties. Thus, as regards
belief claims, Jefferson mirrors the present Court's position. See supra text accompanying notes 289-91.
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Christianity, it is by no means the only one. Nonvolitionalism has
played an important part in Christian theology at least since Augustine of Hippo's response to Pelagius in 416.322 More importantly
for the history of the first amendment, nonvolitionalism lay at the
center of the theological construct of John Calvin, the greatest sin-

gle influence on colonial American religion.
Calvin anchored his analysis to two concepts: the absolute sovereignty of God and the utter depravity of man. Because He is absolutely sovereign, Calvin asserted, God alone chooses which
individuals will be saved by grace. Man plays no part in this salvific
process because his depraved will is bound to sin.3 23 As a result,

God chooses the elect without reference to merit, for reasons that
may seem arbitrary to human notions of justice.3 24 Thus, Calvin

proclaimed free will a fiction and announced that doctrine so unsettling to modem Protestants: predestination. The causal sequence
for this predestinarian description of the salvific process 325 is
nonvolitionalist: Calvin vehemently denied the sequence, Individual Action -> Religious Effect, and proposed instead, God's Ac3 26
tion -> Religious Effect.
Despite its insistence that man cannot save himself, Calvinism

nevertheless gave a prominent place to human action in the process
of salvation, because God sometimes acted through individuals.
Calvin maintained that the reception of grace-the process ofjustifi-

cation-will lead naturally to upright behavior-the process of sanctification. Once individuals have received grace, their hearts turn
322 The British monk Pelagius maintained that humans have the capacity to please
God and do His will on their own initiative. Augustine, who maintained that without
God's help humans are always caught in the snare of self-love, condemned Pelagianism
as heresy. See ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 98-100, 105-06, 129-30
(1988).
323 See 1 JOHN CALVIN, INsTITUTEs OF THE CHRisTIAN RELIGION 238-39, 265 (John
Allen trans. 7th Amer. ed. 1936).
324 Id at 274, 286, 2 id at 191-92.
325 Calvin believed that man's will was bound not only in the process of salvation but
in "corporeal" matters as well. 1 id at 282-84. Thus, Calvin endorsed a fairly thorough
going determinism that later Calvinists would abandon until Jonathan Edwards revived
it in the eighteenth century. See infra text accompanying notes 356-61.
326 The text addresses how man is saved but not how man is damned because the
process of salvation concerned colonial theologians much more than the process of
damnation. Calvin himself and many Calvinists believed that God originally imbued
Adam with free will and that Adam's free choice to sin doomed the rest of mankind. See
1 J. CALVIN, supra note 323, at 181. After the Fall, individuals sin voluntarily, in the
sense that their natures incline them to sin and so they choose to sin. They do not sin
freely, however, because they are bound to sin. See id at 284-85. Thus, even after the
Fall, man is responsible for his damnation because he voluntarily sins. Id. at 285-86.
This responsibility is nonvolitionalist. Man is responsible because he sins, not because
he has a choice about whether to sin. Thus, negative religious effects, like positive ones,
are not the product of free will.
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naturally to God, so that they gladly do good works.3 2 7 But human
choice plays no role in this process. Good works and a willing heart
are a result, not a cause, of grace; and whatever is good in man is
attributed entirely to the indwelling presence of God.3 28 The causal
sequence is again nonvolitionalist: God's Action (election) ->
Religious Effect (justification) ->
Individual Action (sanctification).
In short, Calvinist predestinarianism conceded that a good deal
of human activity occurred in the working out of God's plan of salvation, but it could never be the cause of salvific effects. This distinction is rather a subtle one, and from the beginning, Calvinists
seemed in constant danger of crossing the line from predestinarianism into volitionalism. 3 29 In the early seventeenth century, Jacobus
Arminius and his followers within the Reformed Church of Holland
stepped over that line.
Arminius maintained that God knows in advance who will be
saved and who will not, but He does not predestine them irrespective of their choices. Instead, He offers conditional election to all:
He will offer grace to every individual, but grace is not irresistible;
sinners may freely accept or reject grace when it is offered. In this
way, human choice became a necessary cause of salvation. 33 0 In the
Synod of Dort of 1618, the Reformed Church of Holland con33
demned conditional election and Arminianism as heresy.With the ascension of the Stuarts in England, the English
Church under Archbishop Laud adopted Arminianism as its official
creed. For this reason among others, strict Calvinists within the
Anglican Church felt compelled to emigrate to New England.3 3 2
See 2 idat 10-11.
See 1 idL at 266-70; 2 id. at 12, 23-24.
329 Factors which may account for the tendency of Calvinist groups to abandon or
modify predestinarian doctrines include the innate human desire to control one's own
destiny, and the rise of rival volitionalist ideologies and practices, such as liberalism and
capitalism. The most famous explanation is Max Weber's hypothesis that the anxiety
induced by predestination caused individuals to seek in rigorous self-control signs of
election, such that self-control and spiritual election became identified. See MAX WEBER,
THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 111-118 (r. Parsons trans. 1958).
330 See JOHN McNEILL, THE HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CALVINISM 263-65 (1954);
NORMAN PETrTIT, THE HEART PREPARED 125-27 (1966); WILLIAM SwEET, RELIGION IN CO327
328

LONIAL AMERICA 190 (1942).

331 SeeJ. McNEiLL, supra note 330, at 265; N. PETrr, supra note 330, at 127. The
Synod formulated the famous Five Points of High Calvinism: unconditional election,
limited atonement, total depravity, irresistible grace, and the perserverance of the saints.
Id4 Each of these points was deeply predestinarian: God did not condition election on
human choice; Christ's atonement would save only the elect few; man after the Fall is
utterly depraved and so cannot help himself; grace, when it comes, cannot be resisted by
human will; and God will so preserve his saints that once saved they cannot fall away.
332 See H. MAY, supra note 305, at 14; EDMUND MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA 2831 (1958); W. SWEET, supra note 330, at 20-21. The original emigrants to New England
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The Calvinist settlers themselves exhibited tendencies toward both
Calvinist predestination and a timid Arminian volitionalism.3 3 3 But
this dual tendency should not obscure the fact that at base, the New
England colonies were deeply Calvinist. All of the early settlers denounced Arminianism as heresy.3 3 4 The vast majority, moreover,
were consistent in their belief in certain Calvinist tenets such as
human inability to achieve salvation without the assistance of divine
grace,3 3 5 and the understanding that God may grant grace for reasons of His own to the most unrepentant evil-doer yet deny it to the
most upright citizen.3 3 6 In this sense, the New England Puritans
were resolutely nonvolitionalist.
A group of New England divines, however, sought to soften the
rigors of strict predestinarianism by giving man a limited role to
play in his own salvation. Preachers such as Thomas Hooker,
Thomas Shepard, and Peter Bulkeley maintained that man can and
should prepare himself for the reception of grace. Conversion, in
the view of these preparationists, is not God's sudden seizure of the
individual, but rather a series of steps. God first warms the soul
through the "means of grace"-baptism, preaching, and the biblical
promise of salvation in exchange for man's faith.3 37 After this divine
initiative, the individual must cooperate with God through an "affective response," usually acute self-analysis, in order to engender an
awareness of sin and a yearning for grace.
came seeking the liberty to practice a nonvolitionalist creed, in flight from the prevailing
volitionalism of the English church. Bowen thus resurrected the same orthodoxy from
which the Puritans fled.
Later, while fleetingly in control of the Church of England, English Puritans
promulgated the Westminster Confession of 1648, which adopted the substance of the
Synod of Dort as the definitive explanation of the relationship between man and God.
The Westminster Confession became the standard of orthodoxy by which all Puritan
theological analysis would be judged, both in England and America, and Arminianism
became the most feared Calvinist heresy. See H. MAY, supra note 305, at 14; J. McNEILL,
supra note 330, at 325-26; E. MORGAN, supra, at 136-37; W. SwEEr, supra note 330, at
104-05.
333
See JAMES JONES, THE SHATTERED SYNTHESIS ix (1973).
334 See E. MORGAN, supra note 332, at 136.
335
See N. PETrrr, supra note 330, at 19.
336 See PERRY MILLER, The Marrow of PuritanDivinity, in ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS
93-97 (1956) [hereinafter ERRAND].
337 The most famous form of preparationism was covenant theology, which proclaimed that God made a promise to each individual to save him, if he would have faith.
This covenant rhetorically offered some solace for the anxious Calvinist by giving him a
way to work toward his salvation: if the individual had faith, God would grant him grace.
The hope was only rhetorical, because most covenant theologians believed that the individual could not acquire faith by his own initiative any more than he could acquire grace.
God required man to have faith to fulfill the covenant, but only God could give faith.
The covenant of grace was thus, in truth, a covenant that God made with himself. See P.
MILLER, supra note 336, at 71-74; EDMUND MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND
THE STATE 13-14 (1967).
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The preparationists differed as to the sense in which this response was a product of human volition. Most believed that God
must not only offer the means of grace, He must also create the
response in the breasts of humans, so that humans cannot even contribute to their own salvation.3 3 8 Peter Bulkeley alone went somewhat further in giving man a role: God infuses in man the "habit of
faith" by baptism, after which man must of his own volition engage
in "acts of faith" in order to secure salvation. Thus, the human
acceptance of God's invitation completes the process.3 3 9 With the
exception of Bulkeley,3 40 then, humans play a part in salvation but
only under God's control. God alone provides the means of grace
and engenders the salvific response to them.
Preparationist doctrines often became ambiguous as they
sought to ascribe some important causal role to man's "affective response" while avoiding the Arminian heresy. 341 To many, preparationism seemed little more than disguised Arminianism.3 42 The
Antinomians 343 mounted the first attack on preparationism on this
basis. Preparationists, the Antinomians claimed, believed in a covenant of works, in which man fulfills the contract with God by good
deeds, rather than a covenant of grace, in which man fulfills the contract with God only when God provides grace. 3 44 The Hutchin338 For example, Thomas Shepard maintained that faith was a necessary precondition of grace, but that God alone could fulfill that condition by giving man faith. See J.
JONES, supra note 333, at 8-9; N. PTrrr, supra note 330, at 111-12. Similarly, Thomas

Hooker believed that while man must become painfully aware of his own sinfulness
before he can receive grace, God alone can grant man this awareness, can alone connect
the "means" of grace with grace itself. See J. JoNEs, supra note 333, at 12-13; N. PETrrr,
supra note 330, at 91-92, 95-96.
339 See J. JoNEs, supra note 333, at 9, 21, 72-73; N. PErrrr, supra note 330, at 117-18,
123.

340 Even Bulkeley emphasized that the habit of grace, induced by an unconditional
promise of salvation, is the result of free grace. See N. PErrr, supra note 330, at 120-21.
341
342

See id.at 113; P. MILLER, supra note 336, at 74; E. MORGAN, supra note 332, at 136.
See P. MILLER, supra note 336, at 84; E. MORGAN, supra note 332, at 136-37; W.

SWEET, supra note 330, at 101. There is a difference, however tenuous, between Arminianism and preparationism: Arminianism maintained that God offers grace to all, and
that all are free to accept, whereas preparationists believed that man cannot accept the
covenant without God's help. For preparationists, therefore, God elects the saints without regard to merit. See P. MILLER, supra note 336, at 84 & n.143.
343 The Antinomians were a small group of Puritans located in New England. They

were led by Anne Hutchinson and inspired by the preaching ofJohn Cotton, who took
the doctrines of free grace and divine sovereignty to extremes. The Antinomians maintained that after the Holy Ghost had entered the human breast, its directions supplemented or substituted for the teachings of scripture; that good behavior did not always
follow justification, so that works were not evidence of grace; and that the spirit within
the individual could allow him to discern who was saved, without reference to works. See
E. MORGAN, supra note 332, at 138-39. The colony was briefly divided over the Antinomian controversy, but Antinomian beliefs virtually disappeared following their condemnation in 1637. See id. at 140-54.
344 See id. at 139-40; N. PE-rrr, supra note 330, at 141, 146-47.

1991]

VOLITIONALISM

S863

sonian Synod of 1637, however, condemned the Antinomians as
heretics for denying man any role in salvation, and for a time
preparationism became part of New England orthodoxy. Unlike the
Antinomians, the elders at the Synod maintained that God works
through and in men in salvation, rather than merely upon them.
But they also carefully insisted that preparation was a work of God,
not man. Individuals did participate in their own salvation, but only
as tools in God's hands.mS Thus, even the Synod's position, which
was the high point for preparationism as doctrinal orthodoxy, was
fundamentally nonvolitionalist.
The theological future of New England, however, lay with an
even more nonvolitionalist view, propounded by the intellectual
heirs ofJohn Cotton. Cotton's preaching had inspired the Antinomians, and he supported the movement throughout most of its
short life. Although he differed with the Antinomians on many
points,3 4 6 Cotton agreed that conversion is an instantaneous forceful seizure of the depraved soul by God. The individual can only
wait passively for faith, without preparing for it.34 7 Even the claim
that God works through men gave them too large a role in their
3 48
salvation: God works upon men, as upon lumps of lifeless clay.
After the Hutchinsonian Synod, Cotton no longer maintained this
3 49
view in public, in an effort to avoid theological disunity.
In the 1650s, however, John Norton's became the dominant
theological voice in the colony.3 50 The line between preparationism
and Arminianism had always seemed very thin, even to some
preparationists, 3 5 1 and Arminianism in the 1640s became the
greater threat to Massachusetts orthodoxy. To answer the threat,
Norton vigorously reasserted God's direct and absolute sovereignty,
and denied preparation any regenerative efficacy. Conversion occurred in a single moment, the instant of election, and consisted
See J.JoNEs, supra note 333, at 7, 12; N. Parrr, supra note 330, at 147-55.
346 Cotton condemned two Antinomiam beliefs in particular: their insistence that
divine illumination of the individual could supersede Scripture; and their denial that
before giving grace, God convinced sinners of their sinfulness by showing them that
they could never fulfill the demands of the divine law on their own. See N. PE-rrr, supra
note 330, at 151-55.
347 SeeJ. JONES, supra note 333, at 5-6; N. Pm-rrr, supra note 330, at 136-41.
348 SeeJ. JONES, supra note 333, at 7-9.
349
See id at 4; N. PErrr, supra note 330, at 155-57.
350 See N. PErr,supra note 330, at 177-78.
351
The most famous example of the blurred distinction between preprationism and
Arminianism was John Winthrop's written repudiation of the Antinomian position.
Before publication, he sent it to Thomas Shepard for approval; Shepard responded that,
although he did not doubt Winthrop's orthodoxy, a less sympathetic reader might find
that the draft contained a number of Arminian errors more grievous than Antinomianism itself. Winthrop apparently destroyed the composition. See E. MORGAN, supra note
332, at 142; N. Prrr,
supra note 330, at 144-45.
345
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exclusively of divine action; 3 52 all man's attempts to prepare are
only "painted sins." 35 3 Norton nevertheless urged all would-be

saints to engage in preparatory activities to guard against excessive
religious enthusiasm unconstrained by social norms.S54 This view of
preparation-as both inefficacious and obligatory-became the
dominant position for the next several decades.3 55
As time went on, however, many came to believe that the religious fervor of New England was yielding to a growing spirit of secularism. Conversion experiences, for example, occurred less often
after New England congregations abandoned the requirement that
individuals recite the details of their experience in order to become
full church members. Many unregenerate New Englanders complacently attended on the means of grace with no present fear that God
might never grant them grace. The region seemed to be moving yet
again toward anthropocentric Arminianism, without a sense of the
356
awful majesty and power of the Almighty.
The Great Awakening, a series of religious revivals that swept
across the colonies during the mid-eighteenth century, was a response to this perceived spiritual decline. On an emotional level,
the Awakening reflected a felt need for a vital, consuming religious

35 7
life, one filled with a sense of the immediate presence of God.

On a theological level, this need reflected itself in a Calvinism
stricter than any the colonies had yet known. 358 Preparation, the
means of grace, church discipline, covenant theology, all became
suddenly peripheral if not condemned. The Awakening instead em352 SeeJ.JoNEs, supra note 333, at 10-13, 18-19, 22-24; N. PETrrr, supra note 330, at
182. Despite these forthright statements, Norton was at times ambiguous on the role of
humankind in salvation. Although he always insisted that redemption was entirely a
product of God's will, Norton seemed to suggest that God works through, rather than
upon man: first God calls man, who is wholly passive, by infusing him with faith, but
thereafter man actively participates in his own salvation. SeeJ. JONES, supra note 333, at
20.
353 N. PETrrr, supra note 330, at 180.
354 See J.JoNES, supra note 333, at 24-26; N. PETrrr, supra note 330, at 178-79, 18182.
355
The Synod of 1662 officially adopted Norton's position, see N. PETrrr, supra note
330, at 198, and the Reforming Synod of 1679 entirely omitted mention of preparation.
See id at 203. Even Increase Mather and Solomon Stoddard, who agreed on little else,
followed Norton on this subject. See id at 204-05. Indeed, the Stoddard-Mather debate
is remarkable in that both men, despite their ecclesiological differences, emphasized the
utter helplessness of man and the dangers of Arminianism more emphatically than had
the mid-century theologians. See J. JONES, supra note 333, at 78-83, 114-21.
356
See, e.g., EDWIN GAUSTAD, THE GREAT AWAKENING IN NEW ENGLAND 12-15 (1965).
357 See id. at 97-99; RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740-1790, at
164-69 (1982).
358 See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 375
(1972); E. GAUSTAD, supra note 356, at 134-35; CHARLES LIPPY, SEASONABLE REVOLUTIONARY: THE MIND OF CHARLES CHAUNCY 32 (1981); H. MAY, supra note 305, at 54.
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phasized two features of the spiritual life: the need for a sudden
overwhelming moment of conversion when God takes forceful possession of the individual soul; and the utter helplessness of the individual to cause that experience.35 9
The Awakening split New England into two theological camps,
a split that would never heal. Charles Chauncy, Jonathan Mayhew,
Lemuel Bryant and others like them formed a liberal party based in
Boston that emphasized the importance of rational knowledge and
preparation in the regenerative process. Eventually, they openly
embraced Arminianism and condemned as subversive of morality
the Calvinist belief that human conduct cannot win divine approval. 3 60 On the frontier, Jonathan Edwards-America's most significant pre-twentieth century theologian-preached a Calvinism
"pure and uncompromised." 3 6 1 Edwards left a deep Calvinist mark
359

See ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND

37-39 (1966); C. Lipy,

supra note 358, at 30-32.
360
See A. HEIMERT, supra note 359, at 48-49, 54-55; C. IPPY,supra note 358, at 2728, 85; J. JONES, supra note 333, at 154-60; BRUCE KuKLicK, CHURCHMEN AND PHILOSOPHERS 25 (1985); H. MAY,supra note 305, at 55-58.
361
E. GAUSTAD, supra note 356, at 22; see P. MILLER, supra note 336, at 98; N. PETITr,
supra note 330, at 209. Edwards's vivid sermons emphasizing the inability of depraved
man to help himself are still a familiar part of American culture, especially the famous
passage from "Sinners in the Hand of an Angry God":
O Sinnerl Consider the fearful danger you are in: it is a great furnace of
wrath.... You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath
flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and bum it asunder, and you have no interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of
to save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your
own, nothing that you have ever done, nothing that you can do, to induce
God to spare you one moment.
B. KuCK,
supra note 360, at 24.
In particular, Edwards developed the first rigorous argument in New England theology for thorough-going determinism, based on the inability of the will to choose other
than as it in fact chooses. See id at 34-39. Edwards distinguished between natural liberty--our physical ability to do as we please-and moral necessity-our inability to
choose to please other than as we in fact please. Because of moral necessity, individuals
can will only as their desires or motives move them to will. We cannot choose to have a
different motive-to will to will-because that choice in turn must have a sufficient motive. Freedom, for this reason, consists only in having motives. Thus, because human
desires are depraved and humans cannot change those desires on their own initiative,
they can will only to sin. Their only hope is supernatural grace, which divinely alters
their religious affections and so changes their motives. Edwards believed that his
scheme was just, even to those punished for motives that they could not self-determine,
because of the "theistic paradigms": just as Christ's actions are good, even though they
are necessary, man's willing is evil even though it is necessary. Moral worth depends not
on volition, but rather on the essence or substance of humans. See NORMAN FIERING,
JONATHAN EDWARDS' MORAL THOUGHT AND ITS BRITISH CoNTExr 283-98, 305-08, 313-16
(1981); A. HEIMERT, supra note 359, at 76-77, 195-96; B. KUKLICK, supra note 360, at 3439; Paul Helm,John Locke andJonathanEdwards: A Reconsideration, 7J. HIsT. PHIL. 51, 5153 (1969).
Edwards is sometimes classified as part of the voluntarist Calvinistic tradition. The
theological term of art, "voluntarism," does not imply that man's choices have any reli-
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on colonial theology that persisted well after his death, through his
own writings and the school of thought that followed him, the New
3 62
Divinity.
Theological development in Virginia during this period followed a path similar to that in New England, although Southern analytical theology was less sophisticated than Northern. The early
Virginia settlers adhered to a preparationist Calvinism that closely
resembled the covenant theology of New England.A6 3 By the eighteenth century, however, Southern Anglicanism had embraced an
Arminianism that emphasized the ability of natural reason to perceive religious truths, and human participation in salvation.3 64 As in
New England, religious fervor declined during these years. Also as
in New England, although over a longer period of time, the Great
Awakening subsequently swept the South with its call for an intense,
personal experience of the presence of God in the life of each
3 65
individual.
With the exception of the Methodists, the evangelical groups
making up the Southern Great Awakening were predestinarian
Calvinists who dissented from the established Anglican Church because, inter alia, it was rife with Arminianism. 3 6 6 Calvinist Presbyterians created the first wave of evangelical piety from the 1730s to the
1740s and were to remain the most influential dissenting group
throughout the constitutional period 3 67 Calvinist Baptists set up a
second, larger, and more vociferous wave that was substantially
more disturbing to the establishment. 368 The third great wave, the
gious significance. Rather, the voluntarist tradition maintained that God, in granting
man grace, converts the will, and that this conversion results in a disposition to do good
works. For the voluntarists, this disposition to do good and not the intellectual appreciation of religious truths, was the core of religious life. See N. FIERING, supra, at 299; A.
HEIMERT, supra note 359, at 110; B. KUKLICK, supra note 360, at 33, 41; N. PErr, supra
note 330, at 209-11.
362
See E. GAUSTAD, supra note 356, at 134-40; B. KUKLICK, supra note 360, at 43-65;
H. MAY, supra note 305, at 49-50.
363 See PERRY MILLER, Religion and Society in the Early Literature of Virginia, in ERRAND,
supra note 336, at 106-12, 120-21.
364 See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 199; DONALD G. MATHEWS, RELIGION IN THE
OLD SoUTH 8-11 (1977).
365
See D. MATHEWS, supra note 364, at 12-14.
366
See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,

17761787, at 9 (1977).
367 See id. at 12-13; R. ISAAC, supra note 357, at 146-54; D. MATHEWS, supra note 364,
at 15-19.
368 See D. MATHEWS, supra note 364, at 22-23; R. ISAAC, supra note 357, at 162. The
first Southern Baptists were the relatively sedate General Baptists, who were Arminian
in tendency. In the 1750s missionaries from the Philadelphia Baptist Association reorganized most of these groups into Particular or Regular Baptists churches, which were
Calvinist. S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 317-18. The real flood came from the North
in the 1750s and 1760s. Separate Baptists, Calvinist products of the New England Great
Awakening, migrated south and achieved tremendous success at conversions while both
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Methodist movement, was distinctly Arminian, and the future of
American evangelism-indeed of American Christianity as a
whole-belonged to Arminian theologies.3 69 But in the 1770s and
1780s-the formative period for the thinking of Madison andJefferson-Methodism was still an incipient movement, controversial for
its unrepentant Arminianism, and in the shadow of predestinarian
Baptists.3 7 0 At the time of the first amendment's adoption, then,
the situation in the South largely mirrored that in New England: a
vocal, aggressive, numerous Calvinist backcountry confronted a relatively complacent, urban, Arminian elite with charges of worldliness and religious apathy.
C.

Significance of the Existence of Colonial Calvinism for
Interpreting Madison and Jefferson

This historical overview highlights four features of the development of colonial theology that are important for interpreting the
views of Madison and Jefferson on religious liberty. First, throughout the colonial period, the central bone of theological contention
concerned the role of human will, effort, and choice in the conversion process. Second, the colonies always contained a substantial
number of strict predestinarians, who maintained that human choice
had no religious effect and attacked all- contrary views as heretical
Arminianism. Third, for the whole colonial period, Calvinist groups
were the most numerous denominations, and even though nominal
Calvinists strayed into beliefs resembling Arminianism, these
groups remained formally committed to strict predestinarianism.
And finally, although Arminianism would soon sweep the new nation, in the 1770s and 1780s strict Calvinism was alive and well; indeed, it had recently received a boost from the mid-century
evangelical movements.
Like the American Indian claims considered earlier, Calvinism
ascribed primary religious effects to the activity not of individuals
but of the cosmos. For strict predestinarians, ascribing significance
to human choice denied the depravity of man and derogated from
the sovereignty of God, who gives grace as He chooses without regard to merit and without human participation. After conversion, as
a result of God's grace within them, the saints engaged in good
works, but although they did so willingly and happily, their good
behavior was God's work, not their own. All the primary religious
the General and Particular Baptists held themselves aloof. See iaL at 292-93, 318-20, 37475; D. MAxTEws, supra note 364, at 25.
369 See D. MATHEws, supra note 364, at 29-34; infra notes 421-25 and accompanying
text.
370 See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 321-22; H. MAY, supra note 305, at 141.
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effects on the individual are caused by a divine force beyond his
control.
In this sense, predestinarian Calvinism is quite analogous to the
nonvolitionalist elements of Indian religions. For both belief systems, the religious harm to the individual lies not in his own failure
to live up to his obligations, but in occurrences in the divine sphere
unrelated to his own activity: disruption of the cosmic harmony of
the world, drowning of the gods, or divine denial of grace. In each
case, disruption in the divine sphere causes limitations on individual
religious activity. If the government were to cause such disruptions,
its actions would create limits on individual religious activity in the
believer's nonvolitionalist "frame of reference." In other words, if
the Constitution contains a bias against nonvolitionalist religious
harms like those claimed by the Indians, then it is also biased against
the religious harms most central to colonial Calvinism.
In light of the history sketched above, Jefferson and Madison
could not have intended to exclude nonvolitionalist religions from
protection on the grounds that these religions ascribed no significance to human choice. In the 1780s, the central theological line
dividing believers was precisely the role of human will in salvation.
For Jefferson and Madison to have incorporated a volitionalist
"frame of reference" in the free exercise clause would have been to
set up a creedal orthodoxy precisely designed to disqualify strict
Calvinists and to throw the weight of the government permanently
behind one side of the religious debate. Under these circumstances,
a first amendment that privileged volitionalist religions would
hardly promote the stated goal of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance 3 7 1-equal religious liberty for all-or ofJefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom 3 72 -the free and open debate of religious
ideas.
Moreover, unlike many today, Jefferson and Madison did not
blithely equate religion and volitionalism or assume that nonvolitionalist religions were a small and unimportant fringe group. Their
awareness of the significance of the predestination debate should be
inferentially apparent: both were acute social observers in a century
torn by this issue. But more direct evidence exists for their awareness. Madison's and Jefferson's principal allies in the battle for religious liberty, both in the South and in New England, were Calvinist
evangelicals.3 73 Having accepted the aid of Calvinists, it is hardly
likely that Jefferson and Madison should then turn about and draft a
document biased against them. Further, Madison's lifelong disgust
371
372

373

See Madison, supra note 312, at 56.
See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 319, at 346.
See infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
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with religious persecution was first kindled when he witnessed the

legal punishment of a Calvinist minister.3 74 Madison could hardly
have intended to become the persecutor at the same moment that

he was striving to correct the persecution. And Jefferson, in one of
his early discussions of religious liberty, first carefully distinguishes
Arminian and Calvinist beliefs about human wil,3 75 and then poses
a rhetorical question: "Suppose for instance two churches, one of

Arminians another of Calvinists in Constantinople, has either any
right over the other?" 376 The intended answer obviously is no.
Jefferson and Madison must thus have meant to extend religious liberty to nonvolitionalist predestinarians. And yet their defense of religious liberty was markedly nonpredestinarian: each

individual reserves the right of religious freedom because each is
responsible for procuring his own salvation by living up to his divine
obligations.3 7 7 If the Calvinist soul cannot choose to live up to
those obligations, the rationale offers no apparent reason to grant
him freedom. How then to reconcile these two contradictory observations-the fact that Madison and Jefferson would have extended
protection to Calvinists, and the fact that their defense of religious

liberty offers no reason to do so?
See I. BwAr, supra note 305, at 127-30; R. KErCHAM, supra note 305, at 57-58;
95
(1986); James Madison, Letter to William Bradford (Jan.24, 1774), in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,
supra note 312, at 47-48.
375
See T.JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, supra note 307, at 93 ("Arminians. They think
with the Romish church (agt the Calvinists) that there is an universal grace given to all
men, & that man is always free & at liberty to receive or reject grace.") (emphasis in
original). Madison, too, noted this distinction while preparing notes for the debate on
religious liberty in the Virginia assembly. Madison drafted a question to those who
would establish Christianity, apparently as a way of showing the difficulties in defining
Christianity: "Is it Trinitarianism, arianism, Socinianism? Is it salvation by faith or
works also-by free grace, or free will-&c &c &c-."James Madison, Notes on Debate, in
374

WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 312, at 54.
376 Madison, supra note 375, at 99. The question is drawn virtually verbatim from

Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. SeeJ. LOCKE, supra note 316, at 25.
377 The anti-Calvinist roots of Jefferson's defense of religious liberty are especially
dear in his writings. Jefferson regularly and heatedly denounced the doctrine of predestination as cruel, barbarous, and contrary to enlightened religion, and he exhibited great
hostility to Calvin and Calvinist ministers. He could not believe that ajust, benign God
of reason would ignore the efforts of individuals to achieve salvation. See, e.g., T.JEFFERSON, Letter to Benjamin Waterhouse, supra note 307, at 219; T. JEFFERSON, Letter to Charles
Thomson, supra note 308, at 5-6; THOMASJEFrERSON, Letter toJohnAdams (Apr. 11, 1823), in
WRITINGS H, supra note 307, at 1466-69; Alan V. Briceland, Thomas Jefferson's Epitaph:
Symbol of a Lifelong Crusade Against Those Who Would "Usurp the Throne of God", 29 J.
CHURCH & ST. 285, 288 (1987). As we have seen,Jefferson's defenses of religious liberty
are based on this view of religion. Jefferson makes this origin very clear when he explains that the law reaches injuries to others, but if a man neglects the care of his soul he
injures only himself. Indeed, "God himself will not save men against their wills."-T.
JEFFERSON, Notes on Religion, supra note 307, at 100-a direct contradiction of strict
predestinarianism, which held that God always saves men against their depraved wills.
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One plausible answer may be that Jefferson and Madison sacrificed theoretical consistency to their political pragmatism. Without
help from the Calvinists, they had no chance of winning the struggle
for religious liberty and so had to extend protection to them. This
answer is certainly consistent with the political pragmatism that Jefferson and Madison exhibited during their campaign for religious
liberty,3 78 and it may as a matter of historical fact be the most likely.
But, for purposes of constitutional analysis, there is a more satisfying answer.
D.

The Contribution of Isaac Backus

Another possible explanation may reconcile the framers' volitionalist defense of religious liberty with their extension of it to
nonvolitionalist groups. From the first, no supporter of religious
liberty seriously believed that the other supporters would agree on
one definitive metaphysical rationale. Instead, the exponents
agreed on a single practical result-religious liberty for all-but for
widely differing reasons, each with the understanding that the
others would adopt different internal rationales. Thus, Jefferson's
rationale would explain to Deists why religious liberty is important
for Deists, and Calvinist defenses would do the same for
Calvinists.3 79 Under this view, no one metaphysical defense should
enjoy primacy in the exposition of the first amendment's meaning.
There are two primary reasons for adopting this view of the
religion clauses as an endpoint on which numerous, equally valid
paths of reasoning converged. First, each metaphysical defense
rests on a particular view of the nature of religion-a view with
which some believers will disagree-and the defense will therefore
advocate liberty for reasons which those believers will dispute. In
effect, then, any metaphysical defense of religious liberty will endorse a particular view of religion as true. 38 0 If, for example, the
metaphysical views of Madison andJefferson are the definitive rationales for the religion clauses, the Constitution endorses Deism.
This result is at least in tension with, if not contradictory to, the
requirement of government neutrality created by the religion
378

See R. KETcHAM, supra note 305, at 72; W. MILLER, supra note 374, at 33-34;

Drakeman, supra note 314, at 435; Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as First Amendment Matrix: Henry, Madison, and Assessment Establishment, 8 J. CHURCH & ST. 344, 356
(1966).
379
Cf John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REv.
779, 790 (1986) (rejecting the claim that the free exercise clause exclusively "rests on
the value of individual autonomy" because many believers, including Calvinists, do not
believe in personal autonomy).
380
For example, Jefferson and Madison wanted to protect the Calvinists' chances of
winning salvation before a God who rewards the right choices, but the Calvinists themselves denied the existence of such a God.

1991]

VOLITIONALISM

871

clauses. If no single metaphysical view lies behind the first amendment, however, the amendment endorses no special religious perspective.388 Thus, constitutional theory favors any account of the
clauses' historical underpinnings that emphasizes multiple meta882
physical roots.
Second, as an historical matter, a multiplicity of metaphysical
views did in fact contribute to the acceptance of religious liberty as a
norm. It is a commonplace in scholarly commentary that the
Supreme Court has overemphasized the historical importance of the
views of Madison and Jefferson, who together were only one element in the complicated maneuvering of groups supporting the
principle of religious freedom. 8 3 Perhaps more important, cer881 Some range of views will still be effectively established-the range of metaphysical views that favor religious liberty-but that inevitably will be true if the first amendment has any metaphysical rationale. Cf John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 856 (1984)
("The Constitution embodies a particular view of human nature, human destiny and the
meaning of life. It is not neutral in this regard."). The amendment could possibly be
held to have no metaphysical content-to be just a practical result without a metaphysical rationale. See, e.g., RICHARD P. McBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA 99 (1987); JoN COURTNEY MuRRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 56 (1960) (religion clauses are not "articles of faith but articles of peace," ".nottrue dogma but only
good law"). If this view is the correct one, the volitionalist views of Jefferson and
Madison are completely irrelevant precisely because they are metaphysical.
The religion clauses are different from the rest of the Bill of Rights in this respect:
the establishment clause in effect eschews all particular metaphysical defenses of religious liberty. No analogue to the establishment clause exists, for example, in the speech
area, barring metaphysical defenses of expressive liberty; so the Constitution's protection of free speech might rest on a particular metaphysical explanation. See infra text
accompanying notes 529-38.
882 Madison, if notJefferson, would probably have sympathized with this description
of the origin of the clauses. Madison was convinced that the only certain protection for
religious liberty was the existence of a multiplicity of contending religious sects, none of
which could achieve mastery over the state apparatus. See LEONARD W. LEvY, THE EsTABLISHMENT CIAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 70 (1986); THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 55-56, 60-62 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937). Madison was fond of quoting
Voltaire: "[I]f one religion only were allowed in England, the government would possibly be arbitrary; if there were but two, the people would cut each other's throats; but as
there are such a multitude, they all live happy and at peace." R. KETCHAM, supra note
305, at 166. Thus, it is quite consistent with Madison's thinking to conceptualize the
religion clauses as a mutual peace pact between sharply disagreeing religious factions,
each of which presumably had its own theological rationale for its support of the clauses.
383 See, e.g. MARK DEWoLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 9-12 (1965);
Drakeman, supra note 314, at 427, 445; William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separationof Church and State in America, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 1392, 1392-93 (1968). Most of the
skirmishing occurred over disestablishment, whether to allow for complete religious liberty under a neutral state, rather than the more limited toleration possible under a state
establishment. Historians have identified at least four sources of support for disestablishment: the Deists and the evangelicals; the conservative denominations, each of
which agreed to disestablishment so that no other denomination could seize control of
the federal government; and those individuals, perhaps more numerous in the 1780s
than at any later time until very recently, who were hostile to institutional religion and
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tainly louder, and in any event indispensable was the support of the
Calvinist denominations, the Presbyterians and the Baptists.3 8 4 The
Baptists in particular were the most consistent, organized supporters of religious liberty in the years before the Constitutional Convention, and the definitive statement of the Baptist view is Isaac
38 5
Backus's An Appeal to the Publicfor Religious Liberty.
Drawing heavily on the work of Roger Williams, 3 86 Backus began his pamphlet with an assertion of the Calvinist doctrine of utter
depravity, which throughout his life he fervently defended against
Arminianism. Based on this view of man, Backus repudiated the social contractarian view that the individual surrenders some natural
liberties by submitting to government. Backus maintained that
fallen man in a "state of nature" is a slave and attains freedom only
by entering into government. 3 87 Backus divided this freedomthrough-government into two types: Christian and civil. As to
Christian freedom, unregenerate "natural" men are not free but
slaves to Satan, ruled by sin. They will attain Christian freedom
only by conversion, when they are brought under direct rule by God
to obey the rule of love written in their hearts by the divine finger.
True liberty is doing not as one chooses but as God chooses one to
do. Divine government of the unruly heart is thus necessary for
3 88
Christian freedom.
the clergy in general. See S.
at 409-25.
384

MEAD,

supra note 305, at 35-37, 43; Gaustad, supra note 306,

See BERNARD BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

257 (1967); T. BUCKLEY, supra note 366, at 143, 164, 175-76; S. MEAD, supra note 305, at
43; McLoughlin, supra note 383, at 1392-93; Rutland, supra note 316, at 203-04. Even
late in life, Madison remembered the importance of the support of Calvinist sects in the
Virginia struggle. See James Madison, DetachedMemoranda, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra
note 312, at 90.
385 ISAAC BACKUS, An Appeal to the Publicfor Religious Liberity, in ISAAC BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM 303-43 (1968); see B. BAILYN, supra note 384, at 261-67
(1967); McLoughlin, supra note 383, at 1405-06. Backus was an official representative of
the New England Baptists, but his work accurately represents the views of the Virginia
Baptists as well. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 366, at 38-39, 176.
386 Backus and Williams agreed on a number of ideas: direct rule by God over believers, the origin of the state by agreement of unregenerate souls, and the state's consequent lack of authority over religion. Backus differed from Williams primarily in his
ecclesiological beliefs. Williams believed, or came dose to believing, that the true
church had vanished from the earth and could not be found again. God ruled directly
over individuals and not over ecclesiastic institutions. See E. MORGAN, supra note 337, at
45-51. As a result, no human effort-by the state or by private individuals-to form a
church would prove availing. The state must leave religion free to allow the individual
his lonely relationship with God. See id at 115-20. Backus, on the other hand, had considerable confidence in the work of the churches, but believed that the state could only
detract from that work. The state must therefore leave religion free to allow individuals
their relationship to both God and the church. See McLouglin, supra note 383, at 140203.
387
388

1. BACKUS, supra note 385, at 309.
Id. at 309-11.
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Civil freedom, on the other hand, is possible only under a civil
government, because without order sinners will naturally prey upon
one another and upon those who have received grace. God therefore allows men to form governments so as to restrain the sinners
and preserve civil peace.3 89 Human governments are formed primarily by unregenerate men for necessarily limited purposes. The
unconverted can have no authority over true religion, and so they
390
cannot transfer any such authority to merely civil governments.
They exist only to keep the peace, not to promote salvation. God
Himself has assumed complete rule over His own church, leaving no
room for human ordinances: 39 1 "['T]is only the power of the Gospel that can set [men]freefrom sin."'3 92 Mortals who set up "a test of
orthodoxy ... usurp God's judgment seat" by pretending to sort
men and doctrines.3 9 3
Thus, in diametric opposition to the argument ofJefferson and
Madison, Backus's rationale for religious freedom rests on the utter
inefficacy of human choice. Backus believed that civil governments
have no power over religion precisely because human governments
are the products of human choice, from which no good can come.
Only God can save man, and so man must be subject only to divine
government in religion. The goal of religious liberty is thus not to
leave man free to seek his salvation, but to leave the Spirit free to act
within man without external constraint. The prerogative protected
by the principle of religious freedom is not man's but God's.
Unlike Madison, Backus had no direct hand in the drafting of
the Bill of Rights, but his view was typical of the first amendment's
supporters. More supporters shared this Calvinist view than any
other, and their organized activism was indispensable to the ultimate success of the amendment. 39 4 Thus, the religion clauses became possible because volitionalist and nonvolitionalist groups
agreed on the goal of religious freedom, not on its rationale. Jefferson might have expounded a Deist argument to explain to like389

Id at 312.

Id at 313-14.
Id at 313-16.
Id at 311 (emphasis in original).
392
393
Id at 320-21. Backus, like some other Calvinists, sometimes used language that
to modem ears suggests a volitionalist view of religion. This impression is attributable
to the modem volitionalist gloss on the meaning of certain words. For instance,
Calvinists often assert that religion should be "voluntary," but by this they mean only
that religion should be a private matter uncoerced by the state; not that human choice
has any salvific significance. Similarly, they assert that religious observance is a "duty to
God" and a "matter of conscience"; but these phrases mean that all sinning humans owe
God such a duty, not that their own choices can in any way contribute to the fulfillment
of that duty.
394 See supra text accompanying notes 383-85.
390
391
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minded believers why liberty should prevail; but at the same time he
recognized that Calvinists like Backus would adopt a predestinarian
theory to reach the same conclusion. At their inception, the religion
clauses impartially sheltered both views of religion.
E.

Objections to the Relevance of Colonial Calvinism to
Sacred Land Claims

In response to our analogy between Calvinism and American
Indian religions, a legislature or court might assay a number of distinctions. One would emphasize the fact that in the Calvinist cosmos, government cannot affect the salvific process. Unlike the
Indian place-spirits, the Calvinist God is transcendent and omnipotent. As a result, Calvinists would not need legal protection for the
process of conversion. Thus, Jefferson, Madison, and Backus might
have admitted that nonvolitionalism is a perfectly legitimate belief,
while never imagining that nonvolitionalist religions could benefit
from legal protection against discrimination.
There are two primary flaws in this argument. First, the government could and did create a variety of nonvolitionalist harms for
Calvinists, although it could not force the Almighty to grant or withhold grace. For most predestinarians, God works through human
beings. For example, God might choose the most unlikely individuals to preach this Word, as an occasion to call others to grace. Early
revivalist demands for religious liberty often challenged state laws
requiring licenses for preaching. These laws typically granted
licenses only to members of the established church or to educated
ministers. Calvinists believed that the voice of God could speak
through any person at any time, and so the government should not
limit the number of potential mouthpieces for the Almighty. This
licensing controversy convulsed the colonies in the middle and late
seventeenth century. 95
395

See THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 95-97 (1986); E. GAUSTAD, supra note

356 at 70-72; R. ISAAC, supra note 357, at 151-54; WILLiAM G. McLoUGHLIN, ISAAC
BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND RELIGOUS LIBERTY 5 (1968) (Introduction); Robert S.
Alley, The Despotism of Toleration, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 312, at 142, 143-44.
Another example of God's intervention in the affairs of humankind is His decision to
gather His saints in a Godly Commonwealth in New England. Government action that
sought to thwart this Divine Will would directly cause negative religious effects. Thus,
throughout the colonial period, many libertarians across the colonies criticized the Congregational Standing Order in New England for too closely entwining church and state.
The Congregationalists regularly responded that dismantling the Standing Order would
infringe their religious liberty by denying them the religious experience of living in a
godly commonwealth. See T. CURRY, supra, at 23-24, 82-83, 88. Allowing such extreme
special treatment today would surely create establishment clause problems, but this
should not detract from the point that the framing generation would have recognized

government-induced nonvolitionalist harms.
Since such harms did occur, it seems surprising that the first nonvolitionalist claims
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Calvinist preachers used their argument in this controversy as a
call for liberty from the oppressive laws of Great Britain and of the

emergent states.

Drawing on Edwardsian theology,3 96 these

preachers conceded that moral liberty consists only in willing as we

in fact will. Since without God's grace we all in fact choose to sin,
moral liberty cannot rest on a self-determining will. Further, government cannot guarantee or restrict moral liberty. But govern-

ment can disrupt natural liberty-the physical ability to act upon the
promptings of God. And "[i]f men were to be wholly free to do the
will of God-to do that which was good, just, and honest-n'natural

liberty' was an absolute necessity. '3 97 Revolutionary Calvinists, in
fact, had to fight an anarchistic tendency that would deny governments the right to restrict liberty in any way.398 In this sense, any
government action could create nonvolitionalist Calvinist harms.3 99
Even if no such harms had existed, moreover, the proffered distinction proves only that the framers had no specific intent about
whether the free exercise clause extends to nonvolitionalist religions, because they never anticipated that the government could affect such religions. As a result, we must resort to inferential
evidence to determine the framers' likely intent. That evidence
strongly suggests that the framers would not have allowed the government to discriminate against nonvolitionalist religions. They
purported to adopt a principle of equal religious liberty and governto come before the Court were Indian, rather than Calvinist. The reason may be that
after the adoption of the first amendment and analogous state provisions, Calvinists simply faced no persecution. They initially constituted the majority, and therefore remained highly respectable. In addition, governments in the early period were relatively
inactive and so did not generate many claims. When claims did arise, the Court did not
vigorously enforce the free exercise clause. The only significant nineteenth century
cases are notable primarily for their restrictive interpretation of the clause. See Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), overruled on
other grounds, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). By the twentieth century,
strict Calvinism had all but died out. See infra text accompanying notes 422-25.
396
See supra note 361.
397

A. HEIMERT, supra note 359, at 458.

398 See id at 458-60.
399 The Calvinists faced one remaining difficulty, little noted by them, in making this
argument: if God is truly omnipotent, logically does he not also control the government's actions, so that even laws restricting religious liberty are God's own actions? The
question, of course, suggests that there is no evil in the world, that all is for the best
under the control of God's almighty hand. But strict Calvinists have always maintained
that evil does exist, for reasons that might seem inconsistent with the existence of a truly
omnipotent God-because Satan controls humans (a dangerously dualist view, suggesting that God does not control Satan), or because humans were saved by God but
sinned through their own fault (again a view suggesting that men are independent cosmic forces). See B. KUKLmCK, supra note 360, at 6. Religions are not required to be logically consistent, and the important point for present purposes is that colonial Calvinists
did in fact believe that liberty-restrictive laws were the product of evil men and not of
God.
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ment neutrality; and they could not have meant that principle to exclude the nonvolitionalism that was so much a part of their religious
landscape. Suppose, for example, that the new republic did develop
the power to issue cosmic bills of attainder to God, directing him to
give or deny grace to named individuals. The Calvinists who
formed the majority support for the principle of religious liberty
and the Deists who benefitted from that support would have been
stunned if the legislatures or courts refused to recognize such a
harm on the grounds that it was nonvolitionalist.
Courts or legislatures might offer one other distinction between
Native American religions and colonial Calvinism: predestinarian
Calvinism may not be volitionalist, but it is fundamentally individualist because all significant events for an individual happen within
that individual. God may save an individual without regard to that
individual's will, but he does so by acting through the individual's
thoughts, feelings, and actions. According to this view, the framers
meant the free exercise clause to address the tendency of
governments, not to alter the environment, but directly to affect the
behavior of individuals. As a result, a volitionalist bias may be inappropriate, but an individualist bias has the support of history.
This view of the free exercise clause suggests its own orthodoxy: some gods might act through and in the environment, but the
God of the Constitution has chosen to withdraw to the human
breast, leaving the natural world desacralized and sterile. Concomitantly, this orthodoxy implicitly posits a gulf between man and nature: the natural world is a religiously lifeless object which humans
exploit to serve their needs. The Native Americans, by contrast, believe that man is deeply and inextricably enmeshed in and defined
by the natural world, parts of which retain a sacral quality. 40 0 While
the natural and the supernatural are not identical, the supernatural
regularly erupts into the natural world, especially at sacred sites,
and not just into human beings. 40 1 But, according to this argument,
even if individualism is an orthodoxy, it is an orthodoxy that the
framers intended.
This argument fails because it rests on a distorted understanding of colonial Calvinism, which even in the 1780s retained a sense
of the sacredness of the land. It is true that New England Calvinism
always contained an introspective element, the obsessive concern of
400
See, e.g., FREDERICK TURNER, BEYOND GEOGRAPHY (1980); Calvin Martin, The Metaphysics of Rewriting Indian-White History, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE PROBLEM OF
HISTORY 27-30 (Calvin Martin ed. 1987).
401
See supra text accompanying notes 199-202.
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each individual to locate signs of salvation in himself. 40 2 It is also
true that at the turn of the nineteenth century, Calvinism was undergoing an evolutionary change that would ultimately, for many, confine the voice of God to the promptings of the human breast by
identifying the will of God with the happiness of individuals. 40 3 But
in 1787, that point was still very much in dispute, and many
Calvinists still maintained that God infused the natural as well as the
human world with meaning.
The earliest manifestation of this reverence for the land was the
virtually universal belief among early Puritans that God had imbued
New England with special significance. It was a home chosen by the
Almighty for his remnant, a New World kept hidden until the Puritans were ready to complete the Reformation by fleeing the corruption of the Old. The Puritan encomia to the land of New England
never specify what the Puritans could achieve only in New England,
but it is clear that New England was more than just an expedient
location for them to create their godly commonwealth, because God
Himself chose this spot for them. 4 °4 If, implausibly, the English
government had tried systematically to make New England unlivable, the Puritans would surely have objected to the desecration of
their sacred home.
During the Great Awakening, the evangelical heirs of Cotton
and Norton deemphasized the exceptionality of New England while
increasing the emphasis on the communion of all the regenerate
throughout the colonies. 40 5 Indeed, many historians maintain that
the Awakening was an important antecedent to the Revolution in
creating some self-conscious unity among like-minded believers
across colonial boundaries. 40 6 But while the sense of New England
as sacred was less acute by 1787, citizens of that region still retained
cultural memories of that sacredness (indeed, some still do so today). More importantly, the faith of the Fathers still commanded
tremendous respect 40 7 and Revolutionary Calvinists could not have
dismissed a central tenet of that faith as unworthy of constitutional
protection.
After the Awakening, moreover, New England may have lost
some of its special significance, but Nature as a whole gained greater
significance, at least among evangelicals. Calvinists always sought
402

See SACVAN

BERCOVITCH, THE PURITAN ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SELF

20 (1975);

CHARLES LLOYD COHEN, GOD'S CARESS 4-5, 14 (1986).
403 See J.JoNEs, supra note 333, at 149.
404 See S. BERCOVrrCH, supra note 402, at 98-108.
405 See id. at 99-106.
406 See, e.g., JOHN F. BERENS, PROVIDENCE AND PATRIOTISM
1815, at 29-31 (1978); B. KUKLICK, supra note 360, at 59-60.
407

See S. BERCOVITCH, supra note 402, at 123-28.
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to separate God and nature in order to preserve God's transcendence and omnipotence, and steadfastly maintained that they were
not pantheists. But Calvinists also believed that the universe was
the handiwork of God, that God was present in every molecule, and
that its continuance was due only to His ongoing superintendence.
Perry Miller linked these two strains with the volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist tendencies in colonial Calvinism. On the one hand,
Puritans hungered for the direct experience of nonvolitionalist regeneration, of seizure by God, and were as quick to perceive divine
emanations in the landscape-in "the divine symbolism of nature"-as in themselves. On the other hand, Puritans desired a social ethic of law, order, and institutional control. With this ethic
went an emphasis on the doctrine of preparation and a denial of the
Antinomian notion that God spoke directly to each individual, and
the pantheistic notion that He spoke to the believer through His
40 8
immanence in nature.
After the Great Awakening and the widespread adoption of
Newtonian physics, these two strains-essentially the New Calvinist
and Unitarian strains already described-would diverge further. On
the one hand, Chauncy and his Unitarian followers would describe
the universe as a great Newtonian mechanism, created and ruled by
God according to discernable rules-but very much an object upon
which God works, not God Himself.40 9 On the other hand, Edwards
and his followers would come not so much to identify God with nature as to identify nature with God. To Edwards, all matter is part
of the substance of God Himself, an extension of the Divine Being.
God acts not on but within matter, and matter is nothing but God's
410
acting.
This split should not, however, obscure a deeper unity: both
groups believed that God made Himself manifest through nature.
The Unitarian Newtonians held that the believer could discern the
nature of God in the clockwork quality of the rule-governed uni41
verse; one could understand the Designer through the design. '
The Edwardsians, verging on pantheism and mysticism, claimed
that a believer could, however dimly, glimpse God directly in nature.41 2 For both of these groups, God had not yet withdrawn him408
409
410
411

PERRY MILLER, From Edwards to Emerson, in ERRAND, supra note 336, at 189-93.
See C. Lippy, supra note 358, at 114;J. TURNER, supra note 310, at 45-47, 96-97.
See PERRY MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDS 91-94 (1949).
A mechanistic universe does not logically require the existence of God at all, as

the intellectual descendants of the Newtonians would ultimately realize. In the eighteenth century, however, He still governed every molecule. See J. TURNER, supra note
310, at 179-87.
412 For Edwards, the glory of God in the world was like the light from the sun:
It is by this that the sun itself is seen, and his glory beheld, and all other
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self to the interiors of individual souls, had not yet evaporated out
of nature under the heat of a scientific view that no longer needs
Him to explain the physical world. And if, however implausibly, the
federal government found a way to disrupt the laws of gravity or
matter, Edwards and Chauncy would both have lost the ability to
glimpse God in the natural world.
Finally, for the Calvinists God not only manifested Himself generally in the laws of nature or in matter; He sometimes directly intervened in the affairs of men, in "special providences." 41 3 He sent
disease to kill off the New England Indians, to make room on the
new continent for Puritan settlement. 41 4 He kept the New World
hidden from mariners until the time was right for His chosen remnant to emigrate to it.415 He calmed the waters of the North Atlantic to allow for easy passage of the early Puritans in the Great
Migration. 41 6 He sent intermittent earthquakes to remind His chosen of His wrath, so that they would fearfully flock to church, where
God would act upon their souls. 4 17 Even as late as the Revolutionary War, God sent disease to the Continental Army to remind them
to rely on Him rather than on their own efforts to win the war. 4 18 If
the federal government had found a way to quell earthquakes, it
would have silenced God's voice and thereby prevented a renewal of
faith.
In the overall course of history individualism, like volitionalism,
is a very recent development. Certainly by 1787 believers had not
yet become so self-focused that they had difficulty imagining that
anything other than their own thoughts, feelings, and actions could
have sacred potential. The early Puritans by and large hated the
beliefs of their aboriginal neighbors not because the Indians
glimpsed the divine in the natural, but because they worshipped the
wrong divinity: Manitou, Hobbamock, or others, whom the Puritans
identified with Satan, rather than Providence. 419 For the Puritans
the natural world was still mysterious and religiously charged, full of
things are discovered; it is by a participation of this communication from
the sun, that surrounding objects receive all their lustre, beauty and
brightness. It is by this that all nature is quickened and receives life, comfort, and joy.
Jonathan Edwards, Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World,
quoted in P. MILLER, supra note 408, at 195.

71 (1989).

413

DAVID HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER, DAYS OF JUDGMENT

414
415
416
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portents, folk magic, spirits, and the distant sound of divine trumpets on the wind.4 20 Compared to the Lyng Court's placid condescension toward Indian religions, their hatred was a mark of respect.
The Puritans experienced Indian belief as a meaningful threat, because the Indians worshipped the real presence of Satan in nature.
The Lyng Court rather plainly believed that the Indians worship lifeless landscape, which could better be used by logging trucks.
F.

Conclusion: The General Significance of the History of
Colonial Religion to the Religion Clauses

We do not suggest what, if any, relationship the history of the
first amendment should bear to its interpretation. To whatever extent that history is relevant, it will not support the idea that a volitionalist bias is compatible with religious liberty. Jefferson and
Madison may personally have held volitionalist beliefs, and they may
have embedded this view in the political provisions of the Constitution. In this sense, the Constitution as a whole may well be the
product of an "Arminian" model of man. The free exercise clause,
however, is unusual. In guaranteeing religious liberty, it necessarily
protects varying beliefs about the nature of human beings and lends
its imprimatur to none. As perplexing as Calvinism may seem today, the clause was written as much for predestinarians as for
Arminians. For these predestinarians, the central religious event
was something to which individual activity had no relevance: the
awful and imponderable decision of God to impart grace to some
and not to others for His own reasons and in His own time. Like the
nonvolitionalist claims of the American Indians, the essential Calvinist experience was that of a mortal subject to changes in the universe beyond his control.
In the free exercise clause, the Calvinists found protection from
the free-will metaphysic of the Constitution's political scheme and
the ideological movements loosely associated with that metaphysic.
In politics, religion, philosophy, and law, the national culture developed around the central assumption that the only justifiable basis
for advantages or disadvantages, good or ill treatment, is free
choice-in the form of a vote, a market decision, or the resolution to
receive Jesus into one's life. 42 ' The Calvinists, for a time, opted out
See generally D. HALL, supra note 413, at 71-116.
After the turn of the nineteenth century, revivalism became the dominant form
of American religiosity. Revivalism was aggressively Arminian: it called upon the sinner
to exercise his free will to allowJesus to take possession of his soul. See S. MEADE, supra
note 305, at 123-24. The rise of Methodism, the largest American denomination in the
mid-nineteenth century, also heavily contributed to the Arminian mood of the country
as a whole, both because Methodism itself was openly Arminian and because it
prompted other denominations to revise their beliefs. See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358,
420
421
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of this sunny, aggressive, and active attitude that ascribed so much
significance to human endeavor, choice, grit, and gumption. Eventually, even the Calvinists surrendered to the rising tide: a substantial group of Northern Baptists-the Freewill Baptists-explicitly
adopted an Arminian stance in the Great Revivals; 4 22 the main
branch of Congregationalist theology, the New Haven theology,
adopted a more careful and analytical version of Arminianism; 4 23
and even the Presbyterian Church (North) gave the Westminster
Confession an Arminian interpretation. 4 24 As Sydney AhIstrom has
eloquently put it, the question "Are you saved?" has come to mean
"Have you decided to be saved?" 4 2 5 Today, it is likely that few Protestants of a Reformed tradition could explain the concept of
predestination.
In other words, like the de facto Protestant Establishment of the
nineteenth century, the twentieth century has witnessed a de facto
establishment of volitionalist religion. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's cavalier rejection of nonvolitionalist claims is a de jure recognition of this de facto establishment. The Court may have assumed that religion has always been volitionalist within the
historical "frame of reference" held by the framers. As a result, the
Court may have regarded the Indians' nonvolitionalist frame of reference as a modem or countercultural notion lying beyond the pale
of constitutional orthodoxy. But in fact it is the Court's blithe volitionalist assumption that is the modem development. The framers
knew that there were more things in Heaven and earth than could
be dreamt of in any one theological system, no matter how widely
shared.
at 438-39; WINTHROP S. HUDSON, RELIGION IN AMERICA 180-81 (1981). Evangelical reformers, too, were generally Arminian, espousing man's capacity to bring about the millennium on Earth through unflagging toil. See RONALD G. WALTERS, AMERICAN
REFORMERS 1815-1860, at 26-29, 82, 120, 170-71 (1978).
A number of historians have noted the linkage between Arminian theology and free
market ideology in that both rest on the significance of individual choices as the causes
of legitimate effects, whether in the market or in the afterlife. See A. HEIMERT, supra note
359, at 55;J.JoNEs, supra note 333, at 162-63. Arminianism also harmonizes with belief
in representative democracy: just as individuals can choose to be saved in Heaven, they
can choose to be "saved" on Earth. S. MEAD, supra note 305, at 123-24. The archrevivalist Charles G. Finney made this connection explicit when he urged his audience
to "vote in the Lord Jesus Christ, as governor of the universe." Id at 124.
422 See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 321-22; WILuIA WARREN SwEET, RELIGION
ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER: THE BAPTISTS, 1783-1830, at 66 (1964).
423 See B. KuRucK, supra note 360, at 99-105.
424 See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 444-45, 844; W. HUDSON, supra note 421, at
180-81. For an analysis of the general collapse of Calvinism in the nineteenth century,
seeJ. TURNER, supra note 310, at 89-95. For a poetic, sardonic comment on the collapse
of predestinarian Calvinism during the same period, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
ONE-HOSS SHAY (1891).
425 S. AHLSTROM, supra note 358, at 845.
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SECTION SIx.
THE ARGUMENT FROM POLICY AND PRECEDENT

As the previous section has demonstrated, neither the language
nor the history of the free exercise clause justifies the differential
treatment of nonvolitionalist claims. The third source of guidance
to which the Court regularly turns in its efforts to interpret the Constitution is its own precedent. The constitutional "frame of reference" 4 26 that underlies the Court's volitionalist bias might, then,
have its foundation in the doctrines and policies that have emerged
from the Court's earlier attempts to interpret the free exercise
clause. There is, however, little in the case law to justify this position. In fact, the Court's discriminatory stance conflicts with the
policies and doctrines developed in previous cases.
Until Bowen, the Supreme Court had never directly confronted a
clear nonvolitionalist claim. The case law, therefore, does not include any precedent directly addressing the constitutional status of
nonvolitionalist religions. As a result, all of the evidence is indirect
and inferential. Nonetheless, some strong precedential arguments
favor the equal status of nonvolitionalist religions. First, in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,4 27 the Court came very close to recognizing and approving
a nonvolitionalist free exercise claim. Second, two of the major
principles or policies in free exercise clause jurisprudence-neutrality between religions and voluntarism-provide persuasive arguments for the acceptance of nonvolitionalist practices on an equal
footing with volitionalist ones.
Ranged against this evidence are dicta in several cases expressing the Court's apparent assumption that all religion is volitional. 4 28 The dicta do not, however, either expressly or implicitly
maintain that religious practices based on a contrary view of religion
fall outside the scope of constitutional protection. Indeed, on those
few occasions in which the Court directly addressed the definition of
religion, it refrained from imposing or privileging a volitionalist
view of religion. 4 29 Thus, the fact that the Court may have, in its
less self-conscious moments, given voice to a particular view of reli426 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 n.6 (1986).
427 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In both Smith and Lyng, the Court offered reinterpretations
of Yoder, but, as we argue at infra text accompanying notes 432-43, 457-62, these new
interpretations are erroneous.
428 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985) ("religious beliefs worthy of
respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful"); McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Fundamental to the conception of
religious liberty protected by the Religion Clauses is the idea that religious beliefs are a
matter of voluntary choice by individuals and their associations ... .
429 See infra text accompanying notes 498-528.
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gion does not provide precedential support for the denial of free
exercise protection to other views.
A.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Prior to Bowen and Lyng, the closest the Court had ever come to
addressing a nonvolitionalist claim was in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 430 The
case concerned a state compulsory education law which required
parents to send their children to school until the age of sixteen.
The claimants were Old Order Amish parents who had been convicted for refusing to send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to high school.4 3 1 The Supreme Court reversed their
convictions, holding that the state was required to exempt them
from the compulsory education law.
Almost twenty years later, in Smith, the Court attempted to reclassify Yoder as a "hybrid" case involving both religious rights and
parental rights. 4 32 This reclassification was intended to explain why
the exemption from a facially neutral law allowed in Yoder did not
provide a precedent for religious exemptions generally. There are,
however, two difficulties with this explanation: First, the Yoder opinion rests squarely on the free exercise clause, rather than on some
combination of rights; and second, even if the judgment had rested
on a combination of constitutional rights, that fact would not explain why exemptions are available for a hybrid case but unavailable
when only religious rights are at stake.
The Yoder Court explicitly based its decision on religious rights
rather than parental rights. The Court described the claims as
"concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory
school-attendance statute on [the parents'] rights and the rights of
43 3 It
their children to the free exercise of [their] religious beliefs."
defined its holding as being the same as that of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,4 34 which it described, in turn, as "holding that respondents' convictions for violating the State's compulsory schoolattendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution made applicable
4 35
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Court did discuss the parental rights of the Amish parents,
but that discussion did not represent a separate basis for the opin406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See id. at 208.
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595,
1601, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
433
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
434 See id. at 234.
435 Id at 207.
430
431
432
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ion. Rather, the Court discussed the parental rights in response to
the State's argument that the attendance law was justified by the
compelling interest in the State's role as parens patriae. The existence of a primary parental right to control the upbringing of the
child indicated to the Court that the government does not have such
a broad parenspatriaerole and, therefore, cannot offer it as a compel43 6
ling state interest.
Indeed, it would make little sense for the Court to place much
reliance on the parental right because it is generally much weaker
than the religious right. The Court explicitly stated, that "where
nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture
and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that
the State acts 'reasonably' and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16. ' '4 3 7 The relevance of the fact that "interests of

parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim '
religious rights add strength to the parental claim,

43 9

43 8

is that the

not vice versa,

440
as the Smith Court implied.
Even if we were to assume, however, that the parental right is of
the same stature as the religious right, and that Yoder involved a
combination of the two, that would not explain why an exemption
was appropriate in a hybrid case and not in a case where only religious rights are at stake. The reasons that the Court gave in Smith
for rejecting the possibility of an exemption apply with as much
force to a parental right as to a religious right. The Court was concerned that such exemptions would make "each conscience.., a law
unto itself" 44 1 and would lead to an anarchical "private right to ig-

nore generally applicable laws." 44 2 But allowing exemptions when-

ever parental rights (or parental rights combined with religious
rights) conflict with social policy would lead to precisely the same
kind of anarchical private right. Furthermore, there is no prima facie reason to suppose that parents would assert this right less often
4 43
or with less disruptive consequences.
Putting aside the Smith Court's reading, then, Yoder does involve
a religious exemption to a facially neutral, generally applicable law.
More importantly for our purposes, it involves an exemption for a
437
438

See id at 232-34.
Id at 233.
Id.

439

See id.

436

See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 n.1.
Id. at 1606.
Id. at 1604.
443
If the Court is suggesting that the sheer number of rights at stake would change
the constitutional analysis so dramatically, the simple response is that such a suggestion
is completely without basis in precedent. On the subject of hybrid rights cases, see McConnell, supra note 272, at 1121.
440
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partially nonvolitionalist claim. The Yoders' claim contained both
volitionalist and nonvolitionalist elements. First, the parents asserted that they (and their children) would be directly violating a
tenet of their religion-and risking their salvation-if they allowed
the children to attend high school after the age of fourteen. 444 This
is a clear volitionalist claim: the state facially forbade the parents
from choosing to follow the dictates of their religion.
The parents also asserted, however, that mandatory high school
education would threaten the continued existence of the Old Order
Amish community. 44 5 The parents presented expert testimony,
which the Court described in its opinion,446 to show that high
school education could "ultimately result in the destruction of the
447
Old Order Amish church community" and the Amish way of life.
There are two possible interpretations of the relevance of this
testimony.
First, one may understand this evidence simply as a measure of
the degree of volitionalist harm the members of the religion would
suffer as a result of the challenged government action. The threat
to the continued existence of the community would provide some
indication of the importance of the particular religious rule the
Amish parenis were being forced to violate. Some lower courts
seem to have adopted this interpretation and have taken it a step
further by holding that Yoder mandated a "centrality" test. This new
standard requires free exercise claimants to demonstrate that the
practice burdened by the government is of central importance to
their religion 448 or that the challenged government action interferes
with an "indispensable" aspect of that practice. 44 9
The Supreme Court has, however, rejected this interpretation
of Yoder. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have not considered the
centrality or importance of the particular practice to the individual
or group claiming the religious exemption. 450 Indeed, in Lyng, the
Court explicitly rejected a centrality requirement, arguing that it
would place courts in the untenable position of having "to weigh the
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
See id at 209, 212.
See id at 209-12.
id. at 212.
448 See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
449 See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983).
450 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 142-43
(1987) (rejecting argument that loss smaller than that imposed in Sherbert should lead to
reduced scrutiny); Pepper, supra note 109, at 338 n.131 (arguing that the one "sliding
scale" case-Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)-is actually an instance of a de
minimus burden).
444

445
446
447
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value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be
threatened by any government program." 4 5 1 In Smith, the Court reaffirmed its refusal to consider centrality. 45 2 It is therefore now
plain that the discussion in Yoder concerning the harm to the religious community does not create a new doctrinal focus on the importance or centrality-in practical or religious terms-of the
activity at issue.
The Court's discussion of the threat to the Amish community
should, instead, be understood as the inchoate recognition of a
nonvolitionalist claim. The Amish religion is communal: it depends, in part, upon the existence of an organized community to
support its members-materially, emotionally, and spiritually-in
the required way of life.4 5 3 "There exists no Amish religion apart
from the concept of the Amish community. A person cannot take up
the Amish religion and practice it individually. 4 5 4 If the government undermines the continued existence of the community by forcing its children to attend high school, it may endanger the religious
freedom of all who depend upon the community, not just the parents and children who are forced directly to violate their beliefs. A
threat to the Amish community, therefore, jeopardizes the salvation
of all community members, regardless of whether any member is
personally responsible for the threat.
This latter harm is clearly nonvolitionalist. The religious effect
that will follow upon the destruction of the community does not depend upon any choice by the members: all members will suffer
harm regardless of whether they were individually forced to send
their own children to high school or not. This claim is thus directly
analogous to the claims made in the sacred land cases. The government's destruction of Native American sacred sites led to religious
consequences for the Indians-such as the loss of spiritual powersdespite the fact that the Indians were not themselves responsible for
the desecration in a volitionalist sense.45 5 These nonvolitionalist
claims arise because both religions posit that the spiritual success of
each individual requires certain material conditions-the existence
of particular geographical features or of a community of believers. 4 5 6 When the government destroys those conditions, it threatens individuals with religious harm whether or not the individuals
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457 (1988).
See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1604-05.
453 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210 ("salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world").
454 Brief for Respondents at 21, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70110) (citingJ. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 131 (1968)).
455 See supra text accompanying notes 193-205.
456 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
451
452
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had any choice in the matter.4 57
The majority in Lyng explicitly rejected this nonvolitionalist interpretation of Yoder when Justice Brennan suggested it in dissent.
Brennan argued that the Court allowed an exemption to the compulsory education law in Yoder "not so much because of the affirmative coercion the law exerted on individual religious practitioners,
but because of 'the impact that compulsory high school attendance
could have on the continued survival of Amish communities.' "45
The majority responded by pointing out that the element of direct
personal coercion was present in Yoder and by asserting that "there
is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support the proposition that the 'impact' on the Amish religion would have been constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue had not been coercive in
459
nature."
The Lyng Court's restrictive reading of Yoder presents two difficulties. First, it fails to provide any explanation for why the Yoder
opinion found impact on the Amish community, as opposed to
Amish individuals, to be relevant at all. If coercion of individual
choice or conscience is the foundation of a free exercise claim, then
the impact on the religion generally or on other uncoerced believers
should be irrelevant. The lack of such a wide-ranging impact could
not invalidate a claim if the necessary individual coercion were present. Moreover, the impact on the community could not have been
relevant to indicate an especially great degree of harm. In the absence of something like the centrality requirement, exactly the same
government interest-a compelling state end served by the least restrictive means-must justify any degree of intrusion on free exercise. Thus, under the Lyng majority's interpretation, the impact on
the Amish community should be irrelevant to free exercise analysis;
the Yoder Court's discussion of that impact could serve only as sympathetic posturing.
The Lyng Court's interpretation of Yoder presents another, more
important difficulty in that the Yoder opinion itself suggests that the
impact on the community can be a distinct and constitutionally sig457 Indeed, even an individualist interpretation of the free exercise clause will not
explain the relevance of the harm to the Amish community. An individualist would admit that actions other than free choice can give rise to religious consequences, but would
insist that only an individual's own actions can cause moral consequences for him. See
supra text accompanying notes 146-54. Destruction of the Old Order Amish community
will, however, lead to religious consequences even for those members who did not contribute in any way to its collapse, because their own religious practice depends on the
community's existence. Only a nonindividualist, nonvolitionalist view of moral consequences will explain the burden created by the threat to the Amish community as a
whole.
458
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209).
459
Id at 457 (majority opinion).
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nificant interference with the free exercise of religion. After noting
the parents' volitionalist desire not to be coerced into violating their
religious beliefs, the Court continued:
Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to
grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a
subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries
with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community
and religious practice as they exist today .... 460

The Yoder Court recognized two different types of interference
with free exercise: subjective and objective. Subjective interference
consisted of coercion of the consciences of those individuals
threatened with prosecution. Objective interference consisted of
the threatened loss of the Amish religious community and way of
life. The Native Americans in Lyng asserted-and the Court accepted their assertion-that they faced the same kind of objective
danger to their religious way of life, a danger independent of the
subjective coercion of individual choice, will, or conscience. 46 1 This
objective danger is the essence of a nonvolitionalist claim. 4 62 Thus,
contrary to the assertion of the majorities in Smith and Lyng, the
Yoder opinion offers at least some precedential support for a requirement that nonvolitionalist practices receive the same protection as
volitionalist ones.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447-53. Note that one of the claims made in Wilson v.
Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), is strikingly similar to
the interpretation of Yoder suggested above. The Hopi claimed that the presence of a ski
resort on the sacred mountains would make it impossible to convince their children that
those mountains were truly sacred. Id. at 740 n.2. This is remarkably close to the Amish
claim that high school education will make their children less likely to accept the Amish
way of life. In both cases, the threat to the religion's continued existence comes from
government action that makes the religious training of the next generation more difficult. This threat does not involve the coercion of anyone's conscience.
462
Even the restrictive aspects of the Yoder opinion suggest a nonvolitionalist reading of the second claim: the Court sensed that it was recognizing a new category of
claims and, understandably, attempted to restrict it. For example, the Court carefully
emphasized the religious nature and foundation of the Amish way of life and contrasted
it with secular lifestyles. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 ("It cannot be overemphasized that
we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have
recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children
for modem life."). In addition, the Yoder Court noted that the training the Amish wished
to provide in place of high school apparently encouraged Amish children to be productive and law-abiding citizens. See id at 222-26. The Court, therefore, found that exempting the Amish from the compulsory education law would pose little threat to state
policies underlying the law. See id. at 235-36.
460
461
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Neutrality

The case law and commentary have also discerned broad policy
objectives in free exercise clause jurisprudence that support equal
treatment of nonvolitionalist practices. Preservation of government
neutrality toward, and avoidance of official discrimination between,
religions is one recurring concern in religion clause cases. The
Court has frequently repeated the famous words of Everson v. Board
of Education: "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion

'4 63
over another.
Although this concern over neutrality is most apparent in establishment clause cases, 4 64 the Court has also referred to discrimination as a violation of the free exercise clause.4 6 5 For example, in
Larson v. Valente the Court asserted that, "[fjree exercise.., can be
guaranteed only when legislators-and voters-are required to accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to small,
new, or unpopular denominations. ' ' 4 66 Government preference for
one religion 4 6 7 places pressure on the dissenter to conform to the
prescribed orthodoxy and thereby violates her individual freedom
4 68
of religion, her free exercise.

463 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947); see
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961).
464
See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
465
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("unconstitutionality...
compounded by .. .religious discrimination"); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 (discussing
neutrality as both an establishment clause and a free exercise clause principle); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961) ("if the purpose or
effect ... is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally
invalid"); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492-93 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16).
466 456 U.S. 228, 245, reh'g denied, 457 U.S. 111 (1982).
467 The Court has frequently affirmed that government preference for all religions is
also a violation of the required neutrality. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 381 (1985); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216; Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. This position is
hotly disputed in the literature on the religion clauses. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION

(1982); L.

LEVY, supra note 382, at 91-119; Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School
Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.3, 20 (1949); Robert G. McCloskey, Principles, Powers,
and Values: The Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court, in 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3-33 (Donald Gianella ed. 1965). We do not discuss this controversial issue
because it is sufficient for our purposes to rely upon the general agreement that, at a
minimum, governmental discrimination between religions violates the neutrality prescribed by the religion clauses.
468
See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430-31. Neutrality is also justified by the desire to avoid the
political strife that would attend any effort to enlist governmental aid on behalf of particular religious groups. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24, reh'g denied, 404
U.S. 876 (1971); Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-27; cf.West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("If [public education] is to impose any ideological disci-
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Neutrality requires that the free exercise clause protect nonvolitionalist believers to the same extent that it protects those who hold
volitionalist religious beliefs. The Court's recent interpretations of
the free exercise clause have, however, evolved from outright discrimination against nonvolitionalist religious beliefs to a subtler, but
equally dangerous, abandonment of them to the mercies of legislatures. This section will assess this treatment in light of the policy of
governmental neutrality toward religions.
Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court increasingly had offered protection to religious believers making volitionalist claims. The Court
had adopted a view of the neutrality requirement that allowed free
exercise claimants to challenge facially neutral laws on the ground
that the governmental action restricted their religious practice. The
Supreme Court's neutrality was, in other words, an accommodationist version that took into account the impact of government regulation, and not merely its facial neutrality. "A regulation neutral on
its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the
free exercise of religion. ' 4 69 Indeed, only a few years ago the Court
reaffirmed its position in Sherbert that "the governmental obligation
of neutrality in the face of religious differences" 4 70 may require
granting exemptions to persons who, because of their religious be471
liefs, are differentially harmed by facially neutral regulations.
The Court had, of course, utilized this discriminatory impact
analysis only on volitionalist claims. 4 72 The nonvolitionalist claims
pline, however, each party or denomination must seek to control, or failing that, to
weaken the influence of the educational system."). This concern is addressed primarily
by the establishment clause rather than the free exercise clause. Since the fear of sectarian strife plays no role in the Court's explanation of why the free exercise clause requires
neutrality, that concern will not be discussed in this section.
469
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; see also Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607 ("If the purpose or effect
of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid ....") (emphasis added).
The Court has, in other words, rejected the strict neutrality espoused by Professor Kurland, which requires the government to avoid all religious classifications but allows it to
act for any valid, secular purpose regardless of the effect on some or all religions. See
Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 6, 7
(1961). At least one Justice explicitly described the Court's practice as a rejection of the
Kurland approach. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
470 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409.
471
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987). Several influential commentators have endorsed versions of this type of neutrality. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, supra note 209, § 14-7; Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
andDoctrinalDevelopment: PartII. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HnAv.L. REv. 513, 518
(1968); Wilber G. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 428
(1953).
472
As discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 430-62, Yoder is a possible
exception.
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in Bowen and Lyng, however, also followed this discriminatory impact
format. In those cases, a facially neutral regulation created a special
religious burden on certain individuals who did not share the majority faith. The nonvolitionalist element of the claim-that the negative religious effect did not result from any choice of the individual
claimants-did not alter the basic discriminatory impact structure of
the claim. In both volitionalist and nonvolitionalist cases, an apparently neutral regulation placed a burden on a religious minority and
thereby threatened to cause the religious discrimination that the
free exercise clause was designed to prevent.
The policy of neutrality between religions therefore required
that the Court recognize these discriminatory impact claims in cases
involving nonvolitionalist religious beliefs. The Bowen and Lyng
opinions, however, denied protection from facially neutral laws to
nonvolitionalist claims while allowing such protection to continue
for volitionalist claims. As a result of this refusal, primarily volitionalist religions received constitutional protection from both facially
discriminatory and facially neutral regulations, while nonvolitionalist religious beliefs and practices received protection only from
facially discriminatory regulations. 4 7" Such patent discrimination
between different kinds of religions constituted a straightforward vi4 74
olation of the Court's responsibility to remain neutral.
After struggling to define the category of excluded claims for
several years, the Court finally eliminated this outright discrimination in Smith. The Court achieved this result, however, not by raising the level of protection for nonvolitionalist claims to that already
enjoyed by volitionalist ones, but by according all claims, volitionalist as well as nonvolitionalist, the minimal protection afforded by a
rule that subjects government action to strict scrutiny only when it
facially regulates religion. The Court acknowledged that the gov473 Those nonvolitionalist practices that appear, from the courts' perspective, to fit
the volitionalist model will receive the same protection as genuinely volitionalist claims.
For example, one who requests an exception from the military draft will appear, from
the court's point of view, to be making a claim about the coercion of his own choice even
if, within his own religious framework, the harm arises nonvolitionally. But plainly
nonvolitionalist claims will not be protected from the discriminatory impact of facially
neutral laws.
474 Even the Lyng majority acknowledged that discrimination between religious beliefs would be unacceptable. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred .... "). The majority
simply failed to recognize that its own position led to precisely this result.
Note that an individualist interpretation of the Bowen and Lyng opinions would not
cure this lack of neutrality. Although an individualist interpretation would protect a
larger number of beliefs-since volitionalism, as we have defined it, is a subset of individualism-it would still fail to filly protect some religious beliefs from the impact of
facially neutral laws.
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ernment could provide additional protection should it choose to-in
the form of religious exemptions from facially neutral laws-but
maintained that the Constitution does not require such accommodation. A majority of the Court has, in effect, reversed twenty-five
years of precedent and established a new, weaker level of protection
that appears to apply to both volitionalist and nonvolitionalist
claims.
Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly defined the prohibition against facial or intentional discrimination. And now that the
Court has rejected the Sherbert impact-based analysis, it becomes
more important dearly to elaborate the protection against discriminatory laws left to religious practice. Legislatures, too, will have to
confront the meaning of neutrality, not only in the normal lawmaking process but also in efforts to construct the religious exemptions
authorized by Smith. The process of resolving the ambiguity of this
concept does, however, hold serious danger of further discrimination against nonvolitionalist religions.
What does neutrality mean? Plainly, neutrality means that the
government cannot discriminate between different religious sects by
name, as in a law that would explicitly exclude Seventh Day Adventists from unemployment benefits. Nor can the government pass a
law intended to benefit a particular sect, even if it does not name the
sect. Larson indicates that neutrality goes at least one step further,
to prohibit laws that discriminate between religions based on some
characteristic of their organizations. The law struck down in Larson,
for example, provided an exemption from charitable reporting requirements only to religions that received more than fifty percent of
their funds from members. The Court found this to be a distinction
between
"well-established churches" that have "achieved strong but not
total financial support from their members," on the one hand, and
"churches which are new and lacking in a constituency, or which,
as a matter of policy, may favor public solicitation over general
reliance on financial support from members," on the other
hand.

4 75

At least two ambiguities remain, however. First, the Court has
suggested that statutory distinctions between various individual beliefs-as opposed to organizational characteristics-will not qualify
as discrimination between religions. For example, in Larson, the
Court distinguished Gillette v. United States 4 7 6 by arguing that the Selective Service law at issue restricted conscientious objector status to
475
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 n.23 (1982), (quoting the decision of the
court of appeals in Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981)).
476 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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those who held a certain religious belief-objection to all wars
rather than just to the war at hand-but did not restrict the status to
those affiliated with any particular sect or denomination. 4 77 This
distinction is, however, too absurd to be taken seriously. Surely the
Court would find that a law discriminated between religions-despite the fact that it concerned only individual belief rather than
group identification-if the law restricted a government benefit to
those who had accepted Jesus Christ as their savior. Obviously,
some beliefs are so closely associated with particular religions or
sects that discrimination on the basis of those beliefs is equivalent to
discrimination on the basis of religious group identity.
Of course, not all religious beliefs are so closely identified with
particular sects. Indeed, the belief at issue in Gillette-that one
should refrain from participation in some but not necessarily all
wars-is an interesting and close case. 4 78 The focus on a law's facial
neutrality will require the Court to address the thorny problem of
defining which beliefs are closely enough identified with particular
religious groups to qualify as a facially discriminatory basis for a law
and which are not.
Already a controversial and unenviable task, this process of belief identification is also ripe with danger for smaller and less wellunderstood religions. Such religions are more likely to hold beliefs
not readily recognizable to courts attempting to assess the neutrality
of legislation. The courts will, therefore, more likely see classifications based on those beliefs as not sufficiently tied to sectarian affiliation to qualify as discriminatory. For example, a conscientious
objector law that exempts only those who believe they would suffer
in an afterlife for the choice to participate in war would exclude all
believers with nonvolitionalist objections to war. A court might easily fail to see that this law classifies religions into categories in the
same way as the law in Larson, because the court might not recognize
the belief in volitionalism as particular to only some religions.
While not all uncommon religions are nonvolitionalist, all nonvolitionalist religions in twentieth-century America are uncommon.
The potential for discrimination is, therefore, substantial.
The second, related ambiguity concerns laws that extend special treatment to those who engage in a practice or activity in which
not all religions participate. All religions that engage in the relevant
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 n.23.
The distinction between just and unjust wars is part of the Roman Catholic faith,
and one of the plaintiffs in Gillette explicitly based his claim on Catholicism. See Gillette,
401 U.S. at 440-41. People outside of the Catholic tradition often share this belief,
however. Gillette, for example, identified himself as a humanist who held this position.
See id at 439.
477
478

894

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:769

activity receive the benefit, so there is no Larson-type discrimination
between religions. The potential discrimination arises because religions that do not engage in the relevant activity receive no analogous benefit. For example, if a state passed a law exempting alcohol
use in a religious ceremony from laws prohibiting the consumption
of alcoholic beverages, all religions that use this sacrament would
benefit. But religions whose sacraments take another form, perhaps
ingesting peyote, or those with no sacraments at all, would not receive a comparable benefit. Similarly, when the government exempts Sabbatarians from Sunday dosing laws, it helps those
religions to keep their Sabbaths sacred, but gives no comparable
help to those religions that revere the sacredness of land rather than
of a particular day of the week. Does such facial singling out of an
activity shared by only some religions qualify as non-neutral?
Although the Court has not addressed this issue directly, it has
indicated that it does not regard such laws as non-neutral. For example, in Hernandez v. Commissioner,4 79 the Court dismissed such a
neutrality argument in a single paragraph. The taxpayers in Hernandez had challenged a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that
allows deductions for gifts or contributions to religious organizations, but not for payments to the organization for services. The
taxpayers claimed that the law created a denominational preference
by "according disproportionately harsh tax status to those religions
that raise funds by imposing fixed costs for participation in certain
religious practices." 48 0 The Court responded that the law "does not
differentiate among sects," but "appl[ies] instead to all religious entities." 48 1 Plainly, however, religious organizations with certain
practices are singled out by this rule for benefits that organizations
without those practices will not enjoy. Similarly, in Corporationof the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 4 82 the Court declined to apply the Larson test to the exemption
for religious organizations from Title VII's ban on religious discrimination in employment, on the grounds that the exemption afforded
a uniform benefit to all religions rather than discriminating among
religions. 4 83 The exemption, however, benefits only religions that
rely on employees, and not religions that rely on other regulated
resources. But the Court apparently found the law neutral because
it treated all sects engaged in the particular activity-employmentthe same.
479
480
481
482
483

490 U.S. 680 (1989).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 695-96.
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
See id at 339.
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Once again, this limit on the meaning of neutrality, if firmly
maintained, could lead to absurd results. For example, a state legislature could provide exemptions from all facially secular laws affecting large religious groups--e.g., Sunday dosing laws, restrictions on
alcohol, laws restricting the refusal of medical treatment-and no
exemptions from laws affecting smaller religions-e.g., drug laws
concerning peyote, laws mandating the use of social security numbers in programs administering government benefits, laws regulating the use of sacred sites on federal land. The cumulative effect of
such activity-specific exemptions would vastly privilege certain
groups over others.
This discrimination would, however, be invisible as long as the
Court insisted on examining each exemption individually. Each
such law on its face makes no distinction between religions, offering
an exemption (for the religious use of alcohol, for example) to all
alike. Only if the overall condition of each group is examined does
the aggregate effect of such exemptions become visible. This invisibility poses substantial danger to minority religions. A democratic
legislature is, of course, most likely to accommodate the practices
shared by a large number of people. Smaller or unpopular religions
are likely to be systematically ignored, and thereby disadvantaged.
Moreover, nonvolitionalist practices, which are both unpopular and
difficult for most people to understand, are least likely to command
the sympathy of legislators. Review of government action activityby-activity would leave such religions with little or no protection
from discrimination.
The Court is, however, understandably reluctant to undertake
the general comparison of the legal treatment of various religious
groups that would be necessary to expose this type of discrimination. It is, after all, difficult to know what the basis for such a comparison could be. Indeed, an attempt to define some common coin
in which the aggregate legal treatment of a religion could be measured would very likely involve the imposition of concepts derived
from majority religions on minority ones. For example, if the Court
measured hardship by the number or importance of the religious
rules a law forced members to break, then the harm to nonvolitionalist belief systems would again become largely invisible. Hardship
could, of course, be measured by the degree of harm actually suffered by the religion, in terms of loss of membership or loss of fervor. Such an approach would, however, represent a return to a
Sherbert-style impact analysis, but with the added disadvantage of
having to measure and cumulate the harms rather than simply recognize whether any such harm has occurred.
To summarize, then, the Court began by blatantly discriminat-
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ing against nonvolitionalist claims in terms of the level of protection
provided by the free exercise clause. When the Court rectified this
discrimination, it did so by relegating all free exercise claims to a
lower level of protection tied to facial neutrality of the laws. Neutrality, however, contains unresolved ambiguities that create serious
risk of further discrimination against minority religions, particularly
nonvolitionalist religions, at the hands of both courts and legislatures. In order to avoid systematic discrimination against nonvolitionalist religions, courts and legislatures must either tread carefully
through the maze of "facially neutral" laws, or return to a more accommodationist, impact-based analysis of neutrality.
C.

Voluntarism

The other free exercise policy that supports protection of
nonvolitionalist beliefs is the promotion of voluntarism. Voluntarism describes a state of affairs in which individuals freely adopt
their religious beliefs and practices, without any governmental interference or influence. Although both voluntarism and volitionalism
emphasize the importance of free choice in the formation of religious belief and the practice of religion, the two principles employ
the phrase "free choice" quite differently. The free exercise policy
of voluntarism neither implies nor requires a volitionalist theory of
religion. Voluntarism ensures choices that are "free" only in the
sense that they are free from government coercion, rather than entirely uncoerced or undetermined. 48 4 As a result, nonvolitional religions are, in the Court's sense, free or voluntary and their equal
treatment will promote the policy of voluntarism.
The Supreme Court has regularly affirmed that one of the primary purposes of the free exercise clause is to assure that people are
free to choose their religious beliefs and identities for themselves. 4 85 The religion clauses assume, according to the Court, that
religious belief should be "the product of free and voluntary choice
484 Cf Garvey, supra note 379, at 790-91 (rejecting autonomy as the central free exercise value because the Constitution is concerned not with how citizens arrive at their
choices, but rather how free from government interference citizens are to execute
them).
485 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878),
overrded on other grounds, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see also Jesse H.
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L.
Rzv. 673, 674 (1980); cf. Gail Merel, The Protectionof Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 815 (1978) (suggesting that the Court should recognize "that the central value underlying both the
establishment and free exercise provisions is the protection of individual choice in matters of religion") (emphasis in original).
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by the faithful." 48 6 Voluntarism posits that individuals should adopt
their religious beliefs through a process of free choice based on the
"zeal of [the religion's] adherents and the appeal of its dogma." 48 7
This dictum defining the free exercise policy of voluntarism is
somewhat ambiguous. The Court seems to use "voluntary" synonymously with "free," yet never specifies the kinds of pressures or influences from which religious belief and practice must be free in
order to qualify as voluntary. We might imagine a spectrum of such
influences, stretching from complete causal determinism to outright
physical coercion to persuasion, and involving actors as diverse as
the government, private secular institutions, religious organizations,
and even families and friends. The Court is apparently assuming,
without explaining, that some portion of this spectrum of influences
interferes with the constitutionally mandated policy of voluntarism.
In order to know what the policy of voluntarism means, we must
attempt to make this assumption explicit by asking: Free from what?
The most plausible interpretation posits that "voluntary"
means free from government-government coercion, government
interference, government influence. The level of interference proscribed may remain problematic, 48 8 but the governmental identity
of the interferor is essential. If voluntarism is understood in this
way, then the free exercise clause should free all religious beliefs
and practices from interference by the government, thus assuring
that religion is voluntary. 48 9 This interpretation of voluntarism
would require the recognition of nonvolitionalist religions and practices. Legislative or judicial discrimination in favor of volitionalist
religions-by extending special protection only to such religionswill inevitably interfere with the choice of beliefs and practices and
490
thus reduce its voluntariness.
486
Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Fundamental to the conception of religious liberty protected by the Religion Clauses is the idea that religious beliefs are a matter of
voluntary choice by individuals and their associations ...
487
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
488
For example, as the preceding discussion of neutrality suggests, the free exercise
clause may prohibit only interference directly targeting religious practice, or it may prohibit also those actions causing an indirect impact on religion. Alternatively, the Constitution may allow persuasion through cultural messages-such as public displays of
creches-while disallowing more coercive methods of persuasion. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (upholding municipality's display of creche as part of Christmas display in public park against establishment clause challenge), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994

(1984).
489
Cf. Merel, supra note 485, at 810-11 (goal of both religion clauses is to protect
free choice, but both operate only against government interference in such choice).
490 Again, an interpretation of Bowen and Lyng as rejecting only nonindividualist
claims rather than nonvolitionalist ones would fare no better in terms of the policy of
voluntarism. Nonindividualist beliefs may also have been formed voluntarily and the
refusal to recognize them would itself be a type of government interference with volun-
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There is, however, an alternative interpretation of the policy of
voluntarism. "Voluntary" might mean free from all determinism or
coercion, that is, based on a pure act of free will by the individual
believer. This interpretation would be consistent with a volitionalist
view of religion, in which the act of free choice is the essential religious or moral activity. The goal of the free exercise clause, under
this interpretation of voluntarism, would be to increase the voluntariness of religion by freeing religious beliefs and practices from all
coercion and determinism, governmental or not.
This volitionalist interpretation of voluntarism would support
the Court's refusal to extend equal treatment to nonvolitionalist religions. If the goal of the free exercise clause is to promote undetermined choice in religious matters, then claims that involve no
interference with undetermined choice-nonvolitional claimswould pose no threat to free exercise. The first, more modest
meaning of voluntarism is, however, the better interpretation of the
case law for several reasons.
First, the broad context in which the issue arises-interpretation of the first amendment-suggests that government influence is
the only type of interference prohibited by voluntarism. The first
amendment is explicitly addressed to the government 4 9 1 and has
been interpreted by courts as placing restrictions only on governmental actions. 49 2 This limited scope is more consistent with the
goal of voluntarism when voluntarism is understood as freedom
from government coercion.
Second, a close examination of the particular contexts in which
the Court has mentioned voluntarism demonstrates that "voluntary" refers to freedom only from government influence. For example, the famous phrase from Zorach v. Clauson reads, in pertinent
part: "We sponsor an attitude on the part ofgovernment that.., lets
each [religious group] flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma. ' 4 93 Similarly, after asserting that religious beliefs are a matter of "voluntary choice by individuals and
their associations," Justice Brennan, in his concurrence in McDaniel
v. Paty, concludes: "Accordingly, religious ideas... may be the subject of debate .... Government may not interfere with efforts to proselyte or worship in public places. It may not tax the dissemination
of religious ideas. It may not seek to shield its citizens from those
tary religious affiliation. Discrimination on the basis of either individualism or volitionalism would hinder rather than further the goal of keeping religion free of government
interference.
491
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law") (emphasis added).
492
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Civil Rights
Gases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
493
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (emphasis added).
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who would solicit them with their religious beliefs. ' 49 4 Conjoining
the concept of voluntariness with restrictions on government conduct clearly indicates that "voluntary" means "free from government."
Finally, the volitionalist interpretation of voluntarism is not
merely less plausible than the interpretation offered above, it is
deeply problematic in its own right. If voluntary were understood
to mean "free from all determinism, a product of pure choice," then
the policy of voluntarism would contradict the policy of neutrality.
By offering constitutional protection only to those religious beliefs
or practices that flow from undetermined choices (or by attempting
to enforce such choice on those whose religions direct them to create family and community structures that might inhibit undetermined religious choices), 4 9 5 voluntarism would require courts and
legislatures to distinguish and discriminate against religious beliefs
and practices that ascribe religious effects on the individual to something other than undetermined choice. As long as the courts recognize nonvolitionalist beliefs and practices as sincerely religious 49 6which they have so far done 49 7-they cannot deny those religions
the protection of the free exercise clause without violating the mandate of neutrality. The policy of voluntarism should not be interpreted to require such a violation.
The most reasonable interpretation of this dicta, therefore,
posits that the free exercise clause protects individual religious belief against influence by the government. Free and voluntarily chosen
belief is simply belief free from government interference. Beliefs
that are a product of some nongovernmental influence other than
the individual's choice are nonetheless to be considered free and
voluntary. This definition of voluntarism neither requires nor implies volitionalism. Volitionalism is a moral theory: it describes the
kind of activity (i.e., choice) that generates moral consequences and
may serve as the foundation for moral responsibility. Voluntarism,
as the Court has used it, is a political theory: it describes the ideal
494
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
495
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242 (1972) (Douglas,J., dissenting) (arguing that the children's religious freedom was diminished by parental and community
control that shielded them from exposure to alternate lifestyles).
496 This section will also consider whether the Court's definition of religion could be
interpreted to exclude nonvolitionalist religions. See infra text accompanying notes 498528. For purposes of this argument, however, we assume that courts will continue to
recognize such beliefs and practices as religious.
497 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447
(1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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relationship (i.e., none) between individual religious belief and government influence. Voluntarism does not require that the religious
belief be volitional, only that it be free from government coercion.
Their common language of "choice" disguises the very different
purposes and foci of the two theories.
D.

The Definition of Religion

The arguments based on neutrality and voluntarism are, of
course, persuasive only if nonvolitionalist religions are in fact religions for constitutional purposes. Neutrality is required only between various types of religions, not between religion and other
sorts of belief systems. 498 Similarly, voluntarism protects religion
from government interference, but provides no protection for other
types of beliefs or practices. 4 99 The Court has, however, indicated
in two ways that nonvolitionalist belief systems are religions within
the meaning of the first amendment. First, the Supreme Court in
Bowen and Lyng 50 0 explicitly acknowledged the religious nature of
the beliefs at issue. Second, the Court's few statements on the definition of religion do not justify the exclusion of nonvolitionalist
claims from the protection extended to constitutionally recognized
religions.
The Supreme Court in Bowen and Lyng did not question the religious character of the beliefs at issue. In Bowen, the Court stated the
issue as "whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
compels the government to accommodate a religiously based objection
to the statutory requirements that a Social Security number be provided by an applicant seeking to receive certain welfare benefits." 50
498 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16; cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165
(1965) (interpreting conscientious objector statute to protect religious, but not political
or philosophical, beliefs).
499
In other words, there is no establishment clause in the free speech clause of the
first amendment: the government is generally free to attempt to influence and inculcate
a broad range of ideas as long as they are not religious.
500 Almost all federal circuit courts considering nonvolitionalist claims have found
them to be religious. The only exception is the Sequoyah case, in which the court found
the beliefs at issue to be cultural rather than religious. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The court
admitted that "[t]he Cherokees have a religion within the meaning of the Constitution
...." id at 1163, but found that the particular claims at issue concerned "damage to
tribal and family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observances."
Id at 1164. The court continued: "Though cultural history and tradition are vitally
important to any group of people, these are not interests protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at 1165. It may indeed have been the nonvolitional character of the claims that caused this court to find them cultural rather than
religious. If that is the case, then this court alone succumbed to cultural myopia in its
definition of religion.
501 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695 (emphasis added).
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In other words the Court, like the government, 50 2 did not doubt the
religious nature of Mr. Roy's beliefs. Similarly, the Lyng Court
noted that "[ilt is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs
are sincere and that the Government's proposed actions will have
severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion."50 3
These statements, which are directly on point, should foreclose
any claim that the case law supports excluding nonvolitionalist beliefs from the constitutional definition of religion. Nonetheless, we
will consider the Supreme Court's few general statements on the
definition of religion to suggest why, as a matter of principle, the
precedent is correct. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of the definition of religion for constitutional purposes, 50 4 its comments in other contexts are relevant to
the constitutional question. The issue has come up primarily in the
context of statutory interpretation-most notably interpretation of
the conscientious objector provisions of the federal draft law, which
50 5
exempt from military duty those with religious objections to war.
In several of the conscientious objector cases, the Court was asked
to interpret the phrase "religious training and belief," in light of its
statutory definition as "an individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociologi'50 6
cal, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
Although the majorities in the two most important casesUnited States v. Seeger 50 7 and Welsh v. United States 50 8 -based their decisions on interpretation of the statutory language and congressional intent, 50 9 concurrences in both cases pointed out the
constitutional significance of the decisions. 510 Even if Congress has
the power to refuse an exemption to all religious objectors-i.e., if
See Transcript and Brief for Government, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
The Court has addressed sincerity of belief in free exercise cases, see, e.g., United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), but its comments on
religiousity have been dicta at best. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11
(1961) (observing that religion does not necessarily include belief in the existence of
God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("freedom of religious belief...
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter"); Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) ("The term 'religion' has reference to one's views
of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will.").
505
Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6, 62 Stat. 604, 613.
506 Id
507
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
508 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
509 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44.
510 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354
(Harlan, J., concurring).
502

503
504
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there is no free exercise right to such an exemption 5 l '-it is not free
to discriminate between religions by giving an exemption to some
believers and not others. Such discrimination would create both
free exercise and establishment clause problems.5 1 2 Thus, the category of religious believers for the purposes of the statutory exemption must be the same as the category of religious believers for the
purposes of the free exercise clause, unless the government has a
5 13
compelling state interest to justify any omissions.
The Court in Seeger defined "religious training and belief" as
"[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption." 51 4 This definition appears to
point to the function of the belief rather than its content.5 1 5 It asks
not whether the claimant believes in certain propositions-e.g.,
there is a God; there is only one God-but whether her belief fulfills
a certain role in her life. In order to determine whether nonvolitionalist beliefs qualify under this definition, we must specify the nature of that role.
The statutory language suggests one function that religious belief might serve: "involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation. 5 1 6 The common notion of duty is, of course, volitionalist: a duty is a rule of behavior one must choose to follow in
order to avoid punishment or blame.5 1 7 Assuming, therefore, that
"duty" is understood in this volitionalist sense, nonvolitionalist beliefs would not appear to qualify as "religious" within the meaning
511 The Court has not explicitly decided this question, but it has suggested that the
free exercise clause requires no such exemption. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 461 n.23 (1971); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 264 (1934).
512 See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring); Seeger, 380 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CALiF.
L. REV. 753, 760 (1984).
513
See Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 S. CT. REV. 31, 39 (it is generally accepted that the Seeger test has constitutional overtones); Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1064 (1978).
514 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
515 SeeJesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 589; Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point? 1966 Wis.

L. REV. 217, 264. Several commentators have pursued this functional approach. See,
e.g., J. Morris Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 340-44
(1969); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understandingof Religion
Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 805, 830-32 (1978); Note, supra note 513, at
1075-76.
516 Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 6, 62 Stat. 604, 613 (emphasis added).
517 Duty is not necessarily volitionalist. It is possible to conceive of a duty that one is

obliged to fulfill regardless of one's ability to fulfill it by volition, so that a lack of free
will could not excuse its violation. See supra text accompanying notes 322-70. Nonetheless, duty is commonly understood in the volitionalist sense.
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of the statute because they would not impose such duties on the
faithful. 5 18 There are at least two reasons why this statutory language does not support a restrictive constitutional definition of religion which would include only volitionalist beliefs.
First, the statute tells us little about the constitutional function
of religion that the Court had in mind. The functional approach
adopted by the Court is, in fact, in tension with the language of the
statute, which seems to specify certain substantive beliefs-e.g., in a
Supreme Being 5 19 -as the criteria for religiosity. Indeed, the
Court's inattention to the statutory phrase concerning duty in Seeger
and Welsh confirms the suspicion that the statutory reference to
5 20
"duty" does not describe the function that the Court intended.
Second, the function of generating duties plainly does not exhaust the role of religion as envisioned by the Court in Seeger. The
majority opinion in that case provides direct evidence that the Court
had a broader function in mind, one that would include nonvolitionalist beliefs as well as volitionalist ones. In explaining why it
reached its broad interpretation of the statutory requirement of belief in a Supreme Being, the Court quoted from theologians who
described religious belief not in terms of duty but in terms of ultimate faith, 52 1 answers to questions about the meaning of life and
death, 522 and conceptions of the highest ideal.5 23 The Court
adopted a similar notion for itself when it wrote that within this statutory phrase "would come all sincere religious beliefs which are
518 Interestingly, one of the commentators who has explicitly advocated a functional
definition framed that definition in terms of duties and obligations. See Merel, supra note
515, at 831 (Religion is a multidimensional belief system "involving duties and obligations to conform to the standards of a unified belief system that cuts across and directs
more than a single aspect of an individual's life."). Merel recognized that adding any
"objective," or substantive, element to the definition created a potential intrusion on
religious freedom, id at 829-30, and also acknowledged that her definition includes such
an "objective" element: the requirement that the system address more than one aspect
of life. What she fails to notice is the way in which the requirement of a framework of
duties and obligations also restricts religious freedom. Indeed, Merel seems not to have
considered that religion could take any other form. This omission, by one so sensitive to
the need for a nondiscriminatory definition, is strong evidence of the prevalence of the
volitionalist viewpoint.
519 The Act was amended, after Seeger and before Welsh, to remove the reference to a
Supreme Being. It continued to require, however, that "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code" would not qualify as religious belief for the purposes of assigning conscientious objector status. Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100, 104.
520
The Welsh opinion even disregarded the part of this phrase that Welsh himself
explicitly rejected--"superior to those arising from any human relation." Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970).
521
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965) (citing Paul Tillich, a Protestant theologian).
522
Id. at 181-82 (citing a Catholic Ecumenical Council draft declaration).
523 Id. at 182-83 (citing David Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture Movement).
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based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. ' 5 24 Obviously, such beliefs do far more than simply generate moral duties;
they serve as the foundation for a whole religious vision. 525
Nonvolitionalist beliefs may form the foundation of faith in the
sense described by the Court. Such beliefs often involve answers to
questions about the meaning of life and death, and the origin and
purpose of the world and of humankind. 5 26 Nonvolitionalist beliefs
may also include a conception of the highest ideals which human
beings can attain or desire. 5 27 And, of course, nonvolitionalist beliefs may form the ultimate faith on which all other beliefs and actions depend. 528 Such beliefs should, therefore, qualify as religions
within the meaning of the first amendment and receive the protection of the free exercise clause.
E.

Conclusion

When we examine briefly the nature of religious beliefs, it becomes clear why the free exercise clause must protect nonvolitional
beliefs. Whatever else religion may involve, it usually includes some
claim about the nature of reality. 52 9 That reality may include the
existence and significance of God, 53 0 of some holy text,5 3 1 or of
some sacred institution. 53 2 It may include reincarnation, 53 3 or the
524 Id. at 176. The opinion interprets the phrase "belief in a Supreme Being" rather
than interpreting the requirement that the belief be religious per se. Nonetheless, a
belief that would qualify as "belief in a Supreme Being" would also qualify as religious.
The Court held that if a belief meets the test laid down in this case then it could not be
found also to be political, sociological, philosophical or a "merely personal moral code."
Id. at 186.
525 See Greenawalt, supra note 513, at 39 (interpreting the Seeger test as relying on the
thought of Paul Tillich).
526

See M. ELIADE, supra note 66; AxE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN

INDIANS 29-32, 129-39 (1967).
527 See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 79, at 148 (discussing Aristotle's account of the
virtues as dependent on a notion of the human telos).
528 See Benjamin Lee Whorf, An American Indian Model of the Universe, in TEACHINGS
FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 121-29 (Dennis Tedlock
& Barbara Tedlock eds. 1975).
529 This is by no means intended as a sufficient definition: there might be many
systems of thought that would meet this qualification and yet not be religions. Nor is it
intended as a necessary component of all religions. The point is simply that this is an
essential element of many religions.
530 See L. JACOBS, supra note 40, at 33 (the first principle is the existence of God).
531
See W. CLARKE, supra note 46, at 22-47 (describing the role and authority of scripture in Christian theology).
532 See H. SMrrH, supra note 75, at 333-37 (discussing the authoritative teaching and
sacramental roles of the Catholic church); Hendricks, supra note 53, at 40-41 (the Catholic church is the sole path to complete salvation).
533 See H. SMrrH, supra note 75, at 75-80 (discussing the Hindu belief in reincarnation and karma).
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illusory nature of the material world,5 3 4 or a harmonious balance
between competing yet complementary forces. 53 5 Religion often, if
not always, proffers some vision of the nature of an ultimate reality
and the role of human life within it.
Religious reality may include an afterlife, with rewards and punishments meted out in accordance with volitionalist principles of
personal responsibility. If it does, then it will be consistent with our
culture's secular, and also volitionalist picture of reality. We understand why Sherbert believes she will be punished for violating her
Sabbath even though we may not agree that working on Saturday is
against God's law. Even if we disagree with her about the particular
religious rule at issue, most of us share her view of reality in which
only certain kinds of causal connections-most notably those based
on human free choice-can generate moral consequences.
But the free exercise clause does not guarantee merely the freedom to differ about particular religious rules, such as whether Saturday or Sunday is the required day of rest. It guarantees the much
greater freedom to disagree about whether religious reality consists
of such rules at all or of something else entirely. It guarantees the
right to hold a religious picture of reality completely inconsistent
with the majority's secular, volitionalist picture, and it protects that
right from government discrimination.
This special protection for alternative religious visions, which is
at the heart of the free exercise clause, distinguishes that clause
from much, perhaps all, of the rest of the Constitution. Even those
parts of the Constitution that are not explicitly volitionalist generally allow courts and legislatures to give preference to the common
social vision-which is volitionalist-and impose it on dissenters. It
may be the realization that the Constitution does contain a particular vision of reality that has led some scholars to argue that the religion clauses are not completely neutral as between world-views, but
must, on the contrary, be based upon some substantive philosophy.536 Although the Constitution generally may reject claims

based on visions inconsistent with its own, the free exercise clause
534 See id at 82-86 (discussing the Hindu conception of the world as "maya":
illusion).
535
Id at 211-13 (discussing yin and yang in Taoism).
536 See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 381, at 856-58. Mansfield maintains that "[t]he
Constitution embodies a particular view of human nature, human destiny and the meaning of life." Id at 856. For example, cruel and unusual punishment is wrong, majority
vote is a good way to resolve disputes. Id. at 856-57. On the other hand, Mansfield
himself concedes that the constitutional philosophy celebrates freedom. As a corollary,
the Constitution requires that the state tolerate religious ideologies consistent with the
constitutional ideology and even that it tolerate, to some unspecified extent, religious
ideologies inconsistent with the constitutional philosophy. See id. at 857-58. Indeed,
"[gireater freedom may be required for religious than for nonreligious ideologies incon-
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cannot. 5 37 It is not possible to preserve freedom of religion without

providing equal protection for those religious views of reality that
53 8
clash with the social norm.
Nonvolitionalist beliefs are not just strange, failed versions of
volitionalist ones; they are the result of a different religious vision.
To refuse to grant them equal treatment is to deny constitutional
protection to a whole range of religions simply on the ground that
they are inconsistent with the majority's view of reality. But one of
the primary purposes of the free exercise clause was to protect the
rights of persons who hold religious visions different from those of
the majority. For this reason, the free exercise principles of neutrality and voluntarism, and the definition of religion, require evenhanded treatment of nonvolitionalist and volitionalist religions.
SECTION SEVEN.
DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REFUSING EqUAL
TREATMENT TO NONVOLITIONALIST PRACTICES

A.

Introduction

Thus far, this Article has developed the distinction between
volitionalist and nonvolitionalist practices and argued that the Constitution generally requires equal treatment of the two. In some instances, however, the legislature may discriminate in favor of
volitionalist practices-by extending them special protection while
denying protection- to analogous nonvolitionalist practices. First,
the government under Larson might have a compelling state interest
in protecting some practices but not others, because of the different
degrees of disruption to the government's activities by the protection required for different practices. Thus, the legislature could exempt a Roman Catholic from laws against liquor consumption on
Sunday but deny accommodation to one who sincerely believes that
he will suffer eternal torment if the United States maintains a standing army. Second, certain demands for special treatment may raise
sistent with the constitutional philosophy." Id. at 858. Thus, Mansfield may actually
agree with our argument.
537 Of course, by its very assertion that the Constitution must tolerate different religious views of reality, even the free exercise clause may be said to embrace only a particular range of metaphysical views; it necessarily denies those views that would restrict, by
the mechanism of the state, the availability of divergent views. Similarly, the establishment clause, to the extent that it has any metaphysical rationale, is consistent with only a
limited range of metaphysical positions; it necessarily denies those beliefs that seek to
establish themselves. See Galanter, supra note 515, at 289-90; Note, Reinterpretingthe Religion Clauses: ConstitutionalConstruction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1468,
1481 n.67 (1984).
538 See Garvey, supra note 379, at 798 (arguing that religion is much like insanity
because, in part, it can lead one to "understand[] natural events in a way wholly at odds
with the rest of society").

1991]

VOLITIONALISM

907

serious establishment clause concerns because at some point accommodation becomes impermissible support of religion. Under the
Sherbert regime, an otherwise valid free exercise practice claim is not
invalid simply because the required remedy appears to raise establishment clause difficulties. 53 9 After Smith, however, the free exercise clause does not generally require legislative accommodation of
religious practice; so such accommodation should be subject to normal establishment clause analysis.
Legislatures may deny protection to some nonvolitionalist practices while extending it to volitionalist practices, because protecting
the former requires more severe disruption than protecting the latter. This difference is inherent in the nature of the underlying belief Volitionalist religions recognize only religious effects that are
the product of an individual's own free choices. From the volitionalist perspective, government action has no religious effects unless it
constrains individual choices. Thus, a volitionalist practice will seek
relief from only one type of government action: restrictions on an
individual's choice to act in certain ways. 54° Such a choice-based
practice will also request only limited accommodation: exemption
for the claimant from the relevant restrictions. Once the individual
is exempted, his choice is no longer coerced and he will, therefore,
no longer suffer a religious effect.
To nonvolitionalist religions, however, anything the government does might create hardship for a believer. Nonvolitionalist religions might find religious significance in any government activity,
from adopting a particular filing cabinet to declaring war. The religious effect of these government actions might, in turn, lead to limits on an individual's religious practice within the "frame of
reference" of the believer. Thus, a nonvolitionalist believer might
seek legislative relief from government behavior, even if that behavior does not, according to Lyng, coerce or penalize the choice of any
individual. Protecting a nonvolitionalist practice, moreover, might
require any kind of accommodation, from special treatment for the
individual believer to a complete reordering of the government's affairs. Exempting the individual claimant will often fail to protect a
54
nonvolitionalist practice. '

Thus, claims for legislative accommodation fall along a contin539 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 83 (1985); L. TIBE, supra note 209, § 14-4; Kurland, supra note 469, at 15.
540 This Article deals with practice rather than belief claims.
541
Not all nonvolitionalist claims are of this more extreme type. Mr. Roy's claim,
for example, does not ask the government to cease using social security numbers for all
beneficiaries; it asks only for an exemption for Mr. Roy's family. The point is simply that
nonvolitionalist claims have the potential to take this more far-reaching form, while volitionalist claims will always be satisfied by an exemption.
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uum defined by the type of protection required. At one end lie what
we will call "exemption" claims: the remedy for which consists primarily of providing specialized treatment for the individual claimant
and those who share his religious beliefs. Exemption claims generally create only individualized administrative inconvenience. At the
other end of the continuum lie what we will call "ordering" claims:
the remedy for which consists primarily of reordering some aspect
of the government's program not limited in application to the individual claimant. So, for example, the only sufficient remedy for
Navajos who object to the flooding of Rainbow Bridge Canyon
would be for the government to lower the water level in Lake Powell. This action would have serious consequences for all those dependent on the reservoir for their water supply. There is no way to
satisfy the Navajo claim through special exemptions for the Navajo
alone because the harmful religious effect does not arise from any
government action specifically regulating the Navajo's individual
conduct or otherwise individually concerned with them.
The crucial difference between these two types of claims is that
ordering claims have a much greater potential for interfering with
government programs and policies than do exemption claims. An
ordering claim, by definition, requires a remedy not limited in application to the individual claimant. It is therefore likely to alter the
impact of the government program on a greater number of persons
than would an exemption claim. In addition, ordering claims may
directly challenge a particular policy choice, rather than simply objecting to its application to certain people. The government might
find itself unable to satisfy the claimant while pursuing the given
policy through other means. In short, ordering claims are, as a
practical matter, likely to impose greater burdens on the govern54 2
ment than will exemption claims.
Nonvolitionalist claims pose a greater challenge to the government than volitionalist claims because nonvolitionalist claims can
take the form of either ordering or exemption claims, while volitionalist free exercise claims will always be exemption claims. Lyng pro542 The distinction between exemption claims and ordering claims is one of degree
rather than of kind, which is why we have described it as a continuum. Contrary to the
Court's suggestion, exemption claims like Sherbert's require changes in the internal administration of the program no less than claims like Roy's. Indeed, because the number
of persons who share Sherbert's beliefs is likely to be much greater than the number
who share Roy's, the internal changes necessary to accomodate her claim are likely to be
larger and more expensive. In addition, many exemption claims, like ordering claims,
involve effects on persons other than the claimant, if only by raising the tax burden for a
given program. The distinction is, nonetheless, useful because it indicates the importance of certain differences of degree in determining when a nonvolitionalist claim goes
too far. Cf. Lupu, supra note 5, at 964 (noting the existence of different types of claims
but without identifying or examining them in detail).
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vides an example of a nonvolitionalist ordering claim: To satisfy the
Yuroks, the government would have to alter its use of a resource
that affects many people other than the claimants. Bowen v. Roy, on
the other hand, involved a nonvolitionalist exemption claim. Roy
did not need the government to cease using social security numbers
for all beneficiaries but only for his own family. His claim was
nonvolitionalist because the special treatment did not consist of an
exemption from government regulation of his own conduct, but the
requested remedy was nonetheless an exemption for a particular
case.Ms
The Court in Bowen and Lyng may well have sensed that judicial
recognition of nonvolitionalist free exercise claims involving facially
neutral laws might implicate a vast range of government actions and
require very intrusive relief.5
The Court first chose to address
these fears by retreating to an unprincipled, and we believe unconstitutional, distinction between volitionalist and nonvolitionalist
claims in Bowen and Lyng. Because only nonvolitionalist claims can
be ordering claims, the Court's position eliminated the threat posed
by the recognition of Sherbert-style nonvolitionalist claims. It
achieved this result, however, at the cost of sacrificing all of the relatively harmless nonvolitionalist exemption claims.
Having found that distinction difficult to maintain, the Court in
Smith took the other obvious tack and retreated, not from the recognition of nonvolitionalist claims, but from Sherbert's requirement of
impact neutrality. By adopting a strict neutrality position, and rejecting impact-based claims against facially neutral laws, the Court
reduced the danger of most ordering claims. This solution came, of
course, at the expense of all exemption claims, volitionalist as well
as nonvolitionalist. In addition, it suffers from all the often noted
pitfalls of the strict neutrality approach.MS
The Court's retreat reduced but did not eliminate the need to
consider the disruptive potential of nonvolitionalist claims. Under
the new Smith approach, legislatures hold the primary power to protect religions from facially neutral laws by providing religious exemptions and modifications. As the Court itself recognized, leaving
543 Roy also made a less controversial claim which did concern his own behavior in
providing the social security number. See supra text accompanying notes 126-29.
544 The Court's reference to claims about the color of the government's filing cabinets in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986), and to a "broad range of government
activities-from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects" in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988), make it
clear that it was precisely this possibility of ordering claims directed against facially neutral government policies that frightened the Court.
545 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 512, at 811; Galanter, supra note 515, at 289-93;
Merel, supra note 515, at 808.
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this protection to legislatures is likely to result in greater solicitude
for the needs of majority religions and less for the needs of minority
ones. Legislatures may be less willing to accommodate nonvolitionalist claims because they are not only less familiar than volitionalist
ones, but also potentially more intrusive. But, as the previous sections on history, policy, and precedent indicate, the Constitution requires that all government actions, including these gracious
gestures of legislative accommodation, treat volitionalist and
nonvolitionalist religions evenhandedly.
As a result of Smith, courts are likely to face a new wave of free
exercise claims in which believers complain that the state is discriminatorily providing accommodation for other religions but not for
theirs. What counts as discrimination will, of course, depend on
how courts resolve the ambiguities concerning "facial neutrality"
discussed in the previous section., 6 Assuming, however, that legislatures are violating whatever emerges as the meaning of neutrality,
they would have to meet the strict scrutiny standard in order to justify discrimination between religions.
We need not protect ourselves from the dangers of extreme ordering claims by excluding all nonchoice-based religions from protection. It is not the nonvolitionalist element of such religions that
threatens us, but the far reaching accommodation required for their
satisfaction. It is possible to recognize and protect nonvolitionalist
religious beliefs and practices generally while rejecting only those
that pose this special danger.M7 The focus, then, should not be on
some attempt to categorize claims as volitionalist or nonvolitionalist, or even as ordering claims or exemption claims. Courts and legislatures should, instead, carefully assess the particular impact of
accommodating each religious practice to determine whether it
poses a serious, realistic threat to the functioning of the government. Since this impact justifies rejecting a plea for religious freedom, an assessment of this impact, and not some imprecise or
irrelevant label, should be the basis for the decision.
B.

The Balancing Process

The Supreme Court usually applies a strict scrutiny balancing
test to claims that the state has discriminated between religions: the
government must show that its action is the least restrictive means
See supra text accompanying notes 475-83.
Cf Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530-31 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the special needs of the military can be accounted for in the traditional
balancing test; no special deference should exclude free exercise claims against the military at the threshold).
546
547
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of serving a compelling state interest. 54s Only if the state can meet
this stringent test can it defeat the claimant's prima-facie case. Notice that it is the dicriminationthat the state mustjustify. Because the
state could eliminate this discrimination in either of two ways, there

are two parts to the proof it must offer to justify it.
First, the state could eliminate the discrimination by denying
protection to all religions. It must, therefore, show that it has a

compelling interest in providing protection to volitionalist religions.
Although the Smith opinion has now held that such accommodation
is not constitutionally required, nothing in Smith or in free exercise
jurisprudence casts doubt on the government's strong interest in accommodating religion.M9 We will assume, therefore, that such accommodation is, at least much of the time, 550 a sufficiently
important state interest to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. 551
Second, the state could also eliminate the discrimination by
protecting nonvolitionalist religions along with volitionalist ones.
In order to justify its choice to discriminate, the state must therefore
also show that it has a compelling interest in excluding nonvolitionalist religions from protection. Here, it becomes relevant that
nonvolitionalist claims can pose such a severe threat to the functioning of government. Unless the strict scrutiny standard can take account of this threat, it will leave legislatures with the Hobson's
choice of protecting no one or enduring severe disruption of gov548
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, reh 'g denied, 457 U.S. 111 (1982); see Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); L.
TIBE, supra note 209, § 14-13; Note, Of Interests, Fundamentaland Compelling: The Emerging ConstitutionalBalance, 57 B.U.L. REv. 462, 463-64 (1977).
549
Certain types of accommodation are, of course, prohibited by the establishment
clause, but the Court has long held that there is an area of discretion between what the
free exercise clause requires and what the establishment clause prohibits. In this area
the state may legitimately choose to accommodate religious believers. See, e.g., Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453-54, 461 n.23, reh'g denied, 402 U.S. 934 (1971).
550 It might be possible for the burden on religion to be de minimis, in which case
there should not be a compelling state interest in accommodation. It would also be
possible for the courts to undertake a type of "centrality" assessment and find a compelling interest in accommodation only where the burden of a neutral law falls on a "central" or "indispensible" religious practice. The Supreme Court has thus far refused to
take the latter path.
551
The proposed accommodation would also have to be narrowly tailored to serve
this interest in protecting the volitionalist believers. This requirement will be met in
most cases. Because such accommodations generally derogate from the underlying policy served by the law being modified, the government can usually-be counted on to draft
the accommodations fairly narrowly.
For an interesting, and probably rare, instance in which Indians benefitted from
legislative discrimination, see Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 59
U.S.L.W. 2503, No. 88-7039 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 1991) (upholding an exemption given
exclusively to the Native American Church from federal and state laws banning peyote
use).
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ernmental functions. There are, however, doctrinal tools available
for halting the progression along the continuum from exemption
claims to the more dangerous ordering claims. At some point, the
government interest in denying protection to an ordering claim becomes compelling, even if it extends protection to a less intrusive
claim.
To help legislatures locate this point, courts could more clearly
define what makes a state interest compelling. In particular, courts
could be more specific in describing different types of government
interests and the weight attached to them. This specificity would
enable both courts and legislatures to distinguish between accommodations that pose a serious threat to government operations and
those that do not, and more confidently to identify the compelling
state interest in refusing accommodation of some ordering claims.
Dangerous claims could then be refused without undermining pro55 2
tection for other types of claims.
The first step in weighing the government's interest is to recognize that the government bears the burden of proof on the importance of its interest. The Court cannot simply assume that the
government will suffer harm if it is required to accommodate volitionalist and nonvolitionalist practices equally. The state must
demonstrate that such a harm will occur and must provide as much
evidence as possible of the specific nature and extent of that harm.
"[W]hatever the substantive content of the 'compelling interest'
test, procedurally it appears to mean that the state must particularize and support with evidence claims that its interests subordinate
those of free exercise of religion."5 5 3 The second step is to recognize that the government interest at issue is not the interest in the
general law or policy that restricts religious practice, but only the
interest in avoiding whatever changes would be necessary to accommodate nonvolitionalist believers along with volitionalist ones. This
is a simple application of the "least restrictive means" principle: if
the government can serve its overall purpose in a way that is less
restrictive of religion, then the only interest it has at stake is the
marginal interest in pursuing its chosen path rather than the less
552
A more flexible and sensitive analysis of what makes a government interest compelling is not a new idea. Several commentators have suggested doctrinal modifications
that might increase the sensitivity of that analysis in the context of Sherbert-style claims.
This section relies heavily on their work. See generally Clark, supra note 515; Galanter,
supra note 515, at 217; Donald Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: PartI. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HAav.L. REv. 1381 (1967); Greenawalt, supra note 512, at 770-71; Pepper, supra note 109.
553 Pepper, supra note 109, at 340; see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Servs. v.
Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 672 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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restrictive alternative. 55 4 The government interest must, therefore,
be measured at the margin. 55 5
The location of the request for accommodation along the continuum from exemption claims to ordering claims will be significant
in determining where that margin lies. The marginal change demanded by an exemption claim is merely that the government widen
the scope of the special protection accorded some religious groups
to include the petitioner and others with similar religious beliefs.
The marginal accommodation required by ordering claims, on the
other hand, can implicate a substantial variety of government interests, since the requested changes can involve anything from minuscule administrative details to abandonment of the whole program.
It is reasonable to assume that ordering claims, as an empirical matter, will tend to cause a greater disruption of governmental activities
than exemption claims. 55 6
Once a court has identified the boundaries of the government's
marginal interests, it should next evaluate the nature and importance of the particular harms posed by the claim. These harms fall
into several categories that can be roughly ranked in order of ascending importance. Both ordering and exemption claims may result in the kinds of harms identified in each category, but ordering
claims will usually cause a greater degree of interference.
1. Cost and Administrative Inconvenience
The change in government practice necessary to accommodate
a religious objection will almost always involve some additional cost
or inconvenience to the government. If the government has already
accommodated some believers, and the claimant alleges that the accommodation has been granted discriminatorily, the question will
be whether the cost and inconvenience provide a compelling reason
for distinguishing between those accommodated and those excluded. If the claimant requests only that he and those like him be
exempted from a law, the government's interest in refusing him is
limited to the additional cost of processing those exemptions and of
giving benefits to claimants who would otherwise be ineligible. If
554 See Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Serimly, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV.
299, 311.
555 SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 106 (1980); Clark, supra note 515,
at 331; Galanter, supra note 515, at 280; Note, Less DrasticMeans and the FirstAmendment,
78 YALE LJ. 464, 467-68 (1969).
556 The intrusiveness of the remedies requested in several of the sacred land cases
seems to confirm this assumption. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176
(10th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 788 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir. 1983). Even if this assumption were not supported by the evidence, we
would adopt it in order to recognize the legitimate fears that are motivating the courts.
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the claimant requests the government to reorder the program in order to eliminate the discrimination, the real impact may still fall only
on cost or administrative convenience. For example, assume that
the government allows welfare applicants to refuse to supply their
social security numbers if their religion prohibits them from doing
so. This accommodation exempts certain religious objectors from a
general legal obligation to use the numbers. Assume further that
Roy believes that the government's use of a social security number
to identify anyone will destroy his daughter's spiritual powers. He
might ask the government to extend its accommodation to include
his beliefs by devising a different identification system for all recipients, not just certain members of his own family. This would be an
ordering claim, but the only significant impact of acceding to the
request would be to increase the cost and perhaps the inconvenience of the identification program.
In cases where the government can accommodate the claimant
with only an increase in cost or inconvenience, the balance is
strongly in favor of the claimant. The Supreme Court has insisted
that cost and inconvenience alone are not sufficiently compelling to
meet the strict scrutiny standard. 55 7 There is, in other words, no
point at which cost in an absolute sense-a certain quantity of
money--constitutes a sufficient government interest to justify discriminating between religions. The government has no compelling
interest in simply having any particular amount of money.
Cost does, nonetheless, play a role in the courts' assessment of
the government's interest. The "least restrictive means" branch of
strict scrutiny requires that the government show that there is no
alternative method that it could employ in furthering the objectives
of its program that would provide more equal treatment for the
claimant's religion. This requirement must, however, be qualified
to some extent by the cost of the alternative. There is often a less
restrictive means available, but it may entail great expense. 558 At
some point, the expense becomes so large that accommodation is
not a realistic alternative. In particular, the cost of accommodating
the claimant could become so high that the government would be
justified in abandoning either the underlying program at issue, or
the general process of accommodation. For example, in the above
557
558

See L. TRiBE, supra note 209, § 14-13 n.40.

Cf Clark, supra note 515, at 331 (cost maybe in loss of efficiency);John Hart Ely,
FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in FirstAmendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1185 (1975) ("a more perfect fit involves some added
cost"); Galanter, supra note 515, at 281 (state may have a compelling interest in avoidance of expense and administrative inconvenience); Note, Developments in the Law: Equal
Protection, 82 HIARv. L. REv. 1065, 1102 (1969) (any alternative classification must be
administratively feasible).
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hypothetical, if it became too expensive to identify welfare recipients through some means that would satisfy Roy's objections, the
government might decide not to accommodate anyone, or it might
abandon the welfare program altogether. The state will have a compelling interest in avoiding those costs if: first, the high costs of
accommodation make it reasonable to discontinue the general accommodation or the underlying program; 55 9 second, (as we are assuming), 560 the state has a compelling interest in accommodating
religious believers; and third, the program itself serves a compelling
state interest. Note that it is the interest in certain policies or programs that is compelling, rather than the interest in money, but as a
practical matter the two are related.
Obviously, the cost of accommodating an exemption claim will
depend, to some extent, on the number of people who share the
claimant's religious beliefs. The cost of providing the exemption
increases as the number of potential claimants increases. 5 6' The
same is generally not true of ordering claims: the cost of changing a
particular policy or program is usually independent of the number
of people who share the claimant's religious objections to that policy. The result is that, for exemption claims, the government's interest becomes stronger as the number of people whose religious
beliefs are offended grows. This seemingly paradoxical result is
softened by two considerations. First, as a rough generalization, if a
large number of persons share a particular religion, they have a
greater ability to use the political process to ensure their inclusion
in any accommodation. Hence, they have less need for the constitutional protection against religious. discrimination. 56 2 Second, economies of scale may reduce the impact of increasing numbers of
claimants on the government's costs. Thus, an increase in the
number of potential exemption claimants may add little or no
weight to the government's interest.

559 It is the cost of accommodation in proportion to the total cost of the program
that would determine the reasonableness of continuation. Accommodation costs would
have to rise to a substantial portion of the total costs to justify abandonment of the
program. See Pepper, supra note 554, at 335. In addition, such costs may have to exceed
some absolute minimum. If a program is very inexpensive, then even a doubling of its
cost might not be sufficient if the total is still quite low. The question of reasonableness
is, of course, one for the Court and not merely for the government. The government

cannot be allowed to "blackmail" the Court into sacrificing a claimant's free exercise
rights by threatening to terminate an essential government progam if it is forced to pay
the costs of accommodation.
560
See supra text accompanying notes 550-51.
561
See Clark, supra note 515, at 332.
562
See J. ELY, supra note 555, at 78; Galanter, supra note 515, at 291; Pepper, supra
note 554, at 313-14.
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2. Interference with Substantive Government Policy, but Without
Concrete Impact on ParticularThird Persons
A somewhat more serious government interest is at stake when
the change necessary to accommodate a religious claimant will require some sacrifice of the government's substantive policy goals.
Ordering claims may often entail such a change in policy. For example, assume that Congress passes a law ordering that the National
Endowment for the Arts not fund art that offends the religious sensibilities of a majority of Americans. A claimant could assert that the
government is discriminating against religions that find other government-funded activities religiously offensive. The claimant might
ask, for example, for the cancellation of the NASA space program
on the grounds that exploration of space is disrespectful of the gods
and will cause them to punish humanity-including the claimantby depriving all persons of healing powers. The only way the government could accommodate this claim would be to abandon the
space program, but that would sacrifice the policy objectives that the
program serves (for example, improvements in technology and expansion of scientific knowledge). On the other hand, such policyrelated losses are not unfairly concentrated upon specific third parties; rather they are general social burdens borne by all members of
society.
Exemption claims may also endanger substantive policy goals.
When the policy behind the government activity is to create a certain result in every case--i.e., to prevent nonmedical drug use by all
persons-then every additional exemption detracts somewhat from
the achievement of that policy. The size of such a loss in effectiveness varies with the number of exemptions, but in most cases involv5 63
ing religious exemptions it would seem to be relatively small.
Exemptions may create a more severe interference with substantive policy when uniformity is essential to the overall implementation of a policy. 5 64 For example, a court could reasonably refuse
565
See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Quaring v.
Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1127 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'dsub nom. Jenson v. Quaring, 472 U.S.
478 (1985) (per curiam); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394 P.2d 813, 819, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (1964).
564
The case of Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), in which the Supreme
Court upheld disciplinary action against an orthodox Jewish officer who violated Air
Force regulations by wearing his yarmulke while on duty and indoors, is not an example
of this use of the policy of uniformity. The Air Force justified its regulations by referring
to the need for uniform dress. It distinguished between visible signs of religious affiliation, which it refused to accommodate, and invisible signs, which it did accommodate.
The majority in Goldman, however, did not assess the need for uniformity and did not
consider whether visible signs interfered with that need more than invisible ones. Instead, the Court simply deferred to the judgment of the military that such a need existed
and would be threatened by an exemption in this case. See id at 509 ("The desirability
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to allow exemptions from the tax laws because exemptions pose a
special threat to the substantive policy of providing funds for the
government in a manner that is both effective and fair. 56 5 The need
for uniformity in taxation arises because of strong incentives for
fraudulent exemption claims; everyone can be expected to want to
escape paying taxes.5 6 6 This uniformity argument will, however,
generally be foreclosed to government when facing a claim of religious discrimination. If the government has chosen voluntarily to
relinquish uniformity in the name of accommodating some religions, it should not be permitted to offer the need for uniformity as
67
a reason for refusing to accommodate others. 5
3. Impact on Concrete Interests of Idntifiable Persons
Greater weight falls on the government's side of the balance
when the accommodation the claimant requests is distinguished
from permissible accommodations on the ground that it would interfere with a particular third party's interests. Exemptions from the
criminal laws often create this type of interference. For example,
the government could provide exemptions, for ceremonial religious
use, to laws prohibiting the ingestion of peyote. If it did, then a
claimant might allege discrimination unless the government exempted him from laws that prohibit a religious rite involving the
5 68
handling of poisonous snakes in the presence of third parties.
Religious exemptions to a health or building code could also
threaten the safety of persons who live or work in the vicinity.
Ordering claims may also have a detrimental effect on the interof dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and
they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional
judgment."); id at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The Court "adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment rights a subrational-basis standard-absolute,
uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment of military authorities.' "). The decision in that case rests, therefore, on deference to the military and not on any independent judgment about the policy of uniformity.
565 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982); Giannella, supra note 552,
at 1409. But cf.Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for churches against an establishment clause challenge).
566 See Pepper, supra note 554, at 327; cf Choper, supra note 485, at 698-99 (arguing
that draft avoidance could become an incentive for religious conversion).
567 This principle applies unless the refused accommodation implicates a uniformity
concern absent from the allowed accommodation. Under the new approach in Smith,
and in the absence of deference to the military, this would have been the question in
Goldman-whether the Air Force had a compelling need for uniformity that justified providing an exemption for invisible religious clothing but refusing to allow visible religious
clothing. See supra note 564 (discussing the Goldman case).
568 See, e.g., Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975). There is an important
distinction between third parties who are members of the religion and knowingly consent to the risk imposed upon them, and third parties who are uninformed or outsiders.
See Clark, supra note 515, at 361; Galanter, supra note 515, at 282-83.
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ests of third parties. For example, the government might seek to
protect historically significant churches by maintaining them with
public monies. The Navajo might then argue that this special protection must be extended to their places of worship to avoid discrimination. To accommodate that request, the government would
be required to lower the water level of Lake Powell reservoir so as to
reverse the flooding of Navajo sacred sites. 56 9 If the government
lowered the water level sufficiently to achieve this objective, however, a severe water shortage in the many cities and towns served by
5 70
the reservoir would result.
Practical, nonspeculative, and serious harm to the interests of
identifiable third parties provides a strong reason to accept the government's argument against extending its policy of accommodation
to a particular claimant. While such harm may not be as large or
widespread as the damage to substantive policies discussed in the
second category, it contains an element of unfairness that adds to its
urgency. When accommodation of a religious claim creates a loss in
substantive policy effectiveness, it requires all citizens of a particular
jurisdiction to bear an incremental share of the burden. 57 1 This request is fair because all share in the benefits of the religious freedom
that is thereby protected. 5 72 But when accommodation imposes a
loss on identifiable third parties, a small number of persons are
asked to bear the whole cost of protecting the religious freedom that
all enjoy. 5 73 A harm to particular third parties, therefore, adds considerably to the weight of the state interest.
4.

Interference with the ConstitutionalRights of Third Persons

Perhaps the most weighty reason the government can offer for
569

See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).

570

See id

This argument assumes that the purpose of social policy is to promote the general welfare. This is a common, but by no means uncontroversial, assumption. See, e.g.,
571

Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model:

An Application to ConstitutionalTheory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 476-77 (1988). If some other
model of legislation is adopted-such as interest group pluralism-the frustration of
certain substantive policies might be seen as creating a loss focused on one or a few
identifiable groups, rather than a loss spread more generally over the population.
572
Even those who are nonreligious, and do not receive the direct protection of the
free exercise clause, share in the indirect benefit of living in a society in which others
may freely practice their religions.
573
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation"Law, 80 H.av. L. REv. 1165, 1165-66 (1967) (quoting from
LEONARD TRELAWNEY HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 41 (1964)). This unfairness could be mitigated by government-sponsored compensation and more widespread redistribution of
the burden. In some cases, however, no such redistribution is possible. For example,
when a conscientious objector is exempted from the draft, some other particular person, who would not otherwise have been drafted, must serve.
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refusing to accommodate a particular religious practice is that such
accommodation will interfere with the exercise of a constitutional
right by a third party. This problem arises most dearly in ordering
claims that require the government to impose a religious observance on persons other than the claimants. For example, a group
might argue that if the government seeks to accommodate religious
beliefs in its running of public schools by releasing children during
the school day for religious observances, then the government must
also accommodate their beliefs by imposing mandatory prayer in the
public schools. Such mandatory prayer would violate the free exercise rights of schoolchildren subject to it, 57 4 in addition to establish5 75
ing religion.
It is also possible, although much less likely, that accommodating an exemption claim might interfere with the constitutional rights
of a third party. The difficulty in finding a constitutional violation in
exemption cases is the state action requirement. An exemption simply allows a private party to practice his religion. That practice
might interfere with the ability of a third party to speak, for example, but in that case the restriction on speech would normally be
attributed not to state action but to the action of the private believer. The Constitution would not apply at all in the absence of
state action. 5 76 Only if the government's grant of the exemption
would be sufficient to hold the state responsible for the limits imposed on the third party could an exemption claim create this most
serious kind of concern.
Bob Jones University v. United States 5 77 provides an example of an
exemption claim where the state action requirement might be met.
In that case, the Court found that the free exercise clause did not
require the government to make an exception to its general tax policy by providing tax-exempt status to private schools that practiced
racial discrimination, even if the school believed its religion re574 Although there is no case specifically on point, several related holdings indicate
that mandatory prayer in the public schools would violate the free exercise clause. The
Court has suggested that the establishment and free exercise clauses overlap in that
both prevent the government from imposing a particular religious practice on those who
disagree with the practice, while the establishment clause goes further and prevents government endorsement of religion even when all participation is voluntary. See School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221, 222 (1963). Similarly, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961)-in which the Court held that a religious oath for public office was
unconstitutional-the Court failed to specify which clause was violated and, indeed,
cited previous cases involving both clauses. In any event, mandatory prayer (at least if it
involved verbal or symbolic expression) would surely violate the free speech clause of
the first amendment. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
575 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
576 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
577 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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quired racial discrimination. 5 78 Assume that the government provided tax-exempt status to religious organizations that violated
other limits on charitable status-in other words, allowed them religious exemptions from those requirements. The refusal to exempt
Bob Jones University from this requirement could then be seen as
religious discrimination. Nonetheless, the government might justify
that discrimination by showing that an exemption from this particular requirement would involve an intrusion on a third party's constitutional rights. Government support of such private activity
through subsidization by tax exemption might create the nexus necessary to a finding of state action. 5 79 If the state action requirement
were met, then the racially discriminatory practices of the school
would violate the equal protection rights of black students. 580
The analysis of the government's interest is, in reality, more
complex and less determinate than the simple listing of categories
might suggest. The government must demonstrate that it has made
a good-faith effort to discover means of accommodation and that all
such means fail for one or more reasons such as those above. The
possible permutations of such reasons are, of course, far too numerous for the government or the courts to examine completely. As a
result, the analysis can never be exhaustive. 58 1 In addition, the compelling state interest test requires the government to prove a negative: that there is no alternative course of action that is both less
discriminatory to this claimant and not opposed by a compelling
state interest. Such a proof must always be inductive-and thus not
logically certain-because the issue is an empirical rather than an
analytical one. The analysis is, therefore, necessarily both incomplete and uncertain.
Because the suggested list of categories only refines the compelling state interests standard, it will not eliminate the inherent uncertainty and incompleteness of that analysis. It will, however,
provide greater clarity to the process of determining when a sufficient degree of completeness or certainty has been attained.
See id at 602-04.
579 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). The Court specifically
declined to decide this issue in Bob Jones, relying on the power of the I.R.S. to deny such
an exemption rather than on any constitutional duty for it to do so. See Bob Jones, 461
U.S. at 599 n.24.
580 The argument in text is not the basis for the Court's decision in BobJones. The
Court in that case found that even if the school had a prima facie free exercise claim, the
government's substantive policy of preventing racial discrimination in education was a
compelling state interest that could not be served in any less restrictive way. See Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 599 n.24.
581
Cf STEvEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE
(1990) (discussing the eclectic method).
578
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Greater precision in this process should allow courts and legislatures to feel more confident that they have considered enough of
the issues, and that they have done so in a consistent enough way, to
justify what is an inevitably imperfect conclusion.
C. Establishment Clause Problems
The strict scrutiny standard adequately addresses the government's interest in extending discriminatory accommodation to different religious groups, but it ignores the policies under-lying a
related constitutional mandate: the establishment clause. The Smith
Court invited at least some special accommodation of religion by
the legislature. Such accommodation, however, always presents potential conflicts with establishment clause doctrine requiring that
government action have neither the purpose nor the primary effect
58 2
of advancing religion', and that it avoid excessive entanglement.
Establishment clause case law distinguishes between allowed and
forbidden accommodation, but the line between the two has never
583
been clear and shows no signs of improvement.
In its most elaborate recent exposition of this distinction, the
Court upheld the exemption of religious organizations from Title
VII's ban on religious discrimination in employment. The exemption, the Court explained, was an example of "benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference." 58 4 Addressing the requirement that all laws
have a primary secular purpose, the Court held that a secular purpose need not be unrelated to religion. It is a permissible secular
purpose to "alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions" as long as that alleviation does not become promoSee Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
582
602, 612-13 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although the Supreme Court has lately been vacillating on the importance of the
Lemon test, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984), there is no reason to believe
that purpose and effect will no longer be relevant to the establishment clause analysis.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding state statute requiring
teaching of "creation science" unconstitutional on grounds that it had no secular purpose); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of state assistance program because primary effect was not to aid
religion but to help individual students).
583
Compare Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding an exemption for religious
organizations from Title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination on the
basis of religion) with Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(striking down an exemption from state sales tax for periodicals published or distributed
by a religion).
584 Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
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tion.5 85

Similarly, on the requirement that a law have a primary
secular effect the Court held: "A law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very
purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must
be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through
its own activities and influence." 58 6 The critical question, in other
words, is whether the purpose or effect of the law can better be understood as removing government-imposed obstacles to the practice of religion-which is allowed-or as throwing the weight of
government support behind religion-which is not allowed.
Unfortunately, as Justice O'Connor pointed out,58 7 many laws
can easily be characterized in either way, depending on how the
Court characterizes the status quo ante. Thus, the exemption from
Title VII could be merely removing a government obstacle because
the status quo ante is employer freedom from, all regulation; or it
could be government support because the status quo ante is a universal ban on discrimination in employment. As a practical matter, this
unclarity is likely to disadvantage nonvolitionalist religions because
the Court is likely to import its volitionalist bias into its attempts to
distinguish between government support and government obstruction.
Suppose, for example, that the government yielded to Roy's demand that it not use a social security number with regard to his
daughter. In language that could have been borrowed from the establishment clause standard, the Bowen Court described this demand
as an interference with internal government activity and an insistence that the "[g]overnment itsel... behave in ways that the indi588
vidual believes will further his or her spiritual development.
The Court further denied that in the Constitution's frame of reference, the government's use of a social security number placed any
burden on Roy's conduct. In other words, because of its volitionalist bias, the Court will miss the fact that many ostensibly internal
government activities are obstacles to nonvolitionalist practice. As a
result, it will construe accommodation of that practice as govern58 9
ment sponsorship of, or participation in, a particular religion.
Such a view of the range of permissible accommodations would
Id at 335.
Id- at 337 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
588 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
589 On the other hand, Lyng specifically invited Congress to grant special protection
to Indian sacred sites. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 453-54 (1988). Members of Congress have accepted the Court's invitation by introducing amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act that would do
exactly that. See S.1124, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. § 3, 135 CONG. REC. S6220 (1989).
585
586
587
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be as discriminatory, and as unconstitutional, as Bowen itself. But
legislative accommodation of nonvolitionalist practice might run
afoul of the establishment clause for a more legitimate reason: the
potentially far-reaching effects on how the government conducts its
business. However the Court manages to distinguish between permissible and forbidden accommodation, it stands to reason that
questions of degree will play a part. The more that nonvolitionalist
practices require truly extraordinary protection-for example,
draining Lake Powell-the likelier the Court is to find that protection unconstitutional. This general tendency seems quite legitimate: the establishment clause seeks to prevent the government
from promoting religion; the greater the protection granted, the
closer the government comes to promotion.
As a result, protecting certain nonvolitionalist practices may involve such massive disruption of government that the legislature is
not only constitutionally allowed to decline protection, it is constitutionally required to do so. Furthermore, the legislature may decline
such protection even if it is extending special treatment to other
religious practices, because it is surely a distinction of constitutional
magnitude that some accommodations are positively forbidden by
the Constitution, while others are not. Establishment clause doctrine, however, like free exercise clause doctrine, is very much in a
state of flux. Consequently, until the Court illuminates the murky
boundary between permissible and forbidden accommodation, it is
impossible to tell exactly which nonvolitionalist practices the legislature may accommodate and which it may not.
CONCLUSION

For over two decades, the Supreme Court has negotiated a precarious path between the claims of religious minorities and the
needs of a bureaucratic government. Last Term, this path dramatically shifted course when the Court abandoned more than twentyfive years of protection of religious practices from facially neutral
laws. The Court seems to have forgotten, or stopped caring, that in
a world of vastly expanding state power and activity, if religious
freedom is not protected from incidental infringement by facially
neutral laws, government may gradually marginalize religion in the
lives of most Americans. 5 90 The Smith case, with its disingenuous
descriptions of precedent, represents the triumph of bureaucratic
concerns-concerns about ease of application and orderly ruleboundedness-over the protection of religious freedom.
590 See L. TRIBE, supra note 209, § 14-8; Galanter, supra note 515, at 268, 279; Giannella, supra note 552, at 1383.
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But if Smith is a disaster for religion generally, it is a special
calamity for nonvolitionalist religions. When viewed in the context
of Bowen and Lyng, Smith is revealed as the latest step in a retreat
from constitutional protection, a retreat motivated by fear of
nonvolitionalist beliefs. The process began with the short and cryptic opinion in Bowen, in which the Court held that no prima facie free
exercise claim existed because the government action at issue was a
matter of "internal procedure[]" within the Constitution's volitionalist "frame of reference." 5 9 1 It progressed to the more developed
opinion in Lyng, in which the Court explained that it would refuse to
acknowledge any burden on religious practice where the government action neither coerces the individual into violating his religious beliefs nor penalizes him for practicing his religion.5 92 The
retreat culminated in Smith, where, giving up the effort to cast out
only nonvolitionalist claims, the Court completely abandoned pro5 93
tection for all religious practices from facially neutral laws.
The type of claim that seems to have prompted this constitutional rout is not merely some poorly phrased version or accidental
mutation of a more traditional free exercise claim. These claims are
the result of a religious vision of reality different from the volitionalist vision that dominates modern American culture. Moreover, this
alternative vision played a significant role in the religious views of
many of those involved with the drafting and passage of the first
amendment. Indeed, nonvolitionalist beliefs conceive the universe
to be, in a sense, more religiously charged than does the mainstream today. Because the individual's own free choices are not the
only source of religious consequences, any event, object, or actor
could be fraught with inherent significance-rocks, trees, canyons,
floods, hurricanes, or rainbows. Even the government's actions-in
building a road or using a social security number-may directly
cause religious effects on nonvolitionalist believers. When the
Court turns its face away from nonvolitionalist beliefs, it excludes an
entire theological category of believers from the full protection of
the Constitution.
And the Court has turned its face away. Smith restored the superficial neutrality that was destroyed by Bowen's and Lyng's blatant
discrimination against nonvolitionalist beliefs. But Smith relegates
all religions to the position of supplicants before the legislatures.
Protection from facially neutral laws is no longer a constitutional
mandate but is instead a matter of populist politics. Such an ar591

See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700-01 & 701 n.6.

592 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
593 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Servs. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600
(1990).
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rangement is hardly neutral. It disadvantages minority religions, religions with unusual or unfamiliar beliefs, and religions whose
practices may require large-scale or intrusive accommodation.
Nonvolitionalist religions are all three.
The restrictions adopted by the Court in Bowen and Lyng represent the creation of a religious orthodoxy through the very constitutional mechanism intended to prevent one. The Court's position in
Smith effectively invites legislatures to adopt their own orthodoxies.
The Constitution has, of course, foreclosed that option to legislatures, but the only doctrinal mechanism that remains to enforce that
constitutional prohibition is the ban on discrimination between religions. Larson's mandate of neutrality is all that stands between minority religions, particularly nonvolitionalist religions, and the
vicissitudes and expediencies of the political process.
Larson-style neutrality is, unfortunately, not a very stable foundation for religious freedom. Comparing the treatment of different
religions to determine whether the state is behaving "neutrally" is a
formidable task. If taken to its logical conclusion, it could force the
Court into the impossible undertaking of determining whether the
government is treating each and every religious option, on the
whole, in a neutral fashion, compared to every other religious option. This analysis would require some notion of meta-neutrality,
some Archimedean point of neutrality, from which to assess the impact, not just of particular government actions, but of whole
schemes of government. And, of course, as the scope of government activity grows, larger and larger areas of social life would come
within the scheme to be assessed. Such a sweeping analysis is theoretically impossible (because no absolute Archimedean point
exists), 594 practically impossible (because of the size of the undertaking), and fundamentally undesirable as a judicial undertaking
even if it were possible.
Absent such a sweeping analysis, however, it is not clear that
"facial neutrality" will actually protect nonvolitionalist religions
from discrimination. It is far too easy for a legislature to simply offer protection and accommodation only on those issues and in those
activities of concern to majority religions. Some protection will inevitably trickle down to less popular religions, but, because nonvolitionalist beliefs are so fundamentally different, they are not likely to
enjoy many crumbs from the volitionalists' table. One would think
that the concern about such discrimination might incline the Court
to reconsider the more protective Sherbert approach. The majority
in Smith, however, failed to appreciate that if the religion clauses
594 See Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine,
72 CAMF. L. REv. 817, 824 (1984).
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mean anything, they mean that discrimination against minority religions is not simply an "unavoidable consequence of democratic
government." 5 95
The Court's failure to take such discrimination seriously is,
above all, a failure of the sensitivity that might have led to greater
awareness or imagination. It is surely no coincidence that all of the
cases in which this retreat took place involved American Indians.
The Court finds the Indians' religions-as it found the Mormon religion in the early free exercise cases-so aberrant as to be dispensable.5 96 If the Court had been more sensitive to, or had felt more
personally moved by, the loss of these religions, that experience
might have awakened the imagination necessary to see that the neutrality demanded by the Constitution was violated in these cases,
and will likely be violated by legislatures in the future. The Court is
fond of repeating a reassuring truth: In the religious realm, the
Constitution knows no orthodoxy. Like a small stone cast into the
American cultural pond, religious liberty gradually created ripples,
and the concentric rings of religious pluralism first reached all Protestants, then all Christians, then the "Judaeo-Christian tradition."
The Court, in Lyng and Bowen, froze this ripple effect and prevented
religious liberty from reaching beyond volitionalist beliefs. Then, in
Smith, it retreated still further, putting back at risk all unpopular religions. But we are no more a volitionalist nation than we are a Protestant one, a Christian one, a Judaeo-Christian one, or a generally
religious one-and we never have been. In this century, the Court
at last sought to grant religious liberty to the later immigrants to
this country. Yet in the last several Terms, it has refused to extend
the same liberty to the earliest inhabitants. We hope that the Court
will develop the courage and perspicacity to correct this error
before some of the oldest religious traditions in America are irretrievably lost.
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Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1606.
Cf id. at 1603 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)).

